

THE
MINUTES
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE

APPOINTED BY THE
HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS

TO INQUIRE INTO THE
MATTERS RELATING TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE
REVENUE OF THE
INDIAN TERRITORIES
AND TO REPORT
THEREON TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS
IN THE YEAR 1874

BY
JAMES G. BLADEN, C. S. D.
1874



THE REPORT of the Committee appointed by the Honourable House of Commons, to enquire into the State of the East India Company, and of the British Affairs in the EAST-INDIES, which also contains the authentic Papers and Letters referred to in the MINUTES, is in the Press, and will speedily be published.

[Price Two Shillings]

T H E M I N U T E S O F T H E S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E

A P P O I N T E D B Y T H E
H O U S E O F C O M M O N S t o e n q u i r e i n t o E A S T -
I N D I A A F F A I R S .

Lunæ 27^o die Aprilis 1772.
Colonel BURGOYNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Vane,	Sir Wm. Meredith,
Mr. Ald. Trecothick,	Mr. Strachey,
Sir G. Elliot,	Gov. Johnstone,
Mr. Pulteney,	Mr. Hotham,
Sir J. Turner,	Mr. Ongley,
Ld. Geo. Germain,	Mr. Sutton.

Mr. Moreton, from the East-India House, (according to order) presented several books and papers.

Richard Becher, Esq; *interrogated*.

Q. In what situation were you in Bengal in December, 1756?

A. A Member of the Council and Committee.

Q. When did you join Admiral Watson?

A. I met him in Ballasore road.

Q. What time was Dacca taken?

A. We surrendered 27 June, 1756. I was Chief of the Factory.

Q. What passed, after you joined Admiral Watson, to the retaking of Calcutta?

A. At the time we were at Fulta there were regular proceedings kept. I joined the President and Gentlemen of Fulta some time in August, 1756. Soon after this we had intelligence that Admiral Watson, with troops from Madras, was coming to our assistance. When it was judged that they might be nearly expected, the Council deputed Mr. Watts, myself and Mr. Macket, to meet the Admiral in Ballasore road. We did not meet him till December. He did not arrive before.

Q. By whom was Calcutta retaken?

A. Mr. Watson and the men of war proceeded up the river; troops were landed; but whether Admiral Watson or the forces took it I cannot answer.

Q. Where was you, when it was retaken?

A. I was on board a ship that was following the squadron. The ships assisted in taking of it.

Q. Do you think, if Admiral Watson had not been there, you would have ever retaken Calcutta?

A. I cannot answer, I am no judge. The Moors left Calcutta the 2d of January, 1757. There was no capitulation.

Q. What number of troops landed?

A. About 400 or 450, and 17 or 1800 seapoys.

Q. By whom was Calcutta taken possession of?

A. It was delivered over by Admiral Watson to Mr. Drake.

Q. Do you remember the first idea of setting up Meer Jaffier and deposing Serajah Dowla?

A. About May, 1757; but can't be positive.

Q. Do you remember that any money was stipulated to be given to the Select Committee, if that was brought about?

A. My situation then confined me to Calcutta during 1757, 1758 and 1759, and therefore I cannot give any answers about transactions out of Calcutta. Some time after Mr. Watts, who was the Agent of the

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Company at Muxadabad, wrote word that Meer Jaffier would make some consideration to the army, navy and others that should be instrumental in promoting his advancement to the Subahship by way of donation in case of success.

Q. Whom do you mean by others?

A. As I understood it at that time, it was Mr. Watts himself who was upon the spot at Muxadabad. I cannot recollect who was upon the spot besides. I first mentioned the reasonableness and propriety that the Gentlemen of that Committee who really set the whole machine in motion should be likewise considered on that occasion, and in consequence Mr. Watts was wrote to.

Q. To what effect was he wrote to?

A. To the effect that I have mentioned; that as there were to be donations to the army, navy, &c. it was reasonable the other Gentlemen should be considered. Mr. Watts was wrote to accordingly, but the letter does not appear upon the public proceedings. I should conclude that on the public service every thing is to be entered. This letter was not so considered. I speak of the Select Committee. It consisted of the President Mr. Drake, Col. Clive, Mr. Watts, Major Kilpatrick, Mr. Charles Manningham and myself. The Committee was appointed by the Court of Directors. Col. Clive was took in as second. So far from any particular sum being stipulated to my knowledge that I did not know any thing of the sum till some time after Meer Jaffier was established in the Subahship. Some time after this there was an account sent to the Committee that Meer Jaffier thought proper to make presents to some particular Gentlemen. The Company wrote word that they should not interfere in any private donations by the Nabob to the Company's servants. What I know of was to the Governor two lacs and 80000 rupees; to Col. Clive the same, and to the rest of the Gentlemen two lacs and 40 rupees each. The Admiral, I always understood was considered as Commander in Chief of the Navy in a separate sum, which I don't know. I esteemed Col. Clive as a Member of the Committee, and I don't esteem Mr. Watson as belonging to it. I believe one Gentleman of the Council in Bengal, Mr. Bottom, did send a small sum to the Representatives of Admiral Watson, but don't know what it was. I know of no stipulation for particular sums. Each of the Council that was not a Member of the Committee received a lac of rupees.

The Council consisted of six or seven who were not of the Committee. An account was sent in writing. It was a letter directed to the Governor. I do not know by whom it was signed, but believe it was by Mr. Watts, Col. Clive and Mr. Manningham. I considered it as a private letter, and therefore apprehend it was not entered. I know of no other private donations. I have indeed heard of some, but cannot recollect from whom. I never discoursed with Mr. Watts upon the subject.

Q. Do you know any thing of two treaties with Meer Jaffier of the same date in the course of the negotiation, one real and the other fictitious?

A. I should apprehend that the only treaties should stand publickly on the Company's records. While this affair was upon the anvil, Mr. Watts employed a Black Merchant residing at Calcutta (Omichund) who insisted on having no less a sum than 20 lacs of rupees from Meer Jaffier in case of success. Mr. Watts represented to the Gentlemen in Calcutta that Meer Jaffier was so averse to allowing that sum to Omichund, that he would rather all treaties should be broke off than he should consent to it, or something to that effect, and represented that he himself believed that Omichund was acting a double part, and would deceive both the English and Jaffier. It consequence of these representations it was judged by the Gentlemen that Omichund was no way meriting it, and therefore they did not insist upon it; but that it was necessary for the security and safety of the Company to keep Omichund from the knowledge of it. In consequence of which two papers were transmitted to Mr. Watts, in one of which Omichund was mentioned, and in the other not, with a design to prevent the ill consequences that might have ensued, if Omichund had got a notion that he was not to have the money. I believe the two papers were signed by Admiral Watson and the Gentlemen of the Committee.

Q. Did Admiral Watson sign the fictitious agreement?

A. I think it was sent to him to be signed, but don't know whether he signed it or not. I do not recollect whether they were transmitted to Admiral Watson by writing, or by a messenger, or by whom.

Q. Did you at the time hear of Admiral Watson's scrupling or refusing to sign?

A. I do not recollect that I did.

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Q. Do you know any thing of the additional article or treaty with Jaffier Ally Khan?

A. I believe that or something similar. I don't recollect the circumstance of transmitting the articles to the Directors. I think I heard that Omichund insisted upon the sum of five plent upon all the late Nabob's treasures exclusive of the twenty lacks, and threatened to betray the whole negotiation, if his demands were not complied with. I heard that Omichund had insisted. Mr. Watts represented the apprehensions he had of Omichund's betraying the negotiation, if he was not kept in the dark. I know of no letter from Mr. Watts saying he believed the Nabob's treasures amounted to 40,000,000, and therefore dissuading the Committee from agreeing to the giving five per cent. upon that sum, but rather to give a specific sum. It is twenty-nine years since I first left England in the Company's service.

(Withdrew.)

Mr. Sykes (a Member) *interrogated*.

In 1757 I was stationed at the Factory called Cassim Bussar in Council. I don't know particularly the terms demanded by Omichund; but being on a visit to Mr. Watts I found him under great anxiety. He took me aside and told me that Omichund had been threatening to betray them to Serajah Dowlah, and that he would have them all murdered that night, unless he would give him some assurances that the sum promised by Mr. Watts should be made good. Upon this visit Mr. Watts further said that he was under the greatest anxiety how to counteract the designs of Omichund. I can so far say that Omichund's conduct in the whole scene of that business was always suspected, and that he had spies upon Mr. Watts's conduct. I apprehend that nothing was reduced to paper at this time; but that it was only talked of by Omichund and Mr. Watts. I believe it was only a verbal promise. Serajah Dowlah was at Muxadavad at that time, and was visited frequently by Mr. Watts. I was in the service about 20 years, from 1749 to 1769.

Sir George Pococke *interrogated*.

I was present the latter end of March 1757 at Chandernagore. It surrendered to Admiral Watson. I did not enter the river Bengal with Admiral Watson. Chandernagore was garrisoned by officers and seamen; and in June a detachment of a Lieutenant, seven Midshipmen, and fifty private

men were sent to Lord Clive. The revolution could not certainly in my opinion have been brought about without the assistance of the King's ships then in the river. I do not recollect the number of the King's troops. I think there might be about 300. The Company's troops assisted in taking Chandernagore.

Lord Clive *interrogated*.

When I returned to England in 1755, the first time, the Court of Directors solicited me to go out again. They obtained for me his Majesty's Commission of Lieut. Col. and appointed me Deputy-Governor of Fort St. David, and to succeed to the government of Madras. But, before I went to my government, they wished me to undertake an expedition of great importance, provided Col. Scott, who had been strongly recommended by the Duke of Cumberland, did not chuse to undertake the expedition himself. The intent of the expedition was to join the Morattoes at Bombay, and in conjunction with them to attack the French in the Subah of the Decan, for which I carried out three companies of the King's artillery, and three or four hundred of the King's troops. When I arrived at Bombay, the beginning of 1756, there was a truce between the two nations, and Col. Scott was dead. I found there Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke, with his Squadron. It was thought that these troops should not lie idle, and that there was a fair opportunity of taking Ghereeah, a strong fort, possessed by an Eastern Prince (Angria), who upon all occasions greatly distressed the Company. I commanded the land forces on that expedition, and Mr. Watson commanded by sea. We succeeded, and the prize-money amounted to 150,000 l. Although I commanded the land-forces by virtue of my office, I shared only as a Captain of a man of war. Admiral Watson thought my case so hard, that he very generously offered to make my share equal to that of Sir George Pococke. I think myself as much obliged to him for the offer as if I had accepted it; but I declined the offer. After that I went to my deputy-government at Fort St. David about April 1756. In August 1756 I was soon called from thence to Madras on the news of the capture of Calcutta. It was long debated by the Council what force should be sent to retake Calcutta, and who should command it. It was decided in my favour, and the wish of every officer that I should go upon that expedition.

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In the beginning of October the troops were ready, and then were received on board Admiral Watson's squadron and other transports about 700 Europeans belonging to the Company and 1200 seapoys. There was likewise a detachment of 250 of Aldercron's regiment to serve as marines. We embarked about the 15th of October. After we had been some time at sea, a Council was held on board Admiral Watson's ship to settle the distribution of prize-money; and it was proposed that it should be settled upon the same plan as at Ghereah. I objected to it, because I thought it bore too hard upon the military, and would not consent to a division of prize-money upon any other division than of two equal parts; that one half should go to the military, and the other to the navy. This was agreed to. We arrived in Ballasore road early in December; and it was agreed that the squadron should go up the river at Calcutta; and I look upon that attempt to go up the river to be as daring and meritorious an attempt as ever was made in his Majesty's sea-service. We met with some slight obstructions, till we approached near Calcutta. When the squadron came within a few miles of Calcutta, I desired Admiral Watson would give orders for landing the Company's troops. Accordingly they were landed, and at the same time the ships went by water, the troops went by land. The garrison of Calcutta, upon the approach of the ships and land-forces, abandoned the Fort after a few shots fired by the squadron, and a few returned by the fort. When I entered the Fort at the head of the Company's troops, Captain Coote presented to me a commission from Admiral Watson, appointing him Governor of the Fort. I denied any authority Admiral Watson had to appoint an inferior officer in the King's service, Governor of the Fort, and told Captain Coote, if he disobeyed my orders, I would put him under an arrest. Captain Coote obeyed, and desired leave to acquaint Admiral Watson with these particulars. Upon which Admiral Watson sent Captain Speke to me, to know by what authority I took upon myself the command of the Fort. I answered—by the authority of his Majesty's commission, as being Lieutenant-Colonel and Commander in Chief of the Land forces. Captain Speke went on board with that message. He returned and brought for answer, that, if I did not abandon the Fort, I should be fired out. In answer, I said I could not answer for the consequences, but

that I would not abandon the Fort. Upon which Captain Latham was sent, and when the matter was talked over coolly, it was soon settled; for I told Captain Speke and Captain Latham repeatedly, if Admiral Watson would come and command himself, I had no manner of objection. Admiral Watson did come on shore. I delivered the keys of the garrison into his hands, and he delivered them to the Governor and Council of Calcutta. I was sent to Madras with a power independent of the Governor and Council of Calcutta. I commanded in Bengal as the King's Officer and the Company's both. The King's troops, when on shore, were under me. I was Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, by a commission from the Governor and Council of Madras on my setting out on that expedition. The Governor and Council of Madras looked on the government of Calcutta as annihilated. They thought, if I had not the independent command, the Governor and Council of Bengal would retain the troops which they thought necessary should return to Madras. I took the command as a military officer. The Governor and Council of Calcutta put their troops under my orders. When I came to examine into the state of the Fort, I found it not defensible. It had no ditch. The bastions did not deserve the name of bastions. The flat was surrounded by houses within forty yards of the walls, which commanded the fortifications. I suggested to the Governor and Council the necessity of destroying them, and making a ditch round the fort without delay; and I was convinced that a defensive war would prove destructive. I desired Admiral Watson would land the King's troops to reinforce those of the Company. Great part of the forces, that went out from Madras upon this expedition, were not arrived. The Admiral landed the ships forces, amounting to 250 men, and those added to the Company's, might make 700 Europeans, and 1200 seapoys. With these troops we took the field at about four miles from Calcutta. We encamped in a strong situation, and entrenched ourselves in expectation of Serajah Dowlah and his army, who were upon their march to Calcutta. Serajah Dowlah in a few days arrived, passed within about half a mile of our camp, and encamped his army at the back of Calcutta. At the same time that he was marching to his ground, he made offers of treaty, and intimated to me by letters that he wished to conclude a peace with the
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East-India Company. He encamped about six o'clock in the evening at the back of Calcutta. By this time the terror of his march had frightened away all the natives, and I saw, that, if something was not done, the squadron and land-forces would soon be starved out of the country. I sent Mr. Walsh and Mr. Scrafton to the Nabob about seven that evening. They returned about eleven and assured me they thought the Nabob was not sincere in his intentions for peace, and that he meant treachery. I went immediately on board Admiral Watson's ship, and represented to him the necessity of attacking the Nabob without delay; and desired the assistance of four or five hundred sailors to carry the ammunition and draw the artillery, which he assented to. The sailors were landed about one o'clock in the morning. About two the troops were under arms, and about four they marched to the attack of the Nabob's camp. It was my intention to have seized his cannon and attacked his headquarters; but, when day-light appeared, there arose so thick a fog, that it was impossible for the army to see three yards before them, which continued till we had marched through the whole army. I cannot ascertain the loss the enemy suffered; but it was reported to be very considerable. Our loss amounted to about 150 killed and wounded. We continued our march to the Fort, where the troops were allowed an hour to rest, and then ordered back to camp. In the evening Serajah Dowlah and his army decamped, and got to about eight or ten miles from us. He sent a letter to me and Admiral Watson, that he desired to treat with us. Upon which it was agreed to receive his proposals without delay, and a treaty was concluded which is upon the Company's records. The reason that it was not more advantageous than it was, was that we had just received advice, of a war with France; and the French had within the garrison of Chandernagore almost as many Europeans as we had in the field, and, if they had joined Serajah Dowlah before the conclusion of the peace, we must have been undone; for there wanted only some intelligent person to advise him not to fight at all, and we should have been ruined.

While this treaty was carrying on, the French sent a deputation to propose a neutrality. It was long debated whether a neutrality should be accepted of, Serajah Dowlah forbid us to attack the French and declared, if we did, he would become our enemy. I had no doubt but he would be-

come our enemy the first opportunity that offered, and that he meant with their assistance to drive us out of Bengal. He supplied them with money publicly, and sent 1500 men to be ready to give them their assistance. During this time we received a reinforcement of troops from Bombay. It was taken into consideration by the Committee whether we should undertake the attack of Chandernagore at the risk of displeasing the Nabob, and having his army to encounter. The Members of the Committee were Mr. Drake, myself, Major Kilpatrick and Mr. Becher—Mr. Becher gave it as his opinion for a neutrality—Major Kilpatrick for a neutrality, I gave my opinion for the attack of the place—Mr. Drake gave an opinion that nobody could make any thing of Major Kilpatrick: then asked me whether I thought the forces and squadron could attack Chandernagore, and the Nabob's army at the same time? I said I thought we could; upon which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw his opinion and to be of mine—we voted, Mr. Drake's no opinion at all, and myself and Major Kilpatrick being the majority, a letter was wrote to Admiral Watson desiring him to co-operate in the attack on Chandernagore—the land forces marched first and beset the place, made themselves masters of the outworks and erected two batteries, one about 120 yards of the walls of six 32 pounders and another of three 32 pounders, about 150 yards off the walls. — By this time the squadron came up the river, they surmounted difficulties that I believe no other ships could have done; and it is impossible for me to do the officers of the squadron justice upon that occasion—the place surrendered to them, and it was in a great measure taken by them, but I do believe that the place would have been taken by the army, if the squadron had not come up, it must have fallen into our hands, but not so soon I must say that I think, if the land forces and seapoys could have been landed in Calcutta, every event which has happened would have happened without the assistance of the fleet; after Chandernagore was resolved to be attacked, I repeatedly said to the Committee as well as to others that we could not stop there but must go further; that having established ourselves by force and not by consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour by force to drive us out again—we had numberless proofs of his intentions, many upon record, and I

did suggest to Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke as well as the Committee the necessity of a revolution—Mr. Watson and the Gentlemen of the Committee agreed upon the necessity of it, and the management of that revolution was with consent of the Committee left to Mr. Watts and me—Mr. Watts was resident at Muxadabad, he corresponded with me in cypher, and I sent the intelligence to the Governor and Committee, and Mr. Watson was always consulted but declined being a Member of that Committee. Great dissatisfaction arising among Serajah Dowlah's troops, a favourable opportunity offered and Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to place in the room of Serajah Dowlah, in consequence of which a treaty was formed, which among others consisted of the following articles, that 1,200,000*l.* should be given to the Company, 600,000*l.* to the European sufferers, 500,000*l.* to the navy and army—about 250,000*l.* to the natives of the place, and about 100,000*l.* to the Armenians, when this was settled I remember that Mr. Becher suggested to the Committee that he thought that Committee who managed the great machine of government was intitled to some consideration as well as the navy and army. In consequence of which Mr. Watts was wrote to upon the subject. But what that consideration was I never knew till after the battle of Plassey, and when I was informed of it by Mr. Watts, I thought it too much, and proposed that the Council should have a share in it.—The sums received, I believe, were as Mr. Becher has stated, upon this being known Mr. Watson applied, saying that he was entitled to a share in that money, I agreed in opinion with the Gentlemen when this application was made that Mr. Watson was not one of the Committee, but at the same time did justice to his services and proposed to the Gentlemen to contribute as much as would make his share equal to the Governor's and mine—about three or four consented to it; the rest would not, I sent the proportion of the share I had received some years ago—the heirs of Admiral Watson filed a bill in Chancery, wherein it was set forth as a right, I denied that right, but never had any objection to add my proportion to the rest, if that claim was withdrawn, the money was paid by installments in the same proportion as to the navy and army, I sent my proportion of the first installment to Mr. Pocock for Admiral Watson. The lawsuit dropt, and I have heard no more of it since

—at this time there were no covenants existing, the Company's servants were at liberty to receive presents, they always had received presents, and my idea of presents were as follows, when presents are received as the price of services to the nation, to the Company, and to that Prince who bestowed those presents, when they are not exacted from him by compulsion; when he is in a state of independance and can do with his money what he pleases, and they are not received to the disadvantage of the Company, I hold presents so received not dishonourable—but when they are received from a dependant Prince, when they are received for no services whatever, and when they are not received voluntarily, I hold the receipt of such presents dishonourable, I never made the least secret of the presents I have received—I acquainted the Court of Directors with it, and they who are my masters and were the only persons who had a right to object to my receiving those presents, approved of it.

His Lordship then read to the Committee the following extract from a printed pamphlet, intituled, "a letter to the proprietors of the East India stock from Lord Clive" together with two letters thereunto annexed. "Every thing being agreed on between Meer Jaffier and the Secret Committee: we marched the army to meet the Nabob whom we intirely defeated. His death followed soon after, and Meer Jaffier was in a few days in possession of the government and of a revenue of three millions and a half sterling per annum.—The one half of the Secret Committee being then present at the capital and a report made by the Nabob's Ministers of the state of the Treasury, it was settled that half the sum stipulated by treaty should be paid in three months and the other half in three years, all conditionally that we supported him in his government—the Nabob then agreeable to the known and usual custom of Eastern Princes made presents both to those of his own Court and to such of the English who by their rank and abilities had been instrumental in the happy success of so hazardous an enterprize, suitable to the rank and dignity of a great Prince; I was one among the many who benefited by his favour; I never sought to conceal it, but declared publickly in my letters to the Secret Committee of the India Directors that the Nabob's generosity had made my fortune easy, and that the Company's welfare was now my only motive for staying in India.

India. What injustice was this to the Company? They could expect no more than what was stipulated in the treaty. Or what injunction was I under to refuse a present from him who had the power to make me one, as the reward of honourable services? I know of none. I had surely myself a particular claim by having devoted myself to the Company's military service and neglected all commercial advantages. What reason can there be given or what pretence could the Company have to expect that I, after having risked my life so often in their service, should deny myself the only honourable opportunity that ever offered of acquiring a fortune without prejudice to them, who, it is evident, could not have had more by my having had less? When the Company had acquired a million and a half sterling, and a revenue of 100,000l. per annum from the success of their forces under my command, when ample restoration had been made to those whose fortunes had suffered by the calamity of Calcutta, and when individuals had in consequence of that success acquired large estates, what would the world have said, had I come home and rested upon the generosity of the present Court of Directors? It is well known to every Gentleman in Bengal that the honour of my country and the interest of the Company were the principles that governed all my actions, and that had I only taken the advantageous opportunities that presented themselves by my being Commander in Chief, and at the head of a victorious army, and what by the custom of that country I was intitled to, the Jaghire itself, great as it is, would have been an object scarce worth my consideration.

The City of Muxadavad is as extensive, populous, and rich as the City of London; with this difference that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than any in the last City. These as well as every other man of property made me the greatest offers, which nevertheless are usual upon such occasions, and what they expected would have been required; and had I accepted these offers, I might have been in possession of millions which the present Court of Directors could not have dispossessed me of. But preferring the reputation of the English nation; the interest of the Nabob and the advantage of the Company to all pecuniary considerations, I refused all offers that were made me, not only then, but to the last hour of my continuance

in the Company's service in Bengal, and do challenge friend or enemy to bring one single instance of my being influenced by interested motives to the Company's disadvantage or to do any act that could reflect dishonour to my country or the Company in any one action of my administration, either as Governor or Commanding Officer, I little expected ever to have had my conduct impeached, or to have received such treatment from the Court of Directors, especially after the many public and honourable testimonies of approbation I had received.

Copy of the Company's Letter to Colonel Clive, March 8, 1758.

S I R,

"Our sentiments of gratitude for the many great services you have rendered to this Company, together with the thanks of the General Court, have been hitherto conveyed through the channel of our general letters; but the late extraordinary and unexpected revolution in Bengal, in which you have had so great a share of action both in the cabinet and the field, merits our more particular regard, and we do accordingly embrace this opportunity of returning you our most sincere and hearty thanks for the zeal, good conduct and intrepidity, which you have so eminently exerted on this glorious occasion, as well as for the great and solid advantages resulting therefrom to the East-India Company. We earnestly wish your health may permit your continuance in India for such further term as will give you an opportunity of securing the foundation you have laid, as likewise to give your assistance in putting the Company's mercantile and civil affairs on a proper and advantageous footing, upon the plans now transmitted. For this purpose, as well as in consideration of your eminent services, we have appointed you Governor and President of Fort William in Bengal, and its dependencies in the manner mentioned in the general letter by this conveyance, to which we have annexed an additional allowance of 1000l. a year, as a testimony of our great regard for you."

The Company's General Letter to Bengal, March 8, 1758.

"In our letter of the 3d instant, we lamented the situation of the many unhappy people who had lost their property on the capture of Fort William, and had no relief from the treaty concluded with the late Nabob; in compassion to their sufferings, we recommended your applying to him on their behalf for relief, if you had the least pro-

probability of succeeding. It is with great pleasure we find, that the late happy revolution and your care, have procured what we had very little reason to expect from the late Nabob,—a Grant from the present Nabob of such large sums to make good the losses of the several inhabitants as we are satisfied are much more than sufficient to indemnify them, even with interest thereon. Although the Nabob gives the Company a crore of rupees, yet when the immense expence of maintaining the settlement at Tulta, the military charges of our troops from Fort St. George and Bombay, and the hazard those Presidencies have been exposed to, by drawing them off from thence, the charges of fortifications and rebuildings, replacing stores, increase of our garrison, the loss of a season's investments, if not more, and many other obvious particulars, are taken into the accounts, it will appear that the Company will still be considerable sufferers; it is highly reasonable, therefore, if the several inhabitants are paid out of the money stipulated in the treaty with the Nabob for that purpose, the full amount of their respective losses, together with interest thereon, that all the surplus should be applied to the Company's use. We shall expect to hear that you have acted in this manner, and that such surplus has been accordingly deposited in our cash; and we direct that you may observe this as a rule for your conduct in the distribution of any further sums of money on this account. We do not intend by this to break in upon any sums of money which have been given by the Nabob to particular persons, by way of free gift or gratuity for their services; it is the surplus of the sums, we mean, which are agreed to be paid by the Nabob in the 5th, 6th, and 7th articles of the treaty with him. It is thought proper here to acquaint you that such surpluses, whatever they are, we purpose to expend in such a manner, as will tend to the general utility and security of the settlement: They are therefore to be reserved for our farther orders; and you are hereby directed to transmit us for our information exact accounts of every person's loss, whether English or other inhabitants, on the late capture of Fort William, and what has been paid to each of them in particular, by way of indemnification for the same, out of the money granted by the Nabob for that purpose."

As to the fictitious treaty, when Mr. Watts had nearly accomplished the means of carrying the revolution into execution,

he acquainted me by letter that a fresh difficulty had started, that Omichund had insisted upon five per cent. upon all the Nabob's treasures, and thirty lacks in money, and threatened, if he did not comply with that demand, he would immediately acquaint Serajah Dowlah with what was going on and Mr. Watts should be put to death.—When I received this advice, I thought art and policy was warrantable in defeating the purposes of such a villain, and I myself formed the plan of the fictitious treaty to which the Committee consented. It was sent to Admiral Warton who objected to the signing of it, but to the best of my remembrance gave the gentleman who carried it (Mr Lushington) leave to sign his name upon it. I never made any secret of it; I think it warrantable in such a case, and would do it again a hundred times. I had no interested motive in doing it; I did it with a design of disappointing the expectations of a rapacious man—I never heard that Mr. Watts had made a promise to Omichund of any money directly or indirectly; when I was last abroad the same account was given which is entered in the public proceedings. Omichund was employed only as an agent to Mr. Watts, as having most knowledge of Serajah Dowlah's Court, and had a commission to deal with three or four more of the Court, Omichund's only chance of obtaining retribution was depending on this treaty, I don't believe that Omichund was personally known to Meer Jaffier but through Mr. Watts; when we marched, Meer Jaffier had promised that he and his son would join us with a large force at Cutwa, when we arrived there, we saw no appearance of force to join us, but received a letter from Meer Jaffier informing me that the Nabob had suspected his design and made him swear on the Koran that he would not act against him, and therefore he could not give us the promised assistance, but that, when we met Serajah Dowlah in the field, he would then act; at the same time Omichund received two or three letters from the Nabob's camp, that the affair was discovered and that Meer Jaffier and the Nabob were one. I was much puzzled, for I thought it extremely hazardous to pass a river which is only fordable in one place, march 150 miles up the country, and risk a battle, when, if a defeat ensued, we should not one man of us have returned to tell it; in this situation I called a Council of war, and the question I put was whether we should cross the river

river and attack Serajah Dowlah with our own forces or not, or wait for further intelligence? every Member gave their opinion against the attack till we had received further intelligence, except Captains Coote and Grant. It was the only Council of war ever I held in my life, and, if I had abided by that Council, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company; after about 24 hours mature consideration, I took upon myself to break through this opinion of the Council, and ordered the army to cross the river, I don't recollect any memorial from Capt. Coote on that occasion, nor, was he of rank sufficient at this time to have any influence upon my conduct; whatever I did upon that occasion I did without receiving advice from any one.

Adjourned till tomorrow.

Martis 28^o die Aprilis, 1772.

Colonel BURGON in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Vane,	Lord Falkstone,
Sir G. Elliott,	Mr. Pulteney,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Pitt,	Lord Clive,
Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Hotham,
Mr. Strachey,	Mr. Sutton.
Sir. W. Meredith,	

Mr. Moreton (pursuant to order) presented several books and papers.

Lord Clive.

Calcutta was taken by Serajah Dowla in June 1756, upon the pretence of a black merchant being protected by the English. Mr. Watts was about two or three months employed in the negotiation of the revolution. The correspondence was carried on entirely between myself and Mr. Watts: does not know exactly the amount of the treasure of Serajah Dowla, but believes about three or four millions. The final terms of the agreement between Meer Jaffer and Mr. Watts, were not agreed upon till a few days before the march of the army. Mr. Lushington was the person who signed Admiral Watson's name to the fictitious treaty by my order.

Mr. Walsh.

Myself and Mr. Lushington went together to Calcutta with the treaty. There is a letter from Colonel Clive, which was carried by me and Mr. Lushington from the French gardens, where the army then lay, to the Committee. Returned with the treaty signed in the evening. I don't recollect whether I went to Admiral Watson. Do not

now recollect the whole transaction. Only recollect that the treaties were sent and brought back again. My idea has always been, that Mr. Watson refused to sign the fictitious treaty, but permitted Mr. Lushington to do it for him. The fictitious treaty was called Lol Coggedge, from being wrote on red paper. I remember Omichund was very earnest in his enquiry after that particular paper, after the Nabob was put upon the Musnut.

Lord Clive.

All the letters in cypher that passed between Mr. Watts and myself, are not entered in the country correspondence, or any where else. I have got some of the letters, but don't know whether I have the letter where mention is made of Omichund's demand of five per cent. on the treasures, and thirty lacks. The fictitious treaty, to the best of my remembrance, stated thirty lacks and five per cent. upon the treasures; it might be fifty lacks for what I know. I believe the letter relating to the donation to the army and navy, is entered or mentioned in one of my letters. Don't recollect what I paid to the heirs of Admiral Watson.

I wrote to the Select Committee in England, stating donations to the navy and army, but not the donation to the Committee. I wrote a private letter to Mr. Payne, (then chairman) in which I mentioned the donation to the Committee. I mentioned in my general letter, that the Nabob's bounty had made my fortune easy. Know of no stipulation by Mr. Watts for fifty lacks, or any other sum, besides the donation to the army and navy, and Select Committee; if there was any such, it was without my consent or knowledge. I have been informed, that Serajah Dowla fled, and took shelter in a Faikair's house, whose nose and ears he had cut off upon a former occasion. There was a brother of Meer Jaffer's at Rajamaul, a small distance from the place where he took refuge. This Faikair sent immediate notice to his brother, that he had Serajah Dowla in his house, and he would keep him there till he could seize him. The Nabob's brother immediately set out with a few attendants and seized him. He was brought from thence to the city, and immediately put to death by Meerham, Meer Jaffer's son, as it is said without the father's knowledge. I knew nothing of it till the next day; when the Nabob made me acquainted with it, and apologized for his conduct, by saying that he had raised a mutiny among his troops. This

is all I know of the matter. Don't recollect whether Mr. Lushington brought the fictitious treaty back with Mr. Watson's name to it. To the best of my remembrance, Mr. Lushington told me, that Admiral Watson gave him leave to sign his name to the fictitious treaty. Don't recollect whether Mr. Watson's seal was put to the fictitious treaty. I believe that Mr. Watson's name and a seal was put to both the treaties, before they were dispatched to Mr. Watts. Am not certain whether Mr. Lushington signed it in my presence at Calcutta or the French gardens. Roy Dulub did not receive five per cent. on all the money paid, but on some of it, particularly not on that which was paid to the army and navy. He was one of the Nabob's Generals.

Q. What might be the particular value in money or jewels received by your Lordship, and such other gentlemen as you may recollect?

A. I received about 16 lacks of rupees clear, after deducting commission and all other articles; I received no jewels but all in money. I believe Mr. Watts might receive all together about eight lacks, Mr. Walsh about five lacks; there are three or four more, but can't recollect the sums: I think Mr. Scrafton had two lacks, but am not certain. These donations were given exclusive of the sums stipulated for the gentlemen of the committee, council, army and navy. The share I received, as commander in chief, amounted to about two lacks. Major Kilpatrick, I believe, had about three or four lacks, exclusive of the sum stipulated for the army and Committee. Mr. Lushington had something very trifling, about fifty thousand rupees; captain Grafty of Aldercron's regiment had one lack.

As to the thirteenth article of the treaty with Meer Jaffier, never recollected, till I was last in India, that there was a thirteenth article; twelve only appearing in the Directors books; I saw no more at the India-house, or in Mr. Scrafton's book. I then understood that particular article had been suppressed by Mr. Vansittart, in order, as I apprehend, that Mr. Vansittart might justify his proceedings in the second revolution, as the Company stood bound by that article in alliance with Meer Jaffier.

I acknowledge writing to the Directors on December 5, 1762, that there was no such article to the best of my knowledge.

Q. Whether these presents were paid at the time?

A. No—by installments.

Q. At what time did it become necessary for Mr. Vansittart to suppress the thirteenth article?

A. Upon the affair of the Dutch—the Court of Directors enquired whether there was a thirteenth article, and Mr. Vansittart suppressed it as I suppose.

Mr. Walsh interrogated.

The thirteenth article is the only one binding upon the English, and the only thing that could have been (properly) signed by them. I imagine the copy of it was neglected to be taken in the treaty sent home. The treaty without it is inserted in the Select Committee proceedings, as a translation from the Persian. The twelve articles are all in Persian, and only the thirteenth in English. The English signed Persian articles as far as twelve, which were prefixed to the English articles.

With respect to the thirteenth article, some little time after a publication of Mr. Vansittart's, in which he had treated the thirteenth article as never having subsisted, I had a conversation with that gentleman, at which time I shewed him the words of that thirteenth article, and he confessed his knowledge that that article did subsist. I by no means charge Mr. Vansittart with having suppressed that article, for I do believe that no copy of it did remain among the Company's papers at Calcutta. I looked over Lord Clive's papers; there I saw a copy of the treaty, with the thirteenth article, in Mr. Lushington's writing. I acquainted Mr. Rous and the deputy Chairman with the thirteenth article.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Mercurii 29^o die Aprilis, 1772.

Colonel BURGOMYR in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Vane,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Hotham,	Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Rice,	Mr. Ongley,
Mr. Pitt,	Sir William Meredith,
Sir John Turner,	Mr. Cornwall,
Mr. Attorney General,	Lord Folkestone.

Mr. Moreton presented several books and papers.

Mr. Holt (from the East-India House) to explain a treaty and 13th article.

The papers (Mr. Gillam) who had the collecting these treaties for Parliament, is dead; but I found a paper in the deceased person's writing as follows: "In the treaty here

here referred to was an article containing the conditions on the part of the Company, that it was not transmitted from India to the Company, but it is to be found in the 12th page of the appendix to the Dutch memorial; and as there is no reason to doubt the authority of it, it is subjoined to the treaty with the Nabob, Meer Jassier, No. 3.

Q. In whose hand writing is the copy of the treaty now upon the table?

A. It was Mr. Cray's, a clerk in the office.

Q. At what time was it copied?

A. About 1767.

Q. Where was the original, from which this was copied, lodged among the Company's papers?

A. In February, 1758, a treaty consisting of twelve articles, and dated July 5th, 1757, was received by the Company transmitted by a letter bearing date the 14th July, 1757, from the Select Committee at Bengal to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

Q. When was the thirteenth article added to the treaty?

A. When the treaties were called for by the House of Commons in 1767.

The witness produced the minutes of proceedings of the English and Dutch Commissioners in 1762, out of which were read the following entries:

Page 146. At the East-India House 2nd December, 1762.

Present,

All the Commissioners, English and Dutch.

The Dutch Commissioners, acknowledging the candour of the English in sending them copies of their treaties with the Nabobs, observed that a thirteenth article, as transmitted by Colonel Clive to the government of Chinsurah, and inserted in the appendix to their memorial, page 12, is not to be found in either of those treaties; the English Commissioners disavowed all knowledge of that article.

With this declaration the others seemed much satisfied, saying that, if this article had stood confirmed, it would have been the greatest grievance they had to complain of.

Page 152. At the East-India House, Thursday 14th December 1762, &c.

Letter to Lord Clive relative to the 13th article, read.

Page 154. Lord Clive's answer read.

Mr. Walsh interrogated.

Q. What was the fact respecting your

having found a copy of the treaty with Meer Jassier, wrote in Mr. Lushington's hand writing, who was at the time of making the treaty Secretary to Lord Clive, to which there was a thirteenth article; and what you did in consequence?

A. I certainly saw amongst Lord Clive's papers a copy of this treaty. I am very well convinced it was in Mr. Lushington's hand writing. It contained a thirteenth article. I do think likewise that I took a copy of that thirteenth article, and shewed it to the then Chairman and Deputy Chairman, who, I believe, were Mr. Rous and Mr. Dudley.

Q. Can you recollect whether this was before the papers were laid before the House of Commons?

A. I can't say, nor upon what occasion I carried it to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. Whilst Lord Clive was last abroad, I believe.

Q. Was it to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman in their public capacity?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Can you recollect when you saw that copy in Mr. Lushington's hand writing, whether the thirteenth article was in any respect distinguished from the twelve others?

A. It is by no means distinguished. It is numbered 13th. What facilitates me to recollect that, is by having resorted to a copy in my hands of that copy which I suspected to be Mr. Lushington's.

Q. Whether the first time you saw this 13th article was the time when you carried it to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, or whether you had seen it before?

A. I certainly saw it before. I never had another idea but the thirteenth article existed.

Q. Do you recollect why it was not transmitted together with the other twelve articles?

A. I can only speak on suspicion. The treaty being sent down to Calcutta to be returned with great dispatch, it is likely that after the signing, no copy was taken of it by the Gentlemen of Calcutta, who had the transmitting of these papers to the Company.

Q. Do you recollect any other instance of an instrument of such importance being delivered over without a copy taken?

A. I recollect many instances of omissions.

Q. Do you know how Mr. Lushington came by his copy?

A. Because he was not so negligent as others.

Q. Do you suppose that Mr. Lushington took his copy before it was transmitted to the Nabob?

A. I do imagine he did.

Q. Did any body send accounts of the transaction of that treaty, except the Select Committee?

A. I believe so.

Q. Whether Lord Clive did not transmit to the Company accounts of that treaty?

A. I believe certainly that he did, but not a copy.

Q. Do you recollect from what paper Lord Clive copied the thirteenth article that was sent to Mr. Bisdome?

A. I have no doubt from that copy which I have supposed to be Mr. Lushington's.

Q. Whether there was one instrument or two signed by the Gentlemen of Calcutta and sent up to Muxadabad, exclusive of the fictitious treaty?

A. I conclude but one, which was that delivered to the Nabob.

Q. Do you understand that each of the contracting parties had not one intire instrument in their possession?

A. I imagine that the instrument delivered to the Nabob contained thirteen articles, that that delivered by him to the Company only twelve.

Q. Was the instrument containing thirteen articles signed by the Company alone and not by the Nabob, and that of twelve by the Nabob alone?

A. So I imagine.

Q. Do you imagine that Lord Clive's letter to the Dutch government respecting the thirteenth article was entered in the public proceedings at Calcutta?

A. I should imagine it is not.

Q. Why not, it being a public proceeding of a very important nature?

A. All I can say is that Lord Clive, having an independent command from the Gentlemen of Calcutta did not in every circumstance transmit the particulars of his proceedings to Calcutta, and that in those times there might have been great irregularity in the offices, there being few servants.

Q. Was there any peculiarity in this transaction, that it was not entered in the books of the Company?

A. I do not know that it was not entered.

Letter from the Select Committee to the Secret Committee, dated Bengal, 14th July, 1757, read.

Minutes of the Select Committee of 17th May, 1757, and 19th May, 1757, read.

Treaty concluded by Meer Jaffer, read.

Six letters from Serajah Dowla to the French, and one from Mr. Law, read.

Ordered,

That Captain Brereton, John Caillaud, Esq; John Cook, Esq; Harry Verelst, Esq; and Ralph Leycester, Esq; do attend this Committee to-morrow morning.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Jovis 30^o die Aprilis 1772.

Colonel BURGONYE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,

Mr. Trecothick,

Mr. Fuller,

Ld. Geo. Germaine,

Mr. Rice,

Mr. Pitt,

Mr. Strachey,

Lord Clive,

Mr. Ongley,

Sir John Turner,

General Conway,

Colonel Barre.

Mr. Moreton presented several books and papers.

Captain Brereton (*interrogated*) about what he had heard Admiral Watson say respecting his signing.

Q. Were you in Bengal in 1757, and in what station?

A. I was Lieutenant with Admiral Watson in the Kent in 1757.

Q. Have you ever heard Admiral Watson make any declaration concerning the treaty that was to deceive Omichund?

A. I have often heard him speak of it. I have heard him say that it was proposed to him to sign a fictitious treaty to deceive Omichund of thirty lacks, which he refused to sign as dishonourable to him as an officer, and an affront to him to propose it to him. It was then proposed that somebody should sign it for him, which he refused, and said that he would wash his hands of it; he would have nothing to do with it; he was a stranger to deception; and they might do as they pleased.

Q. From the conversation you have had with the Admiral on this subject, have you ever heard him say that he authorised any person to sign it for him?

A. I believe not. I have often heard him say that he had not, and would not authorize any body to do it.

Q. Do you believe Admiral Watson ever put his seal to it?

A.

A. I believe not. I am sure he had too good a heart.

Q. If it had not been for the assistance of his Majesty's ships and troops, do you think the East-India Company could have succeeded in their different enterprizes, and particularly in effecting that revolution in favour of Meer Jaffer?

A. I believe not.

Q. Do you know whether Admiral Watson, before his death, had ever heard of his name being put to the fictitious treaty?

A. He had. It was communicated to him by Captain Martin, of the Salisbury, on his death bed; and that the Secret Committee had agreed to share the 30 lacks stipulated in the agreement for Omichund among themselves, and on excluding the Admiral from his share, because he had not signed the treaty. The Admiral said that he always thought the transaction dishonourable, and, as there was so much iniquity among mankind, he did not wish to stay any longer among them. This was just before his death.

Q. Were you present at this conversation?

A. I was not, but in the next room. It was communicated to me by Captain Martin the moment he came out of the room. Capt. Martin is dead.

Q. Whether you were not at this time suspended his Majesty's service?

A. No. I never was suspended.

Q. How are you sure that Admiral Watson did not put his seal to it?

A. I have heard him say so in repeated conversations.

Q. When did Admiral Watson die?

A. I believe the 16th of August, 1757.

Q. Do you know of any application from Admiral Watson to the Select Committee for a part of this money?

A. I never heard that he did; but after his death I heard that his executors did.

Q. Whether you ever heard Admiral Watson mention who was the person that proposed to him his signing the fictitious treaty?

A. He did not mention the Gentleman's name, but said with a sneer, it was a Member of the Secret Committee.

Q. Did you ever hear Admiral Watson say any thing as to his signing the real treaty?

A. Not particularly. I have heard him say he thought it an extraordinary measure to depose a man they had so lately made a solemn treaty with; but that, as he was instructed by the King to afford the East-India

Company assistance in their affairs, he assisted them with his forces according to his duty.

Q. Did you collect from Admiral Watson's conversation that he did not sign the real treaty?

A. I always understood from his conversation that he did.

Q. Whether you understood that Admiral Watson approved of that treaty to which he put his name?

A. I never heard him say so.

Q. Did you ever hear him say to the contrary?

A. No.

Q. How soon after signing the fictitious treaty did it become the subject of conversation, or did it ever become the subject of conversation?

A. I heard of this treaty immediately after the attack of Cutwa. It was before the battle of Plassey.

Q. Was it then known that Admiral Watson's name was put to the fictitious treaty?

A. It was talked of.

Q. Where was Admiral Watson then?

A. At Calcutta.

Q. How long after was it that he took to his bed?

A. I believe it was about the 10th of August.

Q. Can you tell nearly when the attack of Cutwa was?

A. The beginning of June.

Q. Do you recollect the time when Admiral Watson made the declaration, that it was extraordinary to depose the Nabob?

A. It was at breakfast about the latter end of May, when he gave me orders to prepare the men, who were to act with the artillery on shore.

Q. Did any detachment from the fleet join the army, and continue with it till the battle of Plassey?

A. I received the Admiral's orders to prepare a body of men from the different ships. They were sent in the Bridgewater up to Chandernagore, where they were to land to join the army; and, as I understood, they acted in all that campaign as artillery.

Q. Was this detachment from his Majesty's ships or from the India ships?

A. From his Majesty's ships.

Q. Whether, when you first heard the report of the Admiral's name being set to the fictitious treaty, you was with the Admiral?

A. I was every other day upon duty with the Admiral, as the person who received his orders.

Q. Did you tell the Admiral at any time that you heard a report, that his name was put to the fictitious treaty?

A. I never took that liberty with the Admiral. I heard the Admiral say that it had been put.

Q. Whether between the report of the Admiral's name being put to the fictitious treaty, and his taking to his bed, it was not nearly two months.

A. I believe it was about two months.

Q. Do you believe that the first time the Admiral heard of it was in the conversation you refer to with Captain Martin?

A. I believe he might know of it before; but then I am sure he knew it.

Q. Whether it was after Admiral Watson took to his bed, or before that time, that you heard him say he knew his name had been put to the fictitious treaty?

A. It is impossible I can recollect at 15 years distance the particular time of that conversation?

Q. When you used the words of the Admiral, that he declared he always thought the transaction dishonourable, did you mean that it was dishonourable to make a false treaty to deceive Omichund, or to use the Admiral's hand and seal to the treaty, when he did not put it himself?

A. I understood it that it was dishonourable to make a false treaty to deceive Omichund.

Q. Whether, before Capt. Martin communicated the subject of Admiral Watson's name being put to that treaty, it was not a matter of suspicion only?

A. I believe it might.

Q. Who was the Commanding Officer of the Kent under the Admiral after the attack of Chandernagore?

A. I was.

Q. By what means did you become the Commanding Officer under the Admiral?

A. Captain Speke was wounded in the attack of Chandernagore. The first Lieutenant was killed. The second Lieutenant appointed Governor of Chandernagore, after it was taken. The third Lieutenant was wounded, and died of his wounds. The fourth Lieutenant was wounded, and was ashore sick. I was the fifth, and then became Commanding Officer.

Q. What did you understand the Admiral to mean, when he said he was a stranger to deception, and they might do as they pleased.

A. In the transaction of the Company's affairs.

Q. Did you not understand Admiral Watson to mean by these words that they might put his name to the fictitious treaty if they pleased?

A. I did not. I could not conceive that the Admiral would give his consent to any transaction that he held dishonourable, that should insinuate his approbation of deception.

(Withdrew)

Sir Eyre Coote interrogated.

Q. Were you in Bengal in 1757, and in what station?

A. I was—a Captain in the 39th regiment doing duty on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Watson.

Q. Was you present at a Council of War held before the battle of Plassey?

A. I was—a Member of that Council.

Q. What was the object of debate at the Council of War, and what was the opinion of the several Members?

A. The Council of War was held the 21st of June, 1757. Colonel Clive informed the Council he found he could not depend on Meer Jaffer for any thing more than standing neuter, in case we came to an action with the Nabob; that Monsieur Law with a body of French was then within three days march of joining the Nabob, whose army by the best intelligence he could get was about fifty thousand men; and that he called us together to desire our opinions whether in these circumstances it would be prudent to come to an immediate action with the Nabob, or fortify ourselves where we were, and remain till the monsoon was over, and the Morattoes could be brought into the country to join us. The question being then put—began with the President and eldest Members, whose opinions were—Lieutenant Col. Robert Clive, President, against an immediate action—Major James Kilpatrick, against—Major Archibald Grant, against—Major Eyre Coote, for—Captain Frederick Gaupp, against—Captain Alexander Grant, for—Captain John Cudmore, for—Captain Thomas Rumbold, against—Captain Christian Fischer, against—Captain Charles Palmer, against—Captain Andrew Armstrong, for—Captain G. Muir, for—Captain Laboom, against—Captain Robert Campbell, for—Captain R. Waggoner, against—Captain Corneil, against—Captain Lieutenant Peter Castairs, for—Captain Lieutenant William Jennings, against—Captain Lieutenant Francis Parshaw, against—Captain Lieutenant Moltair, against.

Q. What were the reasons you gave for that opinion?

A. Having hitherto met with nothing but success, which consequently had given great spirits to our men, I was of opinion that any delay might cast a dampness; 2^{dly}, that the arrival of Monsieur Law would not only strengthen the Nabob's army, and add vigour to their councils, but likewise weaken our force considerably, as the number of Frenchmen we had entered into our service after the capture of Chandernagore would undoubtedly desert to him (Law) upon every opportunity; 3^{dly}, our distance from Calcutta was so great, that all communication from thence would be entirely cut off, and therefore gave us no room to hope for any supplies, and consequently that we must be soon reduced to the greatest distress. For these reasons I gave it as my opinion that we should come to an immediate action; or, if that was thought entirely impracticable, that we should return to Calcutta; the consequence of which must be our own disgrace, and the inevitable destruction of the Company's affairs.

Q. How long was it, after you and the Members who had given your opinion for going on, that Lord Clive acquainted you that he had altered his resolution, and was determined to go on?

A. About an hour after we broke up, Col. Clive informed me, unasked (Captain Robert Campbell to the best of my recollection was with me at the same time) that, notwithstanding the resolution of the Council of War, he intended to march next morning; and accordingly he gave orders for the army to hold themselves in readiness, leaving a subaltern officer's command in the fort of Cutwa.

Q. What were the number of the King's troops, and the Company's troops, at the battle of Plassey?

A. Our army consisted of 750 men in battalion, including 100 topazes, 2100 seapoys, 150 artillery, including sailors.

Q. What was the number of the King's troops?

A. I believe there might be about 150 King's troops, besides the sailors.

(Here Sir Eyre Cooté read a description of the battle of Plassey*, and of the attack upon Chandernagore)

* The public will, no doubt, readily guess what influence kept this account out of the minutes. We are

Q. Whether at the attack of the Nabob's camp near Calcutta, Lord Clive's Secretary,

glad we have it in our power to gratify in this particular the curiosity of our readers, who may be assured that the following words are taken *verbatim* from Sir Eyre Cooté's journal, and are the description which he read of the famous battle of Plassey:

"Our army had now arrived at Plassey Grove. In the morning the Nabob's army appeared at the distance of five miles, marching round us towards the right, with an immense train of artillery; the cannon being mounted on bundles of bamboos tied together, and each piece drawn by twenty or thirty pairs of oxen, while the troops, elephants, and camels, richly cloathed, caparisoned and caparisoned, appeared through the train; so that the sight, to an UNDISCERNING MIND, really seemed formidable; at the same time every circumstance, to a judicious understanding, proved their weakness.

"At six in the morning the cannonading began on both sides. Our army was then ordered into a line of battle before the grove. We remained in that position MOTIONLESS and EXPOSED to the enemy's fire till eleven, when having lost a few men, Colonel Clive RETIRED to Plassey House, and ordered the troops to follow under cover of the wood. In the middle of this confusion and uncertainty, the Colonel called a council of war; but when the officers arrived at the house appointed, HE HAD NOTHING to propose. So we separated. The Colonel, being much fatigued both in body and mind, LAY DOWN TO TAKE A LITTLE REST. In the mean while some of our cannon balls having killed the elephant

Aid de Camp, and Captain of Grenadiers, were not killed?

A. They were, and a great many other officers besides, and a great many men.

Q. Whether Col. Coote ever presented Lord Clive with any memorial after the council of war held at Cutwa?

A. I never did. On the contrary, Lord Clive spoke to me first unasked, on the subject of the army marching, without my mentioning a word to him.

Q. Whether the sailors at the battle of Plassey belonged to the Company's ships, or to the men of war?

on which Surajah Dowlah's head General, Meer Modur, rode, this gentleman was killed by the fall of the animal; and we having likewise killed and wounded many of the OXEN which drew the artillery, the rest were thereby impeded; so that the enemy's army, from both accidents, were thrown into the greatest confusion.

"From thence they began to retreat, which was still more difficult from the death of the said OXEN, and the unweildy carriages, or rather contrivances, on which the cannon were placed.

"In the mean while it was observed that some troops who had occupied a rising ground in the front were retreating, and that a few French Europeans, who had taken possession of a tank, were likewise going off. Major Kilpatrick, by the advice of Captain Grant, immediately ordered a body of men to march and seize upon those posts, and sent Mr. Mariot to AWAKE Colonel Clive, who instantly RETURNED to the field, and sent some sharp messages to Major Kilpatrick for offering to act, WHEN HE WAS ASLEEP, without his orders. At the same time, perceiving the situation of the enemy, the Colonel, with the GREATEST COOLNESS, IN-

A. I believe some were from the Indians. The officers who commanded them belonged to the men of war. The garrison of Chandernagore was composed entirely of seamen from the King's ships.

Q. Were not those seamen from the Indians first turned over on board of the King's ships?

A. I really cannot tell; but I find a minute in my journal, wherein it is agreed that the officers and sailors belonging to the squadron, which were with the army on the expedition to Muxadavad, were not to share with the army in the prize-money, but with the Nabob.

Q. Do you think, without the assistance of the King's troops and ships, in the whole of the transactions in 1757, that the enterprizes would have succeeded?

A. I have no idea that they could.

Q. Whether the army under Col. Clive alone could have taken Chandernagore without the assistance of the navy, and the King's troops?

A. I think the probability was rather against them.

TREPIDITY, and RESOLUTION, ordered Captain Coote immediately to march into the enemy's entrenchments, which he entered without much opposition.

"The rout in the Nabob's army was now become general, excepting a large body of horse, which were coming seemingly to surround us, in a regular formidable manner. The artillery were turned against them, which dispersed some and stopped the rest. But after several signals and messages, they proved to be Meer Jaffier, who was in fact coming to join us.

"In this MEMORABLE BATTLE we had the misfortune to lose THREE EUROPEANS, and TWENTY-SIX SEPOYS killed, and FIVE EUROPEANS and FORTY SEPOYS wounded.

"Besides Oxen and Elephants the enemy must have lost above TWO-HUNDRED SOULS."

Admiral Watson's letter of the 3d of March, 1757, to the Select Committee, read.

Col. Clive's letter to the Select Committee, dated the 4th of March, 1757, read.

Two letters from Admiral Watson to the Select Committee, dated the 7th and 12th of March, 1757, read.

Last paragraph of Col. Clive's letter to the Secret Committee, dated Aug. 22, 1757, read.

A Member of the Committee informed the Committee that he had this morning read a letter in Lord Clive's letter book, from his Lordship to the Select Committee of Fort George, of the 12th of September, 1757, in which were the following words:

"It is with the deepest concern I acquaint you of Admiral Watson's death. His zeal for the service of the Company, and the extraordinary success it was crowned with, both at Gheriah, and in this expedition, will make his memory, particularly in India, survive to the latest ages."

John Cooke, Esq. interrogated.

I was in Bengal in 1757, and Secretary to the Select Committee.

Q. Do you know any thing, and what, of the fictitious treaty?

A. I know there was such a treaty subsisting.

Q. Had you ever any conversation with Admiral Watson on the subject of that fictitious treaty, and what was it?

A. After the battle of Plassey I waited upon Admiral Watson with a message from the Select Committee. Amongst other things this fictitious treaty was mentioned in conversation. He said he had not signed it, (thrusting up his shoulders) but had left them to do as they pleased in the affair, aluding, as I suppose, to Col. Clive and the Select Committee.

Q. Did you understand that Admiral Watson knew his name was to the fictitious treaty?

A. I have no doubt in my own mind but that he did know it.

Q. Did you understand in the course of your conversation with Admiral Watson that he had agreed, consented or permitted that his name should be put to it?

A. I understood from what dropt from Admiral Watson, that he had tacitly permitted his name to be used. I believe he did not publicly give his consent, but had known of it and made no objection.

Q. Do you understand that Admiral Wat-

son by express words permitted his name to be put, or whether, after it was put without his permission, he only connived at it?

A. I don't conceive that his name could have been put to it without his permission. It was only a conversation between the Admiral and myself.

Q. Did Admiral Watson express any resentment or surprize that his name was put?

A. He certainly did not in the conversation with me.

Q. What was that conversation between Admiral Watson and you?

A. It is impossible for me to recollect it at so distant a period. But, if I remember right, when the conversation of the fictitious treaty was mentioned, he thrust up his shoulders and said laughingly, that he had not signed it, but that he had left to them to do as they pleased.

Q. Whether it is from this circumstance that you collect the Admiral knew of his name being put?

A. It was, and from this circumstance only.

Q. Did it give you no surprize to hear that an officer of Admiral Watson's rank, had agreed to have his name put to a treaty he would not sign?

A. It gave me no surprize at all, because I was convinced Admiral Watson knew the motives for which such a fictitious treaty was made, and that, though he would not sign it, he had no objections to Omichund's being lulled into a security, and preventing the whole design from being discovered and defeated.

Q. Whether Admiral Watson told you so much?

A. By no means. There are my reasons why I was not surprized.

Q. Was Admiral Watson's consent to the having his name put to this fictitious treaty, communicated to the Select Committee?

A. No—never.

Q. How many years were you in India?

A. Eighteen years.

Q. Can you give any information relative to Admiral Watson's signing the real treaty?

A. I believe there is no doubt of his having signed it; and, if I remember right, he sealed it. I am sure he signed it.

Q. Was you present at the time the Admiral signed and sealed?

A. To the best of my remembrance not.

Q. What grounds do you found your certainty upon of Admiral Watson's signing the real treaty?

A.

The Minutes of the Select Committee, &c.

A. Because the treaty was sent down by Mr. Watts for the Admiral and Committee to execute, and then to be returned to him again with all the dispatch imaginable. The treaty was then executed by the Committee and the Admiral, and returned to Mr. Watts.

Q. Did you see the treaty after Admiral Watson had signed it?

A. To the best of my remembrance I did not.

Q. Did you see the treaty after the gentlemen of the Committee had signed it, before it was sent to the Admiral?

A. I think I did.

Q. Can you recollect whether it consisted of twelve or thirteen articles?

A. To the best of my remembrance there was an article in that which was returned to Meer Jaffier, which was not in the treaty which Meer Jaffier had executed, and sent to the Committee to be kept by them.

Q. Were both of them in Persian?

A. It occurs to me they were both in Persian and English. In one I am sure there were English articles and Persian articles. There was an additional article in one of the treaties which the Committee and Admiral signed. That article was in English. I believe only one copy of the treaty was signed by Meer Jaffier, which was left with the Committee, and the other copy signed by the Committee and sent to the Nabob.

Q. Were you the only person in that Committee that observed the difference in the treaties?

A. I understood it was known.

Q. Did it occur to no body it was necessary to keep a copy of the treaty sent to Meer Jaffier?

A. I really thought there was a copy. I know no reason why it was not sent to the Company. I imagine it was.

Q. Was it not generally your office to make copies of English papers?

A. There were clerks to copy. I was the Secretary.

Q. How long was your conversation with Admiral Watson before his death?

A. I think it was in July. He was in good health and spirits at that time.

Q. Did not you give orders to the clerks what to copy, and did you not keep those copies?

A. I did.

Q. Whether it would not naturally have been in your custody, if there had been a copy?

A. It would have been in the Secretary's office under my management.

Q. Did Admiral Watson express to you any displeasure at the measures taken for depositing Serajah Dowlah?

A. I do not recollect any such conversation passed between us, nor did I ever hear that he was displeased at it.

The witness being shewn the proceedings of the Select Committee 19th of May, 1757, in which it is ordered, that the treaty with Meer Jaffier, then signed by the Committee and Admiral Watson, should be entered after the proceedings, he was asked if he apprehends he could have allowed his clerks to omit entering the thirteenth article, when it appears all the other articles are entered after the proceedings?

A. It appears to me that the translation entered here is of that treaty which Meer Jaffier signed, in which the additional article was not inserted. I can account for it no other way.

Q. Whether that signed by Meer Jaffier remained in your custody?

A. It was in the office.

Q. Can you recollect how soon after the treaties were signed, they were sent to Admiral Watson?

A. Immediately after signing.

Q. Do you ever remember two parts coming back into your office?

A. No—I think the one was immediately dispatched up the country.

Q. How many times in the course of your office do you think you copied the treaty, as it now stands in the books?

A. I do not know; nor do I think I ever copied it myself.

Withdrew.

Adjourned till to morrow.

Veneris 1^o die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOMNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,
Mr. Vane,
Mr. Bacon,
Mr. Hotham,
Mr. Pitt,

Mr. Trecothick,
Lord Clive,
Mr. Fuller,
Sir Wm. Meredith,
Mr. Strachey.

Lord Clive.

I observe that in my narrative given to the Committee on Monday last I have made a mistake with respect to the number of the Council of War who on the first of June, 1757, voted for the immediate attack of Serajah Dowla. I might very easily have been led

led into that mistake; that event having happened 15 years ago, and I not having consulted a single record from that time to this. Although I might have informed Captain Coote that, notwithstanding that Council of War, I was resolved to attack Serajah Dowla, I do imagine I had not concluded upon the whole plan till twenty four hours after, because the troops did not cross the river to make that attack until the 22d of June in the evening; and this discourse between Captain Coote and me was on the 21st of June in the morning. I certainly should not in my narrative have declared that Admiral Watson had consented to have his name put to the fictitious treaty, if I had not understood so from Mr. Lushington. But I would have ordered his name to be put whether he had consented or not.

Mr. Sykes *interrogated*.

Q. In what manner did Meer Jaffer give Lord Clive his jaghire?

A. To the best of my remembrance I was appointed Resident at the Nabob's court on leave of absence of Mr. Hastings, who was the proper Resident. I think it was in the months of June and July 1758 I was with the Nabob upon business relative to the Company; at which time the Nabob was speaking to me relative to Lord Clive's expedition against the Shah Zadda, at which time, amongst other conversation, he told me of the sense he entertained of Lord Clive's conduct towards him in raising the siege of Patna, and likewise in reducing the Shah Zadda to such a necessitous way as to apply to his Lordship to put himself under the English protection. He mentioned also that he owed his government to Colonel Clive before, and this was a second time he was indebted to him for it; that he had been a means of having honours conferred on Col. Clive by creating him an Omrah of the empire; but that he had given him nothing to support those honours; that he had frequently had it in his thoughts, but that he had never entered upon it seriously till now; that he had thoughts of giving him a jaghire in the Patna province; that he found it would be attended with inconvenience to the officers of the government, and that Juggut Seat had fallen upon a method of obviating these difficulties by giving him the quit-rent arising from the lands ceded to the Company to the southward of Calcutta; that he thought it would interfere the least with the government, and stood the clearest in relation to the Company's affairs. To the best of my remembrance I mentioned to him

that I thought it a large sum. He told me that it was very little adequate to the services he had received from the Colonel, but more especially owing to the Colonel's behaviour upon the capture of Muxadabad, when the whole of the inhabitants expected to be put under contribution; that none of them had experienced a conduct of that kind; but that their persons as well as their property were entirely secured to them. He did mention to me at that meeting that, when I heard of the Colonel's coming down the country, that I would acquaint him with it, and in the mean time he would prepare an instrument called the jaghire, when he would give the Colonel the meeting, and desired my attendance at the time it was to be presented. I did attend him in the Company with Juggut Seat and other persons belonging to the Nabob. We met the Colonel about two miles to the northward of the city, when after some conversation between the Nabob and Colonel Clive the Nabob retired, when Juggut Seat in my presence, and, I think, in Mr. Scrafton's, presented him from the Nabob with the instrument which was the jaghire. That is all I know relative to it. I only speak this to the best of my memory.

Q. Who was present at this conversation between you and the Nabob?

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Did you take any notes of the conversation at the time?

A. No. There were persons present, but no Englishmen but myself. The conversation was in the Moorish language, which, I thought, I understood sufficient for most conversations.

Q. Whether you acquainted any person by letter or otherwise about that time with the conversation?

A. I did not.

Q. Whether the quit-rent granted by this jaghire was not payable by the Company?

A. It was payable by the Company to the Nabob.

Q. Do you know of any notification given to the Company of this grant?

A. I know of none.

Q. How was it paid after the grant?

A. I don't know.

Q. Whether you have not frequently mentioned the conversation you had with the Nabob relative to the jaghire since you came to England?

A. Yes, frequently.

Q. Did you mention it in India?

A. I can't charge my memory, but undoubtedly

doubtedly I did. It was a public act, and, I believe, it was afterwards given to Mr. Hastings to translate into English.

Q. What was the amount of the jaghire?

A. It was reckoned about 30,000l. a year.

Q. Whether you had any instructions from Lord Clive, or any other in his name, to apply for this jaghire?

A. I never had directly nor indirectly.

Q. Whether you had any instructions from Lord Clive, or any in his name, to apply to Juggut Seat for this jaghire?

A. I never had from him or any other person whatsoever.

Q. Whether you ever heard that Lord Clive ever made application to the Nabob for his jaghire?

A. I never heard it till of late.

Q. Whether you ever read Lord Clive's letter to the Proprietors relative to this jaghire?

A. Undoubtedly I must.

Q. Whether you conceived the instrument delivered by Juggut Seat to Lord Clive, the Dewar Sunnud, or whether you conceived it to be an order from the Nabob to the Company to pay the quit-rent?

A. Whether it was the one or the other I cannot pretend to say. I only saw it enclosed in a silken bag at the time it was presented to Lord Clive, not opened, and I never saw it opened.

Letter from Mr. James to Lord Clive 12th of August, 1763, read.

Lord Clive's answer to ditto, 12th of Sept. 1763, read.

Lord Clive's letter to the Seats, the 31st of January, 1759, read.

The Seats answer received the 20th of February, 1759, read.

Lord Clive's letter to Shah Allum, dated the 27th of February, 1759, read.

Lord Clive.

The first letter that ever I wrote about a jaghire, to the best of my remembrance, was on the 31st of January, 1759, to Juggut Seat, informing him that the Nabob had made me an Omrah without a jaghire. In answer to that he replied, that the Nabob never granted jaghires in Bengal, that Orixia was too poor, but that I might have one in Bahar. Now I do declare upon my honour, that I never applied for any jaghire whatever, directly or indirectly, after that period, and, when the Nabob presented me the jaghire, (which was near six months afterwards) I did not know what that jaghire was, nor had the least idea of the amount of that jaghire, nor

of its being the quit-rent upon the Company's lands, and do believe he gave me that jaghire in consequence of the services rendered by me to him, and which have been stated by Mr. Sykes. Looking upon the Nabob's answer as an evasive one, and that he was not inclined to comply with my request, I never wrote, or thought any more upon the subject, until I received a second letter from Juggut Seat in answer to my first, (after our success against the King's son) that the Nabob had turned the thing in his mind, and was willing to grant me a jaghire in Bengal, but the nature of it, where or what value it was to be, I was entirely ignorant of, till the patent explained it. Juggut Seat was a banker, and a man of great wealth and influence with the Nabob.

Letter from the Seats to Lord Clive the 4th of June, 1759, read.

Q. Have you received the benefit of this grant from the time it was granted?

A. I have received it to this day from July 1759.

Q. Whether application was not made to the Nabob Meer Jaffier, for a grant of lands to the northward of Calcutta, to the amount of 12,000l. a year, for the behoof of the Company, and that the Nabob refused the grant, till the Company complied with the Nabob's request, to send him two lacks of rupees, and that the Company was also obliged to make presents to several of the principal officers about him?

A. It is so.

Q. What time was it?

A. I believe it was not above eight or ten months after the battle of Plassey.

Q. Do you know that Meer Jaffier, about the time of granting the jaghire, was surrounded by his troops who had mutinied, because he could not pay them?

A. Certainly. The matter of fact was, there were great arrears due to the army by Serajah Dowlah, as well as by Meer Jaffier; and the sums amounted to three or four millions sterling. It is the custom of that country, never to pay the army a fourth part of what they promise them; and it is only in times of distress that the army can get paid at all, and that is the reason why their troops always behave so.

Q. Do you recollect before the grant of the jaghire, that the Nabob's jewels, goods and furniture, were publicly sold, in order to make good the money he had agreed by treaty to pay the Company?

A. I have been informed, that the Nabob's

Nob's jewels amounted to near a million sterling: about 50,000l. worth of the worst of them were sent down to Calcutta, and sold there as a part of the treaty money: there were also some goods to be sold, but the two parties differing as to the value of them, the Nabob took the goods back again, and paid for them in money.

Q. Whether the Nabob had not granted assignments upon his revenues, particularly the revenues of Burdwan, for paying of the money to the Company, and to the Select Committee, as settled by treaty?

A. The Nabob made assignment of lands for fulfilling all the articles of the treaty, and also for the Committee-money. There were other lands likewise in the nature of a mortgage.

Ordered,

That there be laid before this Committee the proceedings of the board at Calcutta, relating to Colonel Caillaud in the year 1762.

Also an account of the bills drawn upon the Company from Bengal, Madras and Bombay, from June 1757, to December 1760, distinguishing each year, each sum, and each place.

Also the general court-books of the years 1764 and 1767.

Also the proceedings in the trial of Ramcham.

Adjourned till Monday.

Lunæ 4^o die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOME in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Sir John Turner,	Mr. Strachey;
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Bacon,
Lord Clive,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Cornwall,	Mr. Ongley,
Mr. Vane,	Lord Folkestone.
Mr. Johnstone,	

Lord Clive interrogated.

Q. By what installments were the presents which were over and above those stipulated for the Army, Navy, Council and Committee agreed to be paid?

A. I know of no agreement; but they were half paid down, and half in about 15 months, to the best of my remembrance.

Q. Whether, when the first half was paid down, had your Lordship any expectation of the remainder?

A. I had — from the intelligence of Mr. Watts, who acquainted me that the present for my share would amount to about twenty lacks, but I received only sixteen. That

lands to the amount of 700,000 l. a year were mortgaged for the payment of the remainder of the money stipulated for by the treaty. Sir George Pocock applied to the Governor and Council by letter to desire that they would advance to the Navy their remaining half of the fifty lacks given to the Navy and Army, desiring that the Governor and Council would make such a deduction as they thought reasonable for the risk of advancing the money. Some sharp letters passed upon the occasion. To the best of my remembrance I was the only person in that Council that objected to that request being complied with; and then after it had been complied with, I made the same request in favour of the army, and not before. The money deducted to the best of my remembrance was five lacks. The remaining twenty were paid down by the Company for the navy and army.

Q. When was the mortgage made?

A. I believe about December, 1757, or January 1758.

Q. On whose application was you made an Omrah?

A. At Meer Jaffier's. But I applied to Meer Jaffier to make the application to the Mogul.

On the 22d of June, 1757, in the evening, the army crossed the river and marched all night amidst incessant rains, until they reached Plassey Grove; and early in the morning the army of Serajah Dowla attacked us in that situation. I will not trouble the Committee with a description of that battle, because it has already been given in part by Sir Eyre Coote. I shall only observe, that its being attended with so little bloodshed, arose from two causes; first, the Army was sheltered by so high a bank, that the enemy's heavy artillery could not possibly do them much mischief; the other was, that Serajah Dowla had no Confidence in his Army, nor his Army any confidence in him, and therefore they did not do their duty upon that occasion. As the Army was routed, Serajah Dowla, for the sake of expedition, fled to the city on an elephant, which he reached that night, being thirty miles from the field of battle. We pursued the routed army about nine miles to a place called Doudpour, and in the evening Meer Jaffier sent me word that he and many more of the great Officers, and a very considerable part of the Army, were in expectation of my orders. I sent Messrs Watts and Scrafton to wait upon him, and he came to

me the next morning, accompanied by his son, made many apologies for the non-performance of his agreement to join me, and said his fate was in my hands. I assured him that the English would most religiously perform their treaty, and advised him to pursue Serajah Dowla without delay, and I would follow with the English army. When Serajah Dowla arrived at the city, his palace was full of treasure, but with all that treasure he could not purchase the confidence of his Army. He was employed in lavishing considerable sums among his troops, to engage them to another battle, but to no purpose. About twelve o'clock at night was brought him the fatal news of Meer Jaffer's arrival at that city, closely followed by the English army. He then in despair gave up all for lost, and made his escape out of one of the palace windows, with only two or three attendants, and took refuge in the Faikier's house, as mentioned in the former part of my evidence.

The English Army having encamped within about six miles of Muxadavad, I sent Messrs. Watts and Walsh to congratulate Meer Jaffer upon his success, and know the time that I should enter the city. In consequence of which the day was fixed upon, and I entered the city at the head of 200 Europeans, and 500 Seapoys. The inhabitants, who were spectators on that occasion, must have amounted to some hundred thousands, and if they had had an intention to have destroyed us, they might have done it with sticks and stones. On that day, being under no kind of restraint, but that of my own conscience, I might have become too rich for a subject; but I had fixed upon that period to accomplish all my views whatever, and from that period to this hour, which is a space of near fifteen years, I have not benefited myself directly or indirectly the value of one shilling, the jaghire excepted. I have been placed in great and eminent stations surrounded with temptations; the civil and military power were united in me, a circumstance which has never happened to any other man before that time, or since. The Committee will therefore judge whether I have been moderate or immoderate in the pursuit of riches. A few days after my arrival in the city, Meer Jaffer was placed on the musnut, and proclaimed Nabob of Bengal, Bahar and Orixá. A day was then fixed upon to consider the state of the Nabob's treasures, and to see how far he could comply with the treaty immediately; and

after that state was known, this matter was left to be decided by the Seats, two men of immense wealth and great influence; and it was agreed that half should be paid down, and the other half in three years. At this meeting was Omichund, and when the real treaty came to be read, the indignation and resentment expressed in that man's face, bears all description. He said, "this cannot be the treaty. It was a red treaty that I saw." I replied, "Yet, Omichund, but this is a white treaty." This important business being accomplished, I returned to Calcutta with the army; and the Nabob soon began to feel his own greatness, and manifested evident designs of shaking off all dependence upon us, and of evading the fulfilling the rest of the treaty. He dismissed from his service those great men who had been the instruments of his greatness, and he put to death the only brother of Serajah Dowla. As soon as the rains were over, he took the field without assistance, to quash three rebellions; but when he came seriously to consider of his situation, he thought proper to call upon the English for their assistance, and I marched immediately to join him. At the city I had a meeting with the discontented Chiefs, when I engaged to protect them in their persons, and to use my influence to get them restored to favour. This I easily accomplished. I then insisted that he should immediately pay that part of the treaty money which was then due, and that he should assign over lands sufficient in mortgage to secure the rest. We found no difficulty in subduing all his enemies, except Ramnarain, who was the Nabob of Bahar, and at the head of a great Army, and would not acknowledge Meer Jaffer without the English security. That being given, and upon a promise that he should remain in his government, he came to the Nabob and paid his obedience. The country being now just settled, I returned to Calcutta with an intention to embark for the Carnatick, and taking the very first honourable opportunity of returning into my native country; but in the interim the ships arrived from Europe, which brought out the very strange appointment of four Governors, which was called a Rotation Government; because one Governor was only to be as such for three months. I had not the honour to be appointed one of those Governors. Upon which the Gentlemen who had that honour, as well as the rest of the Council, sent me the following letter:

"SIR,

"SIR, Our most serious attention has been devoted to the commands of our honourable employers per Hardwicke, naming a rotation of Governors for the future management of their affairs at this settlement; and having duly weighed the nature of this regulation with all its attending circumstances, a sincere conviction of its being in our present situation and circumstances repugnant to the true interest of our honourable masters, and of the welfare of the settlement in general, obliges us (though with the utmost respect and deference) to believe, that had our employers been apprized of the present state of their affairs in this kingdom, they would have placed their friendship in some one person, as the clearest and easiest method of conducting their affairs, as well as preserving and maintaining the weight and influence the late happy revolution has given us with the Subah of these provinces, on which influence at the present period, the interest and the welfare of the Company depends in the highest degree at this settlement. The difficulties we may be liable to by a rotation in the executive part of government, with its consequences, are sufficiently observed in our present state of affairs. We will however only mention a few points. The treaty with the Nabob not perfected in all its branches; the possession of the lands incomplete; the settlement in no posture of defence; the French considerably reinforced with military and a fleet; their designs with respect to Bengal hitherto unknown; and the impossibility of impressing a proper idea of this divided power in the minds of the Subah, and others of his kingdom, who have at all times been accustomed to the government of a single person. A little reflection will introduce many more, and clearly evince the necessity of this address.

"The Gentlemen nominated Governors in the Honourable Company's commands per Hardwicke have the highest sense of gratitude for the honour conferred on them by our employers in their appointment, but deem themselves in duty bound at this juncture of affairs, to wave all personal honours and advantages, and declare as their sentiments, that a rotation in the executive part of government for the foregoing reason would be extremely prejudicial to the real interest of the Company; in which opinion we unanimously concur and judge it for the welfare of our honourable employers, and of the settlement in general, to deviate in

this instance from the commands of our honourable masters, and fix the Presidentship in a single person, till we hear further from Europe.

"You being named as the head of the Committee (in the letters of the 3d of Aug. last) established at that time for conducting the Company's affairs in Bengal: your eminent services, abilities, and merit together, with your superior weight and influence with the present Subah and his Officers, are motives which have great force with us on this occasion, and all concur in pointing you out as the person best able to render our honourable employers necessary service at this juncture, till they shall make their further pleasure known by the appointment of a President for their affairs here.

"These reasons urge us to make you an offer of being President of the Company's affairs in Bengal, till a person is appointed by the honourable Company, and we flatter ourselves you will be induced to accept of our offer from your wonted regard to the interest of our honourable employers and zeal for the welfare of their affairs, which we doubt not you are, as well as ourselves convinced, will be much prejudiced by a rotation in the executive part of government.

"We wait your reply, and have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, and humble servants,

Fort William,
21st June, 1758.

William Watts,
C. Manningham,
Richard Becher,
M. Collet,
M. Mackett.
T. Boddam."

I did not hesitate one moment to accept of this request, and soon after I received my appointment from the Court of Directors themselves in consequence of our success at Plassey.

Soon after this appointment I took into the most serious consideration the situation of our affairs on the coast of Coromandel. Mr. Lally was arrived with such a force as threatened not only the destruction of all our settlements there, but of all the East India Company's possessions; and nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David at that time but their want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place. However, at last Madras was besieged, and no words that I can command can do justice to the gallant behaviour of Lord Pigot, General Lawrence, Colonel Draper, General Caillaud, Major Brere-

Brereton, &c. I thought it was my duty to contribute my mite towards the destruction of the French; and therefore I projected the scheme of depriving the French of the northern Sircars (whose revenues were computed to amount to 400,000*l.* a year) contrary to the inclinations of my own council. This expedition succeeded compleatly; for the French were totally driven out by Colonel Ford with the Company's troops, whose conduct and gallantry on that occasion was equal, if not superior, to any thing that had happened during the whole course of the war. In the mean time I was called up the country with the remaining part of the forces left behind to raise the siege of Patna; which was besieged by the King's son. The siege being raised, and the King's son drove out of the country, I returned to my government at Calcutta, where I had been but a very short time before I received intelligence that the Dutch were forming a great armament from Batavia; and it was thought to be destined for Bengal, and reported that the Nabob had given them encouragement to come there. In the month of August, 1759, a Dutch ship arrived in the river full of troops; this brought matters to a certainty; and here will be seen the use of the double government; for soon after arrived six other Dutch ships, having on board in all 600 Europeans and 800 Mallays. I was sensible how very critical my situation was at that time. I risked both my life and fortune in taking upon myself to commence hostilities against a nation with whom we were at peace; but I knew the fate of Bengal and of the Company depended upon it; and therefore I ran that risk. I called upon the Nabob to fulfil his agreement with us, and to order the Dutch to leave the river, and, if they did not comply with his orders, I resolved under his sanction to attack them. The seven ships came within a mile of Calcutta, and then landed near 700 Europeans and 800 Mallays, I ordered that gallant Officer Colonel Ford, who was returned from the expedition of the Decan, to intercept them in their march to Chinsura (the Dutch factory) which he did so effectually that of the 700 Europeans not above 14 got to Chinsura. The rest were either killed or taken prisoners. This he did with a force of three hundred men, 800 seapoys, and about 150 of the Nabob's cavalry. At the same time I ordered three East Indiamen to be fitted out and manned for the purpose, under the command of Captain Wilson, to attack

the seven Dutch East Indiamen, and after an engagement of two hours they took six of them, and the seventh was intercepted by two of our ships that lay down in the river, and they took three times the number of men that our ships contained.—After this, two treaties were concluded, the one between the English East India Company, and the Dutch East India Company, where they agreed to pay to the East India Company all the expences of that war.—With the Nabob they made the other treaty, by which they agreed never to introduce forces into his country without his consent, and that they would never keep at Chinsura, and all their other settlements together more than 125 soldiers. At this time, by much the greatest part of my fortune was in the hands of the Dutch; the Company's treasury was so full in consequence of our successes, that the Governor and Council declined giving their servants any bills in their favour, and I was reduced to the necessity of sending my fortune home by bills upon the Dutch.—These bills were made payable by installments, one third part every year, so that I was morally certain, that two thirds of the sum sent, which, to the best of my remembrance, was about 180,000*l.* would remain in the hands of the Dutch, when they heard the news of their ill success in Bengal. But the Dutch Company refusing to accept of those bills in the manner drawn, and insisting upon a deduction of near 15,000*l.* for prompt payment, or else refusing to pay them at all, my attorneys thought proper, considering the critical situation of the two nations at that time, to accept payment upon those terms; this design of the Dutch being frustrated, I resigned my government to Mr. Holwell, embarked on board a ship in February 1760, and arrived in England in July.

His Lordship read to the Committee the following minutes of the East India Company.

At a Court of Directors held on Wednesday February 6, 1754, minutes of the Committee of correspondence dated 15th instant, being read, it was unanimously resolved:

That a sword set with diamonds to the value of 500*l.* be presented by the court to Capt. Robert Clive, as a token of their esteem for him, and sense of his singular services to the Company on the coast of Coromandel.

At a general Court held on Wednesday December 21, 1757, on a motion, and the question being put, it was resolved, that the
thanks

thanks of this general Court be given to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive, for his eminent and signal services to this Company.

At a general Court held on Wednesday September 24, 1760, the Chairman from the Court of Directors informed this Court, that such important services had been rendered to the Company in the East Indies, by Vice Admiral Pocock, and Colonels Clive and Lawrence, as appears from the accounts formerly laid before this Court, and lately received, to demand some farther marks of the Court's sense thereof than had been already expressed, and moving the Court thereunto, it was on the question,

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to Vice Admiral Pocock, Colonel Robert Clive, and Colonel Stringer Lawrence, for their many eminent and signal services to this Company.

And another motion being made,

Ordered, That the Chairman and Deputy Chairman wait upon those Gentlemen, and acquaint them with this mark of this Court's great regard for their services.

And another being made, it was on the question

Resolved unanimously, That the Chairman and Deputy, when they wait upon Vice Admiral Pocock, Colonel Clive, and Colonel Lawrence, will desire those Gentlemen to give their consents that their portraits or statues be taken, in order to be placed in some conspicuous parts of this house, that their eminent and signal services to this Company may be ever had in remembrance.

His Lordship likewise read the following letter.

To Robert Clive, Esq;

"We have received your several letters of the 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th inst. and with great pleasure observe and congratulate you on the rapid successes therein mentioned.—The revolution effected by your gallant conduct, and the bravery of the officers and the soldiers under you, is of such extraordinary importance not only to the Company but to the British nation in general, that we think it incumbent on us to return you and your Officers our sincere thanks on behalf of his Britannic Majesty and the East India Company, for your behaviour on this critical and important occasion.

Although in your last letter Jaffier Ally Khan is styled Nabob, yet we have not on that authority ventured to make any public rejoicings for him as Soubah of these provinces; we should therefore be glad to be in-

formed in your next letter, if he has been proclaimed in form, and is in possession of the government, this will very much add to our satisfaction, and give us a proper opening to address him as the Soubah, proclaim him such in our town, and salute his accession. We have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servants,

Cha. Watson,
G. Pocock,
Roger Drake, jun.
C. Manningham,
Richard Becher."

Fort William,
June 29, 1757.

Q. Does your Lordship, from a review of all the transactions of the period when the Dutch armament came to Bengal in 1759, believe they were invited by Meer Jaffier, or not?

A. I have no proof for what I am going to offer to the Committee, but I believe, when from political motives I found myself obliged to lay the Nabob under restraint, which were by no means agreeable to him, that he did by some means or other give encouragement to the Dutch to send for those forces, but I believe at the same time, that after the services which we had rendered him by raising the siege of Patna, and when his life was saved from the mutiny of his own army, that he repented of what he had done, for he was down with me at Calcutta to the best of my remembrance, at the time the Dutch armament arrived, and seemed very ready to fall into every measure which I recommended.—However, from his timid conduct towards the Dutch even at that time I was confirmed in my suspicions that he had given the Dutch some such invitation.

Q. Whether the European troops in the Dutch service are Dutchmen?

A. They are not—Generally speaking they are Germans; their officers were both French and Dutch; their commanding officer was a Frenchman.

Q. If from subsequent negotiations of the Dutch East India Company, your Lordship was confirmed in the opinion of Meer Jaffier's having encouraged them to come to Bengal?

A. I do believe that the Nabob had invited the Dutch from this circumstance, that upon his return to his capital he either paid them a visit, or received a visit from them, and treated them with such civility, as served to confirm my suspicions. There is reason to believe that he connived at their raising troops

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in the country, and when he was taxed with it, he pleaded ignorance.

Q. Whether the Nabob's cavalry had any share in the action with the Dutch?

A. They had in the pursuit, and killed a great many men.

Q. When you went to raise the siege at Patna, had you any intercourse with the Nabob?

A. Certainly—His son joined me with 8000 men.

Q. What time was this?

A. I think about February or March 1759.

Mr. Holwell's address to Mr. Vansittart, &c. 4th of August 1760, read.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Martis 5^o die Maii, 1772.

Colonel BURGON in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Trecothick,
Mr. Fuller,	Mr. Pitt,
Mr. Ongley,	Mr. Bacon,
Mr. Cornwall,	Mr. Hotham,
Sir W. Meredith,	Mr. Sutton,
Mr. Vane,	Mr. Strachey.

Mr. Moreton, from the East-India House, presented (pursuant to order) a book intitled, Proceedings of the Board relating to Colonel Caillaud.

Proceedings of the Select Committee, Fort William, 11th September, 1760, read.

Ditto, 15th Sept. 1760, read.

Ditto, 16th Sept. 1760, read.

Ditto, 24th Oct. 1760, read.

Mr. Verelst and Mr. Smyth's opinion of the Revolution, and the President's remarks thereon, 8th Nov. 1760, read.

Mr. Vansittart's memorial 10th November, 1760, read.

Colonel Caillaud—to the reasons that induced him to give his consent to the revolution in 1760.

I was called to Bengal in November 1759, to take the command of the troops in the room of Lord Clive, who intended to return to Europe early the next season. I arrived two days after the affair of the Dutch, and upon my enquiring the state of affairs of that country at that time, I was informed that the Prince (called the Shawzadda) was again preparing to enter the province of Bahar with a large army, and joined by several Zeminders of that province who had not taken part with him the year before. The Nabob at Purnea had taken the field on the eastern bank of the Ganges about half-way between Patna and Muxadavad; and his motives for so doing were thought to be

an inclination of joining the Prince, if a favourable opportunity offered. Lord Clive judged it therefore expedient that I should march with a detachment to Muxadavad, there to wait his arrival and his orders. I set out from Calcutta in December with the detachment of 300 Europeans, 50 artillery, six pieces of cannon, and a battalion of seapoys, consisting of about 1000 men. I arrived at Muxadavad about the 26th of December, and on the 6th of January Lord Clive and Colonel Ford joined me. Lord Clive then introduced me to the Nabob, recommended him to my friendship, and desired that he would repose all the confidence possible in me, who was well inclined and attached to his interest. On the 14th of January Lord Clive and Colonel Ford set out upon their return, and on the 18th I began my march to Patna, joined by the Nabob's son, at the head of a large number of country forces. There were a great many difficulties in fitting out the expedition; the low state of the Nabob's treasure obliged him to borrow money as he could get it from the bankers, by mortgaging countries for it. About the 30th of January I reached a place opposite to which the Nabob of Purnea was encamped; he had not declared his intentions openly, but said he was ready and willing to obey the Nabob's orders in every thing, to pay all the revenues that were due, and to prove himself a faithful subject and servant. It was necessary to get more than these general assurances from him; he was at the head of a large body of troops; and as the Officers at Patna were then situated, it was dangerous to have such a force in my rear without knowing whether I could trust them. I endeavoured to settle matters between him and the Nabob as well as I could; he would accept of no mediation but mine; he would not see the young Nabob, but took my security that if he faithfully discharged all the demands the old Nabob had on him for revenues due, that I would endeavour to get the Nabob's consent that he should remain in his command. This kept me seven days. At this time the Prince was drawing near Patna, the Subah of that province (by name Ramnarram) had a considerable army under his command, and besides a battalion of our seapoys that was left in garrison in Patna by Lord Clive, who joined him upon that occasion. He marched out of the city with these forces. I repeatedly wrote to him and pressed him not to come to an action, but to wait

wait my arrival, and no doubt then of our success against the Prince. However, he chose to follow his own advice, he engaged the Prince; two of his principal Jamadars deserted him during the action; he was totally defeated and severely wounded; 400 of our seapoys marched to his assistance when he was surrounded by the enemy, saved him and were cut to pieces themselves with three European gentlemen, two officers, and one gentleman, a volunteer. The remainder of the battalion secured his retreat into Patna, which the Shawzadda immediately invested. I received the news of his defeat the 11th of February, and I marched with all the expedition in my power, such as obliged him on the 15th to raise the siege of Patna, and on the 22d the two armies met and engaged; the detail of the action is very interesting; it suffices to say that the young Nabob followed quite a contrary disposition to the one I wanted him to make, but I saved him in imminent danger, and the enemy was totally routed. The instant the engagement was over the young Nabob retired to his tent on account of the wounds he had received; I requested and conjured him to give me ever so small a body of cavalry, and with my Europeans and seapoys, fatigued as they were, I would do my best to pursue the enemy, and clear the country of them; he was deaf to all my entreaties, and by means of pursuit with the handful of troops I was at the head of, fatigued beyond measure with the forced marches I had made to raise the siege, put it quite out of my power; besides out of the six pieces of cannon which I had in the field, four broke down during the engagement, and some time was necessary to put those carriages in repair. At length I persuaded the Nabob to leave the city of Patna on the 29th of February, and on the 2d of March he received advice that the Shawzaddah (the Prince) was in full march for the province of Bengal. He had the advantage of a day's march of us with an army composed almost intirely of cavalry unincumbered with baggage. On the 7th we got within ten miles of him; he marched off in the night and took his way across the mountains to enter the province of Bengal in another part, a road through which no army before had ever marched, but through which, however, I made a shift to follow him, and on the 4th of April joined the old Nabob, who was in the field. On the 6th, with our united armies, we got so near the Prince, that I proposed to the Nabob

that he would give me a body of cavalry, and some spare horses to assist me in carrying my Europeans, who were exhausted and spent with fatigue, and I would attack the Prince in his camp that night. This he would not comply with, and the next day I came up, however, with the rear of their army, a river only divided us. I again sent repeated messages to beg he would only march a body of cavalry to keep the enemy in play, until I could come up with my infantry; but this he would never consent to, and the enemy marched off unmolested, and in two days after marched off, taking the same road into the Province of Bahar. Afraid for the safety of Patna, which I knew was destitute of troops, I detached Captain Knox with 200 Europeans, a battalion of seapoys, and two pieces of cannon, to march with all the expedition he possibly could for the relief of Patna, if the Prince should besiege it; he came in time to save the city, on which the Prince had made two general assaults, and was preparing for a third, when Captain Knox arrived with some part of the detachment and obliged him to raise the siege a second time. I remained in camp with the old Nabob and his son until the 15th of May, when again I marched with his son against the Nabob of Purnea, whom the old Nabob had endeavoured to bring back to his duty, but which the other refused and would comply with none of his terms, broke his promise with me, and was setting out with an intention of joining the Prince. On the 22d I again reached Patna, and crossed the river there, but before that happened, Captain Knox, whom I had ordered to march from Patna cross the river, and endeavour to stop the progress of the Nabob of Purnea so that we might get up with him, had taken a strong and judicious post, and was then attacked by the Nabob's whole army, and maintained his post with great bravery; we joined in pursuit of the enemy, who were retreating as fast as they could. On the 27th I came up with them, the young Nabob with his army in the rear two miles. The cannonading began between the two armies. I soon seized their cannon, dislodged them from all their posts, and would have obtained a complete victory if foot could have overtaken cavalry, of which his army was chiefly composed. I had none of my own, and the Nabob would not send one horseman. We continued pursuing the Nabob of Purnea until the third of July. We were to have continued our march next day, when

when between one and two o'clock in the morning Mr. Lushington came into my tent with a haccarra (or messenger) and told me the young Nabob was dead; it is difficult to express my surprize, which was followed by my enquiries to know how this accident had happened, which I was told was by a flash of lightning, as he lay in his bed; in a few minutes after his duan (or prime minister) came to me in the greatest distress, assuring me that if something was not immediately done, the consequence would be the plunder of the camp, and the Nabob's troops marching off wherever they thought proper. There was no way to prevent this accident, and the confusion which must follow, but to endeavour to keep his death a secret from his army, that we might gain time to bring over some of the Jamadars of the greatest consequence, and attach them to our interest. I sent for one or two of those he thought he could most confide in, told them the story, and requested them, as a mark of the regard they had for their old master, to continue faithful in the service of the old Nabob, and to bring over by degrees as many of the other Jamadars as they could to this way of thinking; that I on my part would use all my endeavours with the old Nabob that all the arrears of pay, and all the just demands they might have, should be settled to their satisfaction. We then determined that the army should march back towards Patna, and give out that the young Nabob was ill; this we performed in seven days, and during this whole time, except the people who were entrusted with the secret, the army had no knowledge of the young Nabob's Death. This is the narrative of my campaign; soon after my arrival at Patna, about the 28th or 29th of July, or the beginning of August, I received advice of Mr. Vansittart's arrival at Calcutta as governor.

Colonel Caillaud then read to the Committee the following letter.

To the Hon. J. Z. Holwell, Esq; President and Governor of fort William.

Camp at Balkisson's Gardens, May 29, 1760.

Sir,

I am honoured this day with your favour of the 24th inst. My last letters of the 24th, and those of yesterday of the 28th, contain all I can urge in favour of our return to Patna with the young Nabob—You seem also convinced of the necessity of it since the receipt of Mr. Amyatt's letters. I shall be

glad to find it further confirmed by the sentiments of the Select Committee.

I am not master enough of the subject to know how the Company's investment of salt-petre will be so much hurt this year, and that you fear succours will arrive too late to prevent such mischief, but this I am very confident of, that if we do not send succours, the whole province may be lost, and many years investments to come.

I will endeavour now, Sir, to reply as fully as I can to the subject on which you desire so earnestly to know my sentiments, and hope what I have to say will so fully satisfy you, that I need not at least leave the army until the campaign is quite concluded, as I think it cannot be done without prejudice to our affairs.

Bad as the man may be, whose cause we now support, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the risk of much greater inconveniences attending on such a change, than those we now labour under. I presume the establishing tranquility in these provinces, would restore to us all the advantages of trade we could wish for the profit and honour of our employers, and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquility about by our present influence over the Subah, and by supporting him than by any change which can be made. No new revolution can take place without a certainty of troubles, and a revolution will certainly be the consequence whenever we withdraw our protection from the Subah. We cannot in prudence, neither I believe leave this revolution to chance, we must, in some degree, be instrumental to bringing it about; in such a case, it is very possible we may raise a man to the dignity just as unfit to govern, as little to be depended upon, and in short as great a rogue as our Nabob, but perhaps not so great a coward, nor so great a fool, and of consequence much more difficult to manage. As to the injustice of supporting this man on account of his cruelties, oppressions, and his being detested in his government, I see so little chance in this blessed country, of finding a man endued with the opposite virtues, that I think we may put up with these vices with which we have no concern, if in other matters we find him fittest for our purpose.

As to his breach of his treaty by introducing the Dutch last year, that was never so clearly proved, I believe, but as to admit of some doubt. Colonel Clive, before he left the country, seemed satisfied that what was

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suspicious in his conduct in that affair, proceeded not from actual guilt, but from the timidity of his nature. But if we still suspect him from further circumstances, we always have it in our power to put it to the rest at once, by making him act as he ought, whether he will or no.

With regard to drawing our swords against the lawful Prince of the country, no man can more pity his misfortunes than I have done, nor would any one be more willing and happy to be instrumental in assisting him to recover his just right—but such a plan is not the thought of a day, nor the execution of it the work of a few months; there is a powerful party still remaining: the Vizier, with the Mharattas and Jutes, who, notwithstanding the constant success of Abdallah against them, still make head against him, and such are their resources and their numbers, that I believe they will at large oblige the Patans to leave the country; for though they cannot beat them fairly out of the field, they bid fair to starve them out of the country.

You have no doubt received advice from Mr. Hastings, that Abdallah hath sent orders to the several powers to acknowledge the Prince King of Indostan, by the name of Shah Allum; rupees are struck by his order at Banaras and Lucknow in that name; orders are also given to the Shujah Dowlatt, to accept the post of Vizier, and our Nabob hath got, it is said, instructions to acknowledge him, and pay him the obeisance due to the King of Kings, as he is styled.

If we were perfectly sure Abdallah would remain as he says, until he saw the Prince well fixed on the throne, and the peace and tranquillity of the country restored, we might I think all joined together, be a match for the Mharattas; but we must be well assured that Abdallah will heartily enter, and when entered will firmly support the cause; for should this appointment of his be no more (as it is possible) than a finishing stroke to end his expedition with the eclat of having given us a Mogul; and when a certain number of the country powers had entered into the alliance, he should think of a return to his own country and leave us to fight it out with the other contending party, I fear the Vizier and the Mharattas would be too strong for those who remained of the alliance, supposing them to be the Ruellahs and Sujah Dowlatt, and the Nabob of Bengal.—How-

ever, supposing all this should take place, why may it not be done with our Nabob in our hand, still his friends and protectors?

I am this instant favoured with yours of the 25th, and I find by your postscript, that your opinion and mine with regard to the Prince do not differ much: I have no objections to follow the plan you propose—Let Mr. Hastings sound the old Nabob, and I will go to work with the young one, who joins me this day.

We may continue our march on to Patna; the rains will give us time to negotiate, to see we go on sure grounds, and make such a plan of the alliance as will do us honor, and be an advantage to our country and employers—but let us not abandon the Nabob; besides the reasons I have urged above, one or more still remains, which I believe will have some weight, and make us cautious how we attempt, without very strong and urgent reasons, any change in the present system.

You are well acquainted, Sir, with the cause which first gave rise to the present share of influence which we enjoy in this part of the Mogul's empire—a just resentment for injuries received was the first motive which induced us to make a trial of our strength; the ease with which we succeeded enlarged our views, and made us cheerfully embrace all opportunities of increasing that interest and influence, both on account of the advantages which accrued from it to the Honorable Company, as likewise the hopes that it might in time prove a source of benefit and riches to our country.

—Such were I believe, the motives of Col. Clive's actions during his administration; such I believe were the views of the Honorable Company, when they solicited and obtained Col. Coote's regiment from the government; and such I am certain is the plan which the Colonel proposes on his return to pursue and to support, in hopes to convince the Ministry and the Company, as he is convinced himself, that if they please to support his project, it will prove of the greatest advantage to the Publick.

If I have stated our situation right, it follows I believe of course, that we are bound with vigor to work on the same plan, to act on the same principles, and to keep up the system as perfect and entire as it was left in our hands, that whatever resolutions the nation or the Company may come to on Col. Clive's representation, they may be

disappointed, by finding here (at least through our faults) any very material change in our situation, power, or credit.

One word more: All we can wish to do is not to suffer the Nabob to impose on us, and to check every beginning of an independence, he may endeavour to assume—Let us consult and improve upon every occasion that offers, the honor and advantage of our employers, and the increase of their trade and credit, and not let them suffer any additional expence on account of pursuing any plan, or supporting any system whatever.

By acting thus I think we cannot err; we run at least no risk, and I believe the Company's affairs may be conducted by us under this Subah as much to their advantage and credit as any other whom a revolution may place in the government.

Inclosed, I have the honor to send Mr. Amyatt's last letter received this morning. We have had, as you will see, another brush with the Prince's troops and with great success.—However, if the other plan goes on, we must put an end to this fighting system, and talk coolly on affairs.—I shall expect the favor of your opinion with great impatience, and have the honor to assure you that I am with perfect esteem and respect,

Sir,
your most obedient,
and most humble servant,
John Caillaud.

Q. What were your reasons for approving a revolution in Sept. 1760, which you seem to disapprove so strongly by the letter you have read, dated in May?

A. I will to the best of my recollection declare those motives, by stating some particulars of my situation at that time in the country.—The ascendancy which Lord Clive had over the Nabob, which flowed from the Nabob from a sense of the favors he had received from Lord Clive, was very soon after I came to the command, at an end; my constant, my unwearied attention to keep up that confidence so necessary between us and the Nabob, was prevented by some very untoward circumstances. Mr. Holwell succeeded Lord Clive in the chair, only by virtue of his rank, in order of succession, and the certainty of another Governor being soon appointed, was known to the whole country, and of course that degree of respect which the Nabob would have had to a Governor in other circumstances, was not paid to Mr.

Holwell—Mr. Holwell soon saw this and resented it; the Nabob's exceeding weak and irresolute character gave plenty of occasions for Mr. Holwell to find fault and blame his measures: I felt them too and observed them, but I thought that I did my duty best as a faithful servant to the Company, by acting the part of a mediator between them, and by softening rather than irritating the ill dispositions that subsisted between them. On this plan I acted throughout the whole course of Mr. Holwell's administration, putting off by delays, and sometimes with reasons, every approach to a change of system in that government, which, though in my own heart I adopted and knew the necessity of, yet I was desirous to keep it off as long as I could, till the necessity of it might press so hard upon us as to make it unavoidable—I beg that what I have said may have the weight with this Honorable Committee that it has with me, I thought of nothing but temporary systems, formed to the day and to the minute: I would not trust my own abilities and judgment so far as to decide upon what was right or wrong: I knew something was to be done, but how to do it I really did not know.—When that letter I have read was wrote, the Nabob's son was then alive: his extraordinary death made a great change in the situation of our affairs in that country. Mr. Vansittart's arrival, and the confidence I had in his abilities and judgment, made me, without reluctance, adopt his plan: I knew his motives; they were honest and disinterested as to himself, honorable and advantageous to his employers, and such as the necessity of the times, our particular situation at Bengal, the general state of the Company's affairs throughout India, have ever in my opinion vindicated the measure that was pursued.

Q. Whether 20 lacks or any other sum was stipulated for bringing about that revolution?

A. The night that Cossim Ally Khan signed the articles for accepting the management of the affairs of Bengal under Jaffer Ally Khan (in the presence I believe of Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Holwell, and myself) Cossim Ally Khan, after expressing many obligations he had to us for our intended good offices in his favour, tendered a paper to Mr. Vansittart, which as Mr. Vansittart interpreted to us, contained a note for 20 lacks of rupees payable to the gentlemen then present. I don't recollect a gentleman present there that did not concur with me in de-

desiring Mr. Vansittart to return that paper to Cossim Ally Khan, telling him that he mistook our motives for his advancement. He pressed on Mr. Vansittart again the acceptance of the paper, telling him that if we continued to refuse that favour he should fear that the gentlemen present were not well pleased with the appointment. Mr. Vansittart, who knew his own motives as well as mine, and I make no doubt of the rest of the gentlemen of the Committee, told Cossim Ally Khan, returning him the paper, "When you have paid off all the arrears due to the Company, to your own troops, that the peace of this country is settled, and that your own treasury is full, if then you think proper to make us any acknowledgment for the services now done you, we shall not then be unwilling to accept such marks as you will be pleased to give us of your friendship." There ended that affair, and I declare solemnly upon my honour there were no stipulations made, no partition, treaty, or any thing of the kind mentioned then or after to my knowledge of that transaction.

I am now ready and willing to declare what I received upon that occasion, when I received, and how I received it. I own I little expected after thirteen years service in that country, and nine of them in the field, that the little fortune I made should become the object of so publick an enquiry, but I am happy to meet this enquiry more than half way, and the more so in this particular point, as perhaps it may give an opportunity of doing justice to the memory of the man from whom I received it (Mr. Vansittart) who did it in his usual generous and handsome way, so that I knew not but to this minute the sum I received may be charged to this account. After Cossim Ally Khan was placed in the government I went up to the army at Patna, came down again, embarked for the Coast in January 1761, remained there a year and a half and came back to Calcutta, called there upon extraordinary business. In October 1762, Mr. Vansittart then going up to Mungeer, told me, "If I am happy enough to settle with the Nabob the unfortunate differences that have subsisted between him and my council, and that I can with propriety remind him of the services you jointly did him, I shall certainly endeavour to serve you." Mr. Vansittart went up to Mungeer, and I embarked on board a ship for Europe. In the year 1763 I received an account current from

Mr. Vansittart, in which I found credit for two lacks of rupees, unsolicited, as I have mentioned before, and much beyond my expectations; and this upon my honour is the whole of what I received directly or indirectly upon that occasion, so little was money my object or thought that I never enquired or knew of what others might have got upon the same occasion; if money had been my object I should have been more curious in my enquiries. It is not stated in the account from Mr. Vansittart from whom the two lacks came, but I suppose they came from Cossim.

Q. Who took possession of the house and effects of Meer Jassier?

A. Cossim Ally Khan, after Jassier had taken out every thing that he wanted.

Q. When was the resolution taken of making Cossim Ally Khan Nabob in the room of Meer Jassier?

A. In the accounts you have heard read of the transaction it appears that Meer Jassier, rather than consent to the terms we proposed, sent for Meer Cossim, and gave up the government to him immediately.

Q. Whether Mr. Holwell made any report to the Select Committee that Cossim Ally Khan had proposed to take off the Nabob?

A. I never heard of such proposal. Mr. Holwell never reported to us that such a proposal had been made to him.

Ordered,

That the East India Company do lay before this Committee the following papers, viz.

General letter from Fort St. George to the Court of Directors 3d Sept. 1763.

Letters from the Governor and Council of Bengal to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George 13th June, and 7th, 11th, and 14th July 1763.

General letter from the Company to Bengal 17th June 1748.

Joint letter from Messrs. Vansittart and Hallings to the Council at Calcutta 15th Dec. 1762.

Letter from Chief and Council of Dacca to the Governor and Council 10th January 1763.

Letters from John Cartier, Esq; to the Governor and Council 9th Jan. 1763.

Letters from G. Gray, Esq; to the Governor and Council 23d May and 20th June 1763.

Letter from Messrs. Leycester and Gray to the Court of Directors 29th Sept. 1765.

Letters

Letters received and sent by the Select Committee in Bengal from May 1765 to the last advices.

Mr. Yorke's opinion on Lord Clive's jaghire read to the General Court of Proprietors on the 2d of May 1764.

An account of the revenue in sterling money arising to the East-India Company from the five Northern Circars, according to the latest advices.

State of the revenues of Bengal, and charges, shewing the gross and nett receipts of land, revenues, and the civil and military charges from May 1765 to the last advices, distinguishing each year, and distinguishing Calcutta and Pergunnahs of Burdwan Midnapore, Chilligang, Bengal and Bahar.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Mercurii 6^o die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOYNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Trecothick,	Ld. Geo. Germaine,
Mr. Ongley,	Mr. Pitt,
Mr. Vane,	Mr. Rice,
Sir John Turner,	Lord Folkestone.

Ordered,

That the East-India Company do lay before this Committee a letter to the Secret Committee, dated 11th March 1762, signed by Sir E. Coote, Mr. Amyatt, John Carmac, N. Ellis, S. Batson and Mr. Verelst.

Bengal proceedings relative to Col. Caillaud read.

Opinion of Court of Directors relative to Col. Caillaud read.

A Member of the House being present, desired to acquaint the Committee, that he was Chairman of the East-India Company at that time, and was the principal cause of Colonel Caillaud's coming home, in order to do justice to a character he entertained an high opinion of; that the Court of Directors entered into a minute enquiry, when he was unanimously acquitted, and returned to India with higher honours.

Ordered,

That notice be given to Mr. Verelst, that the matter of the petition of Grégoire Cojamaul will be taken into consideration upon Friday morning next.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Jovis 7^o die Maii, 1772.

Colonel BURGOYNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Vane,	Mr. Johnstone,
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Mr. Trecothick,
Sir John Turner,
Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Fuller,

Mr. Ongley,
Mr. Rice,
Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Morton, from the East-India-House, presented several books and papers.

Ordered,

That Mr. John Galdar do attend this Committee to-morrow morning.

Mr. Sumner—to state his reasons for assenting as a Select Committeeman, to the measure of deposing Meer Jaffier, and placing Cossim Ally Khan on the Musnud.

The military operations General Caillaud has given a clear detail of, and every other argument of the intended reformation and subsequent change has been so fully stated on the public records which have been read to the Committee, that very little remains for me to say on the subject, only to assign my reasons for assenting to this measure. I shall not at present insist on the public breach of treaty on the part of Meer Jaffier, in the instance of the Dutch invasion, nor on the many other doubtful parts of his conduct. I shall not enter into the particulars and irregularities of his private life, nor of the cruelties with which he has been charged, but let my cause or conduct rest on the necessity of the reformation. From the extreme difficulties and imminent dangers the affairs of the Company, as well as those of the state, were reduced to, by the jealousies, indolence and inactivity on the part of the Nabob Jaffier on the one hand, and on the other the mal-administration and corruption of his ministers, in the collection and dissipation of the revenue, and to those I may add the intestine troubles through the whole country. I was then of opinion, and continue still firm in the same, that we could not possibly have supported the system of government then established two months longer, and embarked as we were with Meer Jaffier, we must inevitably have shared in his ruin; our difficulties and distresses, and the opinions formed thereon, whilst these were strong in our views and immediate conclusions were necessary: all these are fairly stated on our public records, and fully evince the necessity of the measure pursued. I wish much to have it understood, that, when the Committee first entered into negotiations with Meer Jaffier, their only idea was reformation in the ministry, not a revolution in the government, and that it was the unexpected obstinacy of Meer Jaffier alone, not an original design in the Committee that placed

placed Meer Cossim on the Musnad. It was a circumstance, I believe, as little thought of by Mr. Vansittart as by myself, when he left Calcutta on his visit to the Nabob, for the purpose of making those reformatations. The necessity of the subsequent change made by Mr. Vansittart, is pointed out by him in his narrative, every part of which, from my intimate knowledge of the man, I readily admitted. I then was, and am at this time of opinion, that the distraction of Meer Jassier's government, made the intended reformation necessary, and that, after we had gone such lengths, there was no room left for receding. On the whole, I flatter myself that, when all these matters are duly weighed, my conduct, in whatever character considered, whether as a subject of this realm, or as an immediate servant of the Company, will stand justified in the opinion of every candid and impartial man.

Q. Whether the invitation, which it is supposed Meer Jassier gave to the Dutch, was ever more than suspicion?

A. It was so far proved by a letter or letters found in his cabinet, after he left Muxadavad, wrote by the Dutch Governor to him on the subject of that invasion. I cannot recollect the purport of them precisely, but they were full conviction to me. They are not entered upon the public proceedings.

Q. Whether the Committee at any time presented any remonstrance or memorial to Meer Jassier upon the subject of their suspicions with respect to the Dutch?

A. Not to my recollection.

Q. Did Meer Jassier ever acknowledge any such transaction?

A. Not to my knowledge.

(Mr. Sumner read from a printed book the translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdorn, Director of Chinsara, to the Nabob Jassier Ally Khan, which he recollected to be one of those mentioned above, and which translation is as follows:)

"Our settlement was established here long before the English and other nations entered this kingdom, of which we were eye-witnesses. Our power was then greater as well as our trade; but now we perceive that both our power, interest and wealth, are lost, whilst those of other nations daily encrease. In this case what resource have we left? Our dishonour and thame is almost inevitable. For this reason, and for the security of our possessions, as well as for the service of your Excellency, I have sent for troops

into this country. You are our master and sovereign, and therefore I hope for your protection, and wait your orders to bring our troops to this place. God grant that your riches may daily encrease."

Q. Were there any other letters?

A. There were several that were shown to me by Mr. Vansittart.

Q. Whether Meer Jassier ever acknowledged these letters?

A. Never to my knowledge; nor do I believe they were ever shewn him.

The witness likewise read from the printed book before-mentioned, a translation of the following letters from Mr. Bisdorn to Jassier Ally Khan.

Letter II.

"As our nation has always been encouraged by the favour of your Excellency, and more particularly from that time, when having a favourable regard to our Company's business, you repeatedly assured our Chief of Cossimbuzar of your attachment. Considering these circumstances, I was extremely surprised that your Excellency, during your residence at Calcutta, entered into an agreement that you would strengthen the fort of Muka Tanna, in order to prevent the Dutch troops from coming this way, and also gave a note to the English, directing them to oppose the coming up of our army. All these things considered, it seems plain to us that your Excellency did not enter into the agreement, or give this order from any ill opinion of us; but it is all to be imputed to the overbearing spirit of the English. But, if any one enters into an agreement through force of distress, and afterwards does not abide by it, he will stand justified by the laws of God and man; particularly the Governor of a kingdom, who wishes for nothing else but the good of his country and the prosperity of his people. I am therefore in hopes, through your justice and favour, that you will recede from your agreement and order, and that we shall obtain an order from your Excellency for the bringing up of our army, and also that a positive order may be given to the English, on no account to molest them; for we sent for the said army to this country, in consequence of your directions. The King's revenues are greatly detrimented and the country ruined, and of this you can only look upon the English as the sole cause. Our nation formerly brought considerable sums of money into this kingdom, and did not carry out any; and now the English are so powerful, that no trade can be carried on

by us; for which reason no money now arrives, and the English yearly remit considerable sums. By this means the revenues of the country are greatly decreased, and therefore how will you, without great difficulty, be able to maintain your forces? And, when your enemies come upon you, you will not then be capable of opposing them. This time, if you will favour the Company, they will ever be at your command, and your present anxiety and uneasiness may be removed. Your Excellency cannot take a better step; and I hope you will take this into your favourable and serious consideration, and return me a proper answer."

Letter III.

"The wrathful letter you have wrote to me I have received, and it has given me inexpressible uneasiness. The troops were not called here at my own desire, nor did I imagine they would ever have come to action, and fully intended to have returned them by the ships when they sailed for Europe; they were brought here for the security of the ships: this I acquainted your Excellency of several times. During their stay in camp they molested no man, nor had any disturbances with the country people. This also you are well assured of. It was never my intention they should fight; but the English hoisted Moorish colours, and immediately came down upon them, and a battle ensued. Your Excellency is the magistrate of justice; and therefore I desire you will interfere. I was desirous that some advantage should arise to the Riots from the sale of the goods, when they were brought up, and intended to have laden on board the ships the saltpetre, and other goods that were brought, and, with the people that came here, dispatched them to Europe; but the English would not permit the boats to pass. I am willing to act up to our agreement, and I hope your Excellency will adhere to it also. In this we entirely depend on your favour. The Company have for a long time carried on trade here, and therefore earnestly desire you will continue to them your favour and protection, as we are not able of ourselves to root out our enemies."

Q. Are these all the letters that were shewn you?

A. I can't say. These I have seen.

Q. Whether you know that the Dutch Governor acknowledged the writing of these letters to Meer Jaffier?

A. I neither know whether it was asked him, or whether he ever declared it.

Q. Were those letters signed?

A. I don't recollect—they were sealed on the cover.

Q. Are you convinced that these letters were writ by the Dutch Governor?

A. I was convinced they were.

Q. What do you apprehend to be the reason that these letters were not shewn to the Select Committee, and why they were not transmitted as part of their proceedings?

A. I believe they were shewn to every one of the Committee separately, but not collectively.

Q. Why were they not shewn to the Committee in their collective capacity?

A. I cannot assign a certain reason for the conduct of Mr. Vansittart, but I suppose he did not think them of consequence.

Q. What do you apprehend to be the reason that copies of them were not transmitted to the Directors?

A. I can give but the same answer as to the last question.

Q. Do you know whether they were transmitted to the Directors or not?

A. I can't say.

Q. When were the first hostilities commenced between the Dutch and English, and by whom?

A. I can't recollect.

Q. Whether there were any hostilities between the two Companies, previous to the Dutch fleet coming into the River?

A. No hostilities. Some disagreements there had always been in our commercial transactions, which were generally accommodated.

Q. Do you think the Nabob was bound by treaty to prevent any ships or troops of the Dutch coming into Bengal?

A. Certainly I did—by the second article of the treaty.

Q. Whether the two Companies were in such a state, as that the Dutch were regarded as enemies to the English?

A. They certainly would have acted as our enemies, if they had been permitted to introduce seven or eight hundred Europeans.

Q. Do you know the general strength of the Dutch in their factories, before this operation?

A. I should imagine that in Chinsura, Cossimbuzar and Patna, and all their subordinates, there were about 150 military men.

Q. Whether the Dutch, before the affair of Fulta, publicly disavowed any hostile intentions towards the English?

A. A correspondence passed between the English

English and Dutch upon that occasion, but I cannot exactly recollect their public professions. We had no doubt of their intentions.

Q. How long was you of the Select Committee before the revolution?

A. From the time of Lord Clive's departure to the period of the revolution.

Q. Did you at the time Mr. Holwell was president, adopt Mr. Caillaud's reasons against the revolution?

A. I don't recollect that we had any meetings as a Select Committee upon that subject. The whole was carried on in the correspondence between General Caillaud and Mr. Holwell; never, to my recollection, before the Select Committee.

Q. Was you one of the Select Committee, when Cossim Ally Khan made the offer of twenty lacks to the Governor and Council?

A. I was, and was present when that offer was made. I confirm every part of Gen. Caillaud's evidence upon that occasion, with this difference, that, when the paper was returned, Mr. Vansittart observed, that we were labouring for the peace and safety of the country; that the exigencies of the state were pressing, and that we would not on any account receive this offer; but that if, when the country was settled, he found himself in a situation so to do with convenience to his affairs, he would then be at full liberty to gratify his friends as he thought proper. Mr. Vansittart further added, "I will for my part under such circumstances freely accept any token of your regard, and I should suppose the other gentlemen will do the same." Mr. Vansittart returned the paper to Cossim Ally Khan, who seemed uneasy, and said he apprehended we were not so much his friends as he wished. Mr. Vansittart then gave him the strongest assurances of our sincerity, and took this opportunity to press a donation or gift from him of five lacks of rupees to the Company, as a help towards the reduction of Pondicherry. This was granted and paid the very first money, which was within a very few weeks after the transaction, to the best of my recollection.

Q. Do you know what acknowledgement Cossim Ally Khan made the Governor and Council any time after he was placed on the Musnud?

A. None that I know of as a Governor and Committee.

Q. Do you know of any acknowledgement to any individual?

A. As to myself, and as in the course of

my reply to this question I shall have occasion to mention my dismissal from the Company's service, a circumstance which, if not explained by me, may leave an impression of culpability on my part, I beg leave to inform the Committee that the cause of my dismissal was my having signed a letter to the Court of Directors as one of the Council among many others, wherein we expostulated with them on what we thought harsh and undeserved treatment. This letter gave the Directors such umbrage that, without the least regard to the merits or length of our services, every man in India who signed it was immediately dismissed. I state this as the sole cause of my dismissal, and in proof thereof I refer to our general letter to the Court of Directors of 29th Dec. 1759, and the 147th paragraph, which contains the offence; and to the Court of Directors dated 21st Jan. 1761, and the first paragraph, which assigns the cause thereof, and which I hope the Committee will indulge me to have read.

Letters above-mentioned read.

I shall now proceed to remind the Committee that the change of government in favour of Cossim Ally took place in October 1760. Several months after this establishment Coja Petrusse, the Nabob's Agent in Calcutta, presented me in the name of the Nabob with 80,000 sicca rupees. The payments were made from May to July 1761. I was dismissed the Company's service the 5th of August following, and from this period to the time of my leaving Bengal (the 20th of Jan. 1762) I received further and in like manner through the same hands at different times the further sum of 144,000 sicca rupees, making together the whole amount received 224,000 rupees (28,000 l. sterling). The reason for my separating the sums received prior and subsequent to my dismissal is in support and confirmation of the idea I have always entertained of its having been a free and voluntary gift on the part of the Nabob; and, as I would wish to convey this idea to the Committee, I beg leave to draw their attention to this one circumstance, that by far the largest part of the Nabob's present was made and received by me after my dismissal, a period when I was no longer in any way to render the Nabob services or injuries. Under these circumstances and upon the whole I do declare, that I never considered this transaction as dishonourable. I never made a secret of it. I considered that my employers had been no way prejudiced by it, that no part of their interest had been

been sacrificed to this man, and that I was at full liberty to receive from him any favours he might think proper to bestow. I should be sorry to intrude on the patience of the Committee, but to obviate an opinion which seems too prevalent, that presents are received indiscriminately in India, and that self-interest only is the motive of our actions. I must crave their indulgence for a moment longer whilst, after showing what I thought an honourable present, I set in an opposite point of view what I thought a dishonourable one. In March 1761 I was appointed by the Governor and Council to take charge of the Company's affairs in the province of Burdwan, and to make the necessary inquiries into the state of the revenues, so as to enable them to form a settlement with the Rajah for the ensuing year. While I was yet upon my journey, and while I had reached Burdwan, the Rajah found means to send his Agents to Calcutta to make this settlement of the revenues for the Company with the Governor and Council. The Agents represented that of late years the Nabob's receipts, which was the claim we had on the Province on behalf of the Company, had scarcely exceeded 18 lacks of rupees. However, after much treating, they offered to settle for the next year at between 24 and 25 lacks of rupees. The Governor and Council, though they had not actually and in form agreed to this proposal, yet considered it so advantageous to the Company that they had determined amongst themselves to accept of it; and on the 3d of April I was informed by letter that they meant to accept of it, and I was in consequence by a letter from the Board immediately recalled. As in the course of my journey I had acquired such information as assured me that the Province would yield a much larger payment to the Company than had been offered, I acquainted Mr. Vansittart with my opinion, and that I meant to protest against those terms of agreement at our next meeting in Council. The next morning I waited on Mr. Vansittart again before the Council met, and on my farther information to him he was so fully convinced of the propriety and justness of this opinion, that he very readily agreed to make the experiment. This transaction appears on the consultation 10th April 1760, and accordingly I was re-appointed to Burdwan with the same commission and powers I had before received. I did return in consequence, prosecuted the business, and by the latter end of June or the

beginning of July had completed my enquiries, and on the foundation of those enquiries I returned to Calcutta with a free voluntary offer of the Rajah to pay 32 lacks and a half of rupees. This was agreed to, and the whole was received within that year. My opposition to this agreement and persisting in the enquiry had further this good consequence attending it, that it established a footing for a future President at Burdwan, and thereby laid a foundation for those great improvements and increase of rents, which have followed annually, and which, if I am rightly informed, are increased at this time to 43 lacks of rupees per ann. neat receipts to the Company.

The matter I mean to bring to the Committee's view on the occasion, is, that the interest of my employers hath ever been the motives of my conduct. On the morning of the 10th April when my re-appointment to Burdwan was debated in Council and took place, I had an offer made by the Rajah's Agent of four lacks of rupees for my own absolute use and benefit to be paid down immediately on condition I would forbear all remonstrance against and opposition to those engagements which the Council thought were right and proper, and were ready to enter into, and, no doubt, would have done, had I remained silent. Mr. Smith, a Member of the Council, and a Gentleman with whom I was most intimately acquainted, came to me soon after the offer had been made. He informed me that he had offers made to him of two lacks of rupees to use his influence with me not to stir in the affair, that their offers to me through him were unlimited, so much had they this point at heart. We both treated the proposal as it deserved, and immediately went together to Mr. Vansittart, before the Council met, as I have mentioned before. In confirmation of what I have here said, I entreat to call upon Mr. Cullin Smith for his evidence of what passed upon that occasion, and I appeal to an honourable Member of this Committee of known candour (Gov. Johnstone) who was long since acquainted with this fact, and who took occasion to mention it, very much to my honour, in a large Assembly, at a General Court of Proprietors, at a time I little imagined I should have occasion to bring it back to his recollection in this place.

Governor Johnstone.

As Mr. Sumner has appealed to me for the truth of a particular transaction, I should be sorry to appear backward in giving my testimony

testimony where I can testify any thing in his favour; more especially as I disapprove of much of his conduct in 1765 and 1766, and that we have not been on friendly terms of late. I know that all I can say upon this matter, respecting what I heard from Mr. Culling Smith, is no evidence, because Mr. Smith is alive and in Britain. However, it is certain Mr. Smith informed me of the transactions of the Rajah of Burdwan, as Mr. Sumner has stated them; and Mr. Vansittart, who is probably lost, told me that he had nearly quarreled with Mr. Sumner, for his persisting in resisting the agreement Mr. Vansittart had made with the Rajah for eighteen lacks per annum. However, Mr. Sumner's propositions were at length adopted, and he actually paid into the Company's treasury 32 lacks and 50,000 rupees for the first year.

Mr. SUMNER.

Q. What presents were received by others?

A. Whatever has come to my knowledge as to the receipts of others has been acting as their attorney, or in the course of business; so that I shall be under some difficulty in replying to this question, were I not persuaded that every one of those gentlemen, if called upon, would declare as freely and with as little reserve as I have done, the benefits they received from Meer Cossim's bounty; and as I can from this circumstance of being attorney to these gentlemen speak with certainty upon the subject I shall conceal no part. Mr. Holwell, who was of the Council, received two lacks and 70,000 rupees. Mr. Macguire one lack and 80,000 rupees. Mr. Culling Smith, Secretary to the Committee, one lack and 34,000 rupees. Major York, who commanded the detachment immediately attendant on Meer Cossim, one lack and 34,000 rupees. This is all that ever came to my knowledge. I don't know whether Mr. Vansittart ever received any thing. Those sums were paid in 1761.

Q. What were the circumstances of the country when this money was received?

A. It is a matter, I suppose, the Nabob is a proper judge of.

Q. Whether Meer Jaffier at the time of the revolution had discharged his debt incurred by the treaty in 1757 with the Company?

A. No. A balance remained due for which, when the assignments on the Burdwan country were given up, we received jewels and other effects which we considered as full security.

Q. Were these considered as security or payment?

A. As security absolutely.

Q. When was the payment made?

A. Upon my honour I can't recollect.

Q. Whether, when you received the first payment of your present or previous to it, you did not receive an obligation for a larger sum?

A. I did. It was some weeks to the best of my recollection after Cossim Ally Khan left Calcutta; but I cannot so far charge my memory as to ascertain the exact time, or indeed how many weeks, that Coja Petrusse, his Agent in Calcutta, informed me the Nabob intended to make me a present of two lacks and a half of rupees, and desired to know whether I would accept of them. My answer was, that as a free and voluntary gift on his part, whenever his circumstance and situation was such as would admit of it with convenience to his own affairs, I would very thankfully accept of it. He then presented me with the Nabob's obligation for that sum, which he desired I would receive, saying that the Nabob had suffered much uneasiness on Mr. Vansittart's refusal of the obligation for 20 lacks of rupees, fearing that we were not so much his friends as he could wish. My answer was, that I considered the obligation as of no validity in itself, but as he put it on this footing, and seemed rather to press it, I would receive it as an earnest of the Nabob's friendly intentions towards me. During the whole time Cossim Ally Khan was in Calcutta I never had any private conference with him, nor was I at any time given to understand by him, by message or otherwise, directly or indirectly, that he intended making me a present, nor had I any expectation of such till I received the obligation, I solemnly declare.

Q. At the time of the conversation between you and Coja Petrusse was the Nabob indebted to the Company?

A. It is a circumstance I cannot from memory answer. It is probable he might have been in debt; but I think jewels were mortgaged to us for the payment of every debt to the best of my knowledge.

Q. Whether the deposit of jewels from Meer Jaffier was looked upon as a sufficient security, and what became of that security?

A. It was considered as absolute good security; but when they were redeemed or how that account was settled I cannot recollect.

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Q. Were there at the time of the conversation with Coja Petrusse great arrears due to the Nabob's army?

A. Large sums had been sent up by Meer Cossim to Patna for the payment of the troops, and payments had likewise been made at Muxadavad for payment of that part of the army that was there. As to what was due to the army it is impossible for me to ascertain. That sums were due is most probable; for I don't suppose the army account has ever been or ever will be settled in the memory of man.

Q. Whether there was peace or confusion in the country at the time of the conversation with Coja Petrusse?

A. I apprehend the troubles were not altogether concluded, nor that the battle with the Shah Zadda had happened.

Q. Whether you apprehend the treasury of the Nabob was abounding at that time?

A. At the time the obligation was given I apprehend not; but when it was paid I apprehend the Nabob found no inconvenience in paying it.

Q. Whether after the conversation with Coja Petrusse you disclosed at any time and when that conversation with Mr. Vansittart?

A. I never did.

Q. Whether you had curiosity to enquire of Coja Petrusse whether a message similar to that sent to you, had been sent to Mr. Holwell, Mr. Caillaud, Mr. Macguire, or either of them?

A. I had not.

102d paragraph of the Company's general letter to Bengal 19th Feb. 1766 read.

Letter from Mr. Holwell to Mr. Wollaston, dated London 13th April 1763 read.

Letter from Mr. Amyatt to Mr. Hastings, 2d March, with Mr. Hastings's answer, read.
Mr. Sumner.

Q. Do you believe (as Mr. Holwell's attorney) that Mr. Vansittart knew any thing of the two lacks mentioned in Mr. Holwell's letter?

A. I do not believe it, and think it impossible he should.

Ordered,

That Archibald Swinton, Esq; do attend this Committee.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Veneris 8^o die Maii, 1772.

Colonel BURGOYNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,
Mr. Sutton,

Mr. Ongley,
Mr. Hotham,

Mr. Vane,
Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Curzon,
Mr. Fuller,

Mr. Pitt,
Sir John Turner,
Mr. Cornwall,
Mr. Ellis.

Petition of Gregore Cojamaul read.

Part of Lord Clive's letter to Mr. Verelst and the Committee, upon his leaving India, dated 16th of January 1767, read.

The President's Minute of 5th of February 1767, read.

Gregore Cojamaul—to give an account of the circumstances of his being taken up and confined to the time of his releasement and embarking for England.

On the 14th of March 1768, Rajah Bulwanting's officer seized me at Bara Fort, and told me it was in consequence of an order the Rajah had received from the Calcutta Governor, Mr. Verelst—I was then taken to different forts under 40 men, who guarded me. On the 17th they put me in a boat, where was another prisoner, an Armenian gentleman, named Melcomb Phillip—we were carried to Chauncey, where I received letters of condolance from the Rajah and his Ministers on my imprisonment, and approbation of my conduct.

After some days we were carried to Patna, where we arrived the 30th of March, and were carried before the Company's collector, named Shetabroy, who confined us in his Cutcherry till the 6th of April—he then sent away Rajah Bulwanting's guard, and put English seapoys over us:—As soon as the guard was changed they carried us into a boat in such a hasty manner, that we could not know what we were accused of—one day we heard that there was an order from Mr. Verelst that we should be carried to Muxadavad before Mhamud Reza Cawn. We arrived at Muxadavad on the 26th of April, and were carried before Mhamud Reza Cawn, who was the superior of the English Collectors, and he ordered us to be carried to a place called Terribay. On the 27th of April the seapoy guard was sent away, and other English seapoys were put in their place, under the command of Major Christian Fisher. While we were prisoners, our relations and friends applied to the Nabob for our releasement: he told them he had wrote to Calcutta for orders. At Calcutta our relations presented a petition to the Council and Governor, which was presented to Mr. Verelst himself, who told them to go and apply to the Nabob in the city of Muxadavad. On the 23d of May we were released and sent to Calcutta, where we arrived the 8th

8th of June.

On the 10th we waited on Mr. Verelst to know his pleasure—he insisted that we had not been prisoners. I told Mr. Verelst that I had transacted business for some English gentlemen, under a purwannah sealed with the Company's seal:—He said if this be the case you are blameless, bring the purwannah and shew it me. I did not bring my purwannah to shew him, being advised not to do it, because the other gentleman, Melcomb Phillip, told me that he had carried his, and that Mr. Verelst had detained it. Afterwards I was distressed, from an order that no Armenian or Portuguese should go out of the English dominions; so I remained without having my goods, or being able to collect my money, which determined me to come to this country to seek for justice.

Q. To what value do you suppose the goods and debts you left behind you amounted to?

A. In all 5000l.

Q. Was that belonging to yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you leave no goods or debts with which you was entrusted by other people?

A. I did.

Q. Whose goods?

A. Mr. Bolts' and Mr. Hare's—I guess about ten or twelve thousand pounds worth.

Q. In what part of the country were those goods and debts?

A. In Bulwantsing's dominions.

Q. Since that time have you had no accounts of your debts, or those belonging to Mr. Bolts or Mr. Hare?

A. I have had no account: I have been in England since August 1769.

Q. Whether you ever heard that the Company's servants were forbid to trade in Bulwantsing's country?

A. No. I think the Company's servants were allowed to trade in that country, because I have often seen goods there belonging to the English, and have seen English Gomastahs in that country.

Q. Do you think your goods and debts, together with those of Mr. Bolts and Mr. Hare, are lost, so that you shall never receive them?

A. I don't expect a farthing.

Q. Of the 5000l. you left, what part was in goods, and what in debts?

A. Rather more in debts than in goods.

Q. When you left that country, did you look upon your debts as good?

A. At that time every one of them was good.

Q. What part of Mr. Bolts' and Mr. Hare's property left behind was in goods, and what in debts?

A. As I guess rather more in goods than in debts.

Q. Did you apprehend that their debts were good when you left that country?

A. They were good.

Q. Whether you know of any goods of English manufacture being sold in Bulwantsing's country?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any English broad cloth and copper, or other English commodities being sold in Bulwantsing's or Shujah Dowla's country?

A. I never saw it but have heard it has.

Q. About what time was it that you have heard of English goods being sold in Bulwantsing's country?

A. Between 1767 and 1768.

Mr. Cojamaul's original purwannah produced, and declared by Mr. Rumbold to be the purwannah issued by him when he was Chief of Patna, and interpreted by Gonyshamdass as follows:

“The magnificent merchants of the English Company, the Dewans of the magnificent provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa, servants of the bold King Shah Allum.

The Governors, Zemindars, Chondries, and Canongores of the districts belonging to the province of Gauzepoor, which belongs to the great province of Oud, may observe:

Since Gregore Gomastah being appointed by Mr. Francis Hare, gentleman, to buy and sell goods, he going into that country that he may carry on trade for the abovesaid gentleman, for the space of six months, it is necessary that nobody shall interrupt him, that he may carry on trade by uprightness with an easy mind, it is necessary that they having observed the power of this order, may put it in execution.

30th of October 1767, in the 9th year of the King.

Gregore Cojamaul.”

Q. Had you ever any notice or warning, either from the servants of the English Company, or Bulwantsing, or any of his officers that you was conducting yourself improperly, before you was seized and imprisoned?

A. I never had any notice.

Q. Did you think that that purwannah gave you authority to trade for Mr. Bolts?

A. No.

Q. Had you any purwannah to trade for Mr. Bolts?

A.

A. No.

Q. Had you a right to trade for the English without a purwannah?

A. I had, being a merchant settled in that country.

Q. If you had a right to trade without a purwannah, what use was there in having one?

A. I was advised, if I did any business for the English gentlemen, to get one. I had liberty and permission from Bulwanting to do business in that country, and never was molested—The Rajah and people were satisfied.

Q. Was Gauzepoor part of Bulwanting's country?

A. It was.

Q. When you came to this kingdom did you apply to the East-India Company?

A. I arrived in London the 18th of August 1769—I presented a petition to the Court of Directors on the 12th of September, but I never had any answer. In October the Secretary sent me a letter that he would be glad to speak with me any morning—I employed Mr. Bolts, because I could not speak English myself.

Q. Did Mr. Verelst ever desire you to give him a list of your goods, and say he would assist you in recovering them?

A. No.

Q. When you carried on trade in Bulwanting's country, did you ever make use of the English name?

A. I did not—I had no occasion, because I was a merchant—I traded for English gentlemen, but I did not call myself an English Gomastah, nor said I traded by English authority.

Thomas Rumbold, Esq;

With regard to purwannahs they are of very different kinds—when they are issued in the manner of that produced for the purchase of goods, the servants of the Company have only been entitled to them—they exempt the possessor from all duties or impositions of the officers of the country government. And no man residing in Bulwanting's country without them, or within the provinces, could have carried on their business without being liable to frequent interruptions and demand of duties from the farmers of the districts—I believe there have been no Armenians residing in Shujah Dowla's country till the influence obtained by the English; and they were after that in common, with other Gomastahs, employed by the servants of the Company—It was sometimes a doubt

whether we had a right to grant these purwannahs for the purchase of goods within his dominions; it had been however for some time done, and no notice taken of it, probably from Shujah Dowla's being put in possession of that country—In course of time complaints came that Gomastahs of the English were guilty of many oppressions in that country; many letters were wrote by Shujah Dowla: some I received myself, and General Smith, who was at the Court of Shujah Dowla, often made representations how disagreeable it was to the Nabob to have those Gomastahs residing with such a protection within his country.

This occasioned orders from the President and Council of Fort William that no purwannahs should in future be granted—that all Gomastahs should be recalled, and that when goods passed the boundaries of the Bahar province, whether belonging to the natives of Bengal, Bahar, or Orissa, or not, should be subject to the duties collected by Shujah Dowla's officers from other merchants: In short, that the English privilege should be withdrawn. I believe that these orders from the President and Council were in consequence of some directions from home. Every man who had these purwannahs was entitled to particular privileges: an exemption from all duties of the country government. When the orders came for recalling these Gomastahs, several gentlemen at Patna represented that they should suffer greatly by the immediate recall of their Gomastahs, before they could have time to adjust their concerns; and several who made this representation were indulged with a longer time; but there appearing no end to that indulgence, another order was sent for their immediate return, and to deliver up their purwannahs. This order was signified to several of the gentlemen I had granted purwannahs to—many of the purwannahs were delivered to me.

I cannot speak particularly to the purwannahs of these Armenians, why it was not given up, or whether the time was elapsed.—Several Gomastahs still remained in Shujah Dowla's country, and took the names of English gentlemen—three in particular took my name, and were seized upon either by Shujah Dowla, or the troops acting under Capt. Starpen. Mr. Verelst, Resident at Calcutta, wrote to me, that he was surprized there should be men acting for me in that country, when the orders from the Presidency had so frequently been repeated against it. I wrote him for answer, that I was very glad they

they had been taken up, and hoped they would meet with a due punishment, for acting in my name without any authority from me—the only Gomastahs that I kept in the country at that time, were for the service of the Company, and by permission of Shujah Dowla, to provide timber at a place called Gorruckpore, for building barracks for the troops—I never had any complaint from Mr. Hare, who was the Second at Patna, of those persons, who by that purwannah had acted as his Gomastahs, being seized—I cannot recollect the time; but Mr. Bolts wrote to me, mentioning these Armenians being in Shujah Dowla's country, and recommending it to me to employ them as my Gomastahs—he particularly mentioned to me the advantages that would arise by carrying on a particular trade by them—I declined employing them.

Q. At what time did you receive the complaints from Shujah Dowla?

A. I can't charge my memory with the particular time.

Q. Whether Mr. Johnstone did not present the purwannah, now produced, to you several days ago, to look at the date, that you might be master of the subject?

A. Certainly.

Q. Whether you understood this purwannah was both to buy and sell?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. By what stipulation of treaty, or other regulation, did the exemption of duties arise in consequence of the English purwannahs in Bulwanth's and Shujah Dowla's dominions?

A. He refers back to the former part of his evidence.

Q. Do you remember the date, when orders were sent to you not to grant any more purwannahs?

A. I have many copies of transactions abroad, which I keep for my own satisfaction—If on looking over my papers I shall find the copy of the order, I shall certainly bring it to the Committee.

Q. In what light do you consider Shitabroy?

A. I consider Shitabroy as a man appointed by the Nabob and his Ministers, to collect the revenues with the approbation of the Company's agents, as having the Dewannu in their possession.

Q. Who do you consider the Nabob and his Ministers to be appointed by?

A. I believe the Company's records will shew.

Q. Have you any belief or knowledge concerning that yourself?

A. I never had the honour of being concerned in the appointment of any Nabob or Minister.

Q. When you was chief at Patna, was Shitabroy under your direction?

A. No.

Q. Was he perfectly independent of your authority?

A. Intirely independent of my authority.

Q. Do you consider him as a servant of the East-India Company or not?

A. No more than I consider Mhamud Reza Cawn.

Q. Do you consider Mhamud Reza Cawn as a servant?

A. I consider him as the Minister of the Nabob.

Q. Does Mhamud Reza Cawn receive his directions upon the affairs of the government from the Nabob?

A. I never was present at any directions that were sent him.

Q. Did you ever send or give any orders to Shitabroy?

A. I never gave an order to him in my life; but I have made many requests to him as Chief of the Factory.

Q. Was he always so civil as to grant your requests?

A. He was one of the best bred men I ever met with—and I never gave him an order.

Q. What would have been the consequence to Shitabroy, if he had refused the request?

A. If it had been on behalf of the East-India Company, I should have represented it to the Governor and Council of Calcutta, if of a private nature, I must have satisfied myself.

Q. Whether you suppose in consequence of such a representation, Shitabroy would have been removed from his office?

A. I suppose, if it had been any thing that materially affected the interest of the Company, the Nabob would have shewed a proper resentment to the officer who had the charge of his business in that province.

Q. Whether you believe Shitabroy would have dared to refuse any request coming from you officially, as a public officer of the Company, and upon a public account?

A. Except the requests had been very improper, I don't believe he would.

Q. Who pays Shitabroy his salary?

A. He is paid out of the revenues, the same as other officers employed in collecting them.

M

Q.

Q. Who is it that pays him—the Nabob or the East-India Company?

A. Certainly the Nabob—he receives it out of the revenues, and makes up his accounts every year to the Nabob at Muxadavad.

Q. Whether it is paid out of the gross revenue, or out of the particular revenue assigned to the Nabob by treaty?

A. Out of the gross revenue.

Q. About what time were those purwannahs first issued?

A. There were purwannahs issued, before I was Chief of the Factory, which was in December 1766.

Q. Were any purwannahs ordered by Lord Clive?

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Whether purwannahs to the same effect as that produced, were not issued in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa?

A. They were to the Company's servants, mentioning the name of the Gomastah employed by them.

Q. Whether a Gomastah acting under such a purwannah, could send goods free of duties without a duffuck?

A. Certainly not; the duffuck passes the goods by the different custom-houses, which are called Chokies; but there is a duty upon almost every species of goods which are paid to the farmer where those goods are manufactured, which the duffuck has nothing to do with, and which all the country merchants are subject to; but which the purwannah given to our merchants exempts them from, as I have always understood. I am not sure whether the duty is paid by the purchaser or the manufacturer, but which ever it is, the purwannah exempts him—I have traded in Shujah Dowla's country in opium and some little salt-petre.

Q. Do they pay duties in Shujah Dowla's country?

A. I always traded as a servant of the Company, and consequently my agents were furnished with purwannahs and duffucks, and therefore I can't speak positively to the duties. When the orders came to me every Gomastah of mine was recalled.

Q. Had you ever any complaints against Coja Gregore, Coja Melcombe, Coja Johannes Padre Rafael, or Ramsuncher?

A. Never particularly—the complaints that I heard were in general against the English Gomastahs.

Q. Did you ever hear or know the causes of confining those Gomastahs?

A. I never heard any thing in particular about them.

Q. Had you ever any complaint from any of the Princes of the country whilst you was Chief at Patna, against Mr. Bolts?

A. No, not to my recollection.

Fort William Consultations, May 18, 1768, read.

Q. Do you remember any public orders for prohibiting Armenians, their descendants, and others, from trading in Bulwanting's or Shujah Dowla's dominions, before the edict of the 18th of May 1768, which has now been read?

A. I don't recollect—but should there have been any order at that time which may have slipped my memory, I hope the Committee will not suppose that I had any intention of secreting it.

Q. Was it not your custom at Patna to enter in a book all your letters of correspondence with the country powers?

A. I believe they mostly were, but I have no copies.

Q. Are those books transmitted from the subordinate Factories to the Presidency?

A. I do not believe the books of country correspondence have been so transmitted.

Q. Was that general order for withdrawing the Gomastahs and purwannahs issued by you, entered?

A. I believe they are.

Gregore Cojamaul.

Q. When you purchased goods for Mr. Hare, did you pay the duty to the Zemindar?

A. I know but of one duty, and that goes to the Toudar or his officers—I never purchased any thing without paying the duty.

Q. Why did you not produce the purwannah to excuse Mr. Hare from paying the duty?

A. Because I did not chuse to act as a Gomastah, but as a merchant—I told Mr. Hare I would not do it.

Q. Why did you take the purwannah?

A. I was advised by my friends, but I never used it.

Q. Do you know nothing of any duties whatsoever from which the producing the purwannah would exempt you?

A. The force of this purwannah, as I have heard, is to hinder the duty in the English or any other dominions—but I never made use of it.

Q. Did you charge Mr. Hare with the duties?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you, when you had a pur-
wannah that would have exempted them?

A. Because I told Mr. Hare at first, that
I would not be employed as a Gomastah for
the English, but as a merchant.

Q. What is the force of the dustuck?

A. To pass the goods by the Chokies.

Q. Whether there is not a duty paid in
the place where the goods are manufactured?

A. Yes—where it is bought or manufac-
tured.

Q. Have you your account with Mr. Hare?

A. No—it remains in India.

Q. Is it any disgrace to be an English
Gomastah?

A. A merchant is always respected more,
and has more credit than a Gomastah.

Q. Is a merchant more respected than an
English Gomastah?

A. It is a character of more respect.

Q. Did you ever apply to Mr. Verelst for
redress?

A. I never applied myself, but my friends
did.

Q. What was their application?

A. It was for redress—I have heard of no
answer from my friends.

Q. Who were those friends?

A. Melcomb Phillip—he said he could get
no answer.

Q. Did you ever send any goods to Mr.
Hare?

A. I have sent things of little consequence.

Ordered,

That Capt. James Capper do attend this
Committee on Monday next.

Ordered,

That the East-India Company do lay be-
fore this Committee the agreement entered
into between the old East-India Company
and the Armenian Phanuse on behalf of this
nation.

Lunæ 11^a die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGONYE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Trecothick,
Mr. Vane,	Mr. Ongley,
Mr. Pulteney,	Lord Clive,
Mr. Strachey,	Mr. Pitt,
Sir G. Elliot,	Lord Falkstone.

Mr. Morton, pursuant to orders, present-
ed several books and papers.

General letter from the Select Committee
to the Court of Directors, 31st Jan. 1766,
read.

Proceedings of Select Committee, 31st
Dec. 1766, read.

Consultations 10th Dec. 1767, letters from
Col. Smith, Mr. Bolts, and the President's
minute read.

Proceedings of Select Committee, 11th
Dec. 1767, read.

Proceedings of Select Committee, 22d
Dec. 1767, read.

Persian Correspondence, 19th Feb. 1768,
and 27th Feb. 1768, read. B. No. 12. and
14.

Original letter (in the Bengal language)
from Ramsinker to Mr. Bolts, dated 17th
Mar. 1768, produced by Mr. Bolts; toge-
ther with a translation of the same, which was
read.

A letter from Capt. Gabriel Harper, and
translation produced and reproved by Go-
nythamdas, which was read.

22d March, 1768. Bulwanting's letter to
Mr. Verelst, in answer to his of the 19th,
read. C. No. 98.

27th March, 1768, C. No. 28 and 31,
read.

Mr. Bolts produces a copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Verelst, dated Calcutta, 30th
March, 1768, which was read.

Mr. Bolts produces a letter from Mr. Verelst
in answer to the above, dated 31st March
1768, read.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Verelst, dated 2d April, 1768,
which was read.

Letter from Sujah Dowla, to Mr. Verelst,
3d April, 1768, read. C. No. 118.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Verelst, dated 7th April,
1768, which was read.

Mr. Bolts produces a letter from Mr. Ve-
relst, dated 9th April, 1768, which was
read.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Verelst, dated 11th April,
1768, which was read.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Knot, dated 13th April,
1768, which was read.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from
himself to Mr. Floyer, dated 13th April,
1768, which was read.

Mr. Bolts produces a letter from Mr.
Floyer, in answer to the above, dated 13th
April, 1768, which was read.

Letter to Rajah Bulwanting, 14th April,
1768, read. C. No. 32.

Proceedings of Select Committee, 15th
April, 1768, read.

Letter from Shitabroy received 16th April,
1768, read. C. No. 134.

Letter

Letter to Sujah al Dowla, 26th April, 1768, read. C. No. 34.

Letter to Bulwanting of same date read. C. No. 35.

Mr. Bolts produces an original letter from Coja Abraham, dated 4 Zilhedge, and translation, which was proved by Gonyshamdass, and read.

Mr. Bolts produces copy of a letter from himself to Governor and Council, dated 2d May, 1768, which was read.

Fort William Consultations, 4th May, 1768, read.

Letters from Mahomed Reza Cawn received 3d May, 1768, read. C. No. 146.

Rukah from Sujah al Dowla received May 15, 1768, together with Meer Mufhallah's obligation, read. C. No. 161.

Petition of the relations of the Armenians to council at Fort William, 16th May, 1768, produced and read.

Bengal consultations, 18th May, 1768, (Mr. Bolts' protest) read.

Letter from Shitabroy to Mr. Bolts, dated 9th May, 1768, and translation produced and re-proved by Gonyshamdass, read.

Letter from Juggulanound to Mr. Bolts, dated 24th May, 1768, and translation produced and read.

Letter to Rajah Bulwanting, 29th May, 1768, read. C. No. 46.

Letter from Borgenauking to Coja Gre-gore produced by Mr. Bolts, and proved by Gonyshamdass, read.

Letter from Sujah al Dowla, 4th July, 1768, read. D. No. 209.

Original note from Bulwanting to his ambassador at Calcutta, dated 24th April, 1768, and translation produced and proved by Mr. Bolts, which was read.

Persian letter wrote by Rajah Shitabroy to Mr. Bolts, 31st July, 1768, produced by Mr. Bolts, and re-prov'd by Gonyshamdass, read.

Gregore Cojamaul's letter to the Court of Directors, 29th Feb: 1772, together with the answer thereto, read.

Padre Rafael.

Q. Give an account of your being taken up till the time of your releasement?

A. I was in Fizeabad the 27th of March, 1768. Captain Harper sent two parties of seapoys, who took me prisoner and carried me to Captain Harper's tent; he sent the Munhee to know the reason why we came at such an improper hour. I said, your matter knows the reason why your seapoys brought me here. As soon as I spoke to the

Munhee, Captain Harper came out and said, I must send you to Calcutta! I answered, for what reason? he said angrily, that Mr. Verelst had sent a letter and you must go immediately.—I represented the distress my affairs would suffer, if I had not three or four months time allowed to settle them, and intreated some delay. He said, I shall give you three days. I represented that I should be ruined, if I had not more time allowed me—I was put under confinement in my own house, and strictly guarded by the seapoys, and kept from the 27th of March to the 1st of May. On the 2d of May I was sent to Illahabad, and arrived the 10th; I was kept till the 30th in the open air; I applied by Capt. Gravely to be released, but without success. The 2d of June (still under confinement) I was sent to Patna, where I arrived the 28th. I was 10 days at Patna under confinement. I applied to Shitabroy to be released, but without success. On the 15th of July I arrived at Muxadavad; I was brought before the Nabob, I pleaded that as a merchant I apprehended I might go where I pleased, paying the duties; the Nabob said, there was now a new regulation, and that could not be; and then demanded an obligation that I would not go up to the high country to trade under pain of confiscation of my goods. I refused to grant the obligation, and was confined in a stable without meat and drink for 24 hours. I was then imprisoned in a dark dirty place, worse than a stable, till the 22d of August. I made application to Mhamud Reza Cawn to be released. He said he could do nothing without orders from Mr. Verelst. The Subadar (or commander of the seapoys) told me some days after that the Nabob had been to wait on Mr. Sykes, to know whether he had any orders from the Committee, and upon his return I was ordered to be released; the Subadar demanded 60 Rupees, which I not being able to pay him, was detained three days longer by his authority, when upon payment of the money I was released, but directions were given me not to go to the upper country, and accordingly I went to Calcutta. During my confinement money was frequently extorted from me by the seapoys. It cost me 2000 Rupees during this confinement; the greatest part of which was forced from me by the seapoys.

Ordered,

That Mr. Verelst do attend this Committee to-morrow morning.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Martis 12^o die Maii, 1772.

Colonel BURGOYNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Lord Falkstone,	Mr. Johnstone,
Mr. Vane,	Mr. Rice,
Sir G. Elliot,	Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Sutton.

Mr. Morton, from the East-India House, presented, pursuant to order, a paper intitled, An Agreement between the Company and the Armenians, June 22, 1688, which was read.

Consultations at Fort William, March 3, 1766, read.

Letter from the Court of Directors, March 4, 1767, read.

Mr. Verelst interrogated.

Q. What do you know with respect to the imprisonment of the Armenians, the cause of it, and by whose authority they were confined?

A. I should be very ready to give any account in my power to the Committee of these transactions; but, as the petitioner Cojamaul, and Rafael, another Armenian, have commenced suits against me both in Chancery and in the Court of Common Pleas, to which I have a defence, and, I doubt not, a full satisfaction; and, as those suits are now depending, I am advised by my council not to answer before this Committee matters which are the subject of those suits. I therefore wish to decline answering the question.

Mr. Bolts interrogated.

Q. What time did you resign the company's service.

A. I believe in November 1766.

Q. When was it first notified to you by the Governor and Council, that you should return to England?

A. A few months after I resigned the service, but while I was a magistrate of the Mayor's court.

Gregore Cojamaul.

Q. Whether, when you had got your purwannah, when you went to Shujah Dowla's country, you did any business for Mr. Bolts?

A. I did no new business for Mr. Bolts after the date of that purwannah?

Q. What business did you?

A. I gathered in some money for him, and sold his remaining goods.

Q. Do you know of Mr. Verelst's application in writing to the Nabob Mahomet Reza Khan, at the request of Coja Melcomb, for him to proceed to Patna, in order to receive his effects in Shujah Dowla's country, after your arrival in Calcutta?

A. I know of no application.

Mr. Bolts.

Q. Was you forced out of the country?

A. I was, by a party of twenty-eight armed soldiers, by an order of Mr. Verelst and the rest of the Council. I had refused to go. Captain Cox came to me early in the morning of the 23d of September 1768, kept his guard at a distance, shewed me the order he had from the Governor and Council; and told me he must take me away, if I did not consent to go voluntarily. I told him that I did not conceive those gentlemen had any right to send me away, that I had long been persecuted, and that they had long threatened it, but I never thought they would have dared to execute their threats. I sent to my friends, and in about ten minutes there were twenty or thirty gentlemen assembled. I petitioned the Captain for a little time to throw my books and my wife's cloaths into a couple of chests, and he was kind enough to grant me two hours. He then said he could stay no longer with safety. I went into my wife's bed-chamber to see if she had sent her things away, when the Captain and one of his seapoys came into the bed-chamber and took me out by the shoulders. They marched me through the streets to a boat that was prepared for me, in which they conducted me on board a sloop prepared for the purpose. My wife followed me afterwards. In that sloop we were conducted down the river, and kept seven days and nights under confinement in the sloop, with the seapoys at the cabin-door. When the ship Valentine was under way, we were taken out of that sloop to sea, and forcibly put on board the Valentine and brought to England.

Q. When the first sentence of banishment was pronounced against you, had you any intimation of your crime, or was you called before the Governor and Council that pronounced it, to make any defence?

A. I had no intimation whatever, nor was ever called before them.

Q. Do you remember when you received the first sentence, from the Secretary to the Governor and Select Committee?

A. I think it was about April 1767.

Q. Did you know for what reasons you was thus sent home?

A. I never knew no more than what was written in the paper delivered me as my sentence, after I was banished.

Q. What was that paper?

A. The order of the Select Committee.

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The said paper was produced and read.

Q. Did you ever hear of any other reasons except what are specified in the above paper?

A. I never heard of any, excepting that I had wrote a letter to Mr. Gentil, acquainting him with parliamentary proceedings, which has been read.

Q. Did you never hear that one reason for your being sent away was your evading signing the new covenants relative to receiving presents?

A. I never did hear of any such reason.

Q. Did you sign the new covenants?

A. I did not sign them myself, but did by my deputy, which was equally as valid, and which I always acknowledged to be so.

Q. Why did you not sign them yourself?

A. Because it was my pleasure.

Q. Did you ever give any other reason for not signing yourself?

A. I don't remember I ever did.

Q. Who was the deputy that signed them for you?

A. My own book-keeper in my name and for me. He was a native of the country.

Q. Whether you have not given as a reason for not signing the covenants, that you had taken an oath you never would?

A. If I have, it will appear upon the public records. I believe I did.

Q. Did you enter into any new contract or concerns in trade, after you had resigned the service?

A. I did, because I had a right to do it.

Q. Whether you know an instance of any other person who had resigned the service of the Company, forced out of the country in the manner you was?

A. I know of none in the civil service of the Company, but I know of several gentlemen that had been in the military service, being seized and ordered for England; but I know of none that were seized so suddenly and with so much violence as I was.

Q. Is it not usual for civil servants to go when they receive notice?

A. I never knew of any such custom among the civil servants, though I have known many instances of such arbitrary orders.

Q. Have these orders been obeyed?

A. Sometimes they have and sometimes not.

Q. What is done with the civil servants when they do not obey?

A. I have not known of any civil servants sent away by force. Sometimes their residing

was dispensed with; but I suppose they would have been sent away, if they had not gone voluntarily.

Q. Do you know of any civil servants going away when they were ordered?

A. Yes.

Q. When did that custom begin of ordering people to be seized and sent home by force?

A. I never knew of any instance before 1765 and 1766.

Q. Whether you ever knew of any civil servant refusing to go, when the order was not dispensed with?

A. I don't remember any of the civil covenanted servants of the Company refusing to go, but I know of several British subjects being forced, upon such orders, to seek that protection in the foreign settlements that they could not enjoy in their own.

Q. Did you ever know of any British subject covenanted or not covenanted, who continued to reside in Calcutta after being ordered to quit, and that order not dispensed with?

A. None in my time, but have heard of others in former times.

Q. What instances have you heard of in former times?

A. There was a gentleman named Cooke, and several others whose names I don't recollect. Mr. Cooke was in the Company's civil service at Dacca, and, as I heard, dismissed for embezzlement, and ordered home by the Directors, but refused to go and remained in the country. The Governor and Council at that time did not think themselves safe to execute such orders.

Q. Whether there were not orders repeatedly issued for two years for you to go away, before you was forced away?

A. There were; but I always considered them as illegal, and in my case as particularly void in law, because I was an Alderman of the Mayor's court.

Q. Was you an Alderman of the Mayor's court at the time the first order for your departure was issued?

A. I was.

Q. Did you ever assign that as a reason to the Governor and Council for not going?

A. I never entered upon the legality of the orders with the Governor and Council. I don't remember that I assigned that as a reason.

Q. How long was it after you received your sentence of banishment that you heard of the objections against you for not signing the covenants?

A. The sentence of banishment was dated in April 1767, and I first heard of the other charge concerning the covenants in September 1768.

Q. When this charge respecting the covenants was stated against you, did you offer to find security to any person, who should alledge you was not equally bound by the deed of your clerk done by your order, as if done by yourself or to the Company to stand any prosecution for the receipt of presents, while you was in the Company's service?

A. I did.

Q. Was it ever alledged by any person that you had received any presents, when in the Company's service, after the covenants were ordered to be signed?

A. It was never alledged against me when in or out of the service.

Q. How long had you resigned the service before September 1768?

A. About two years; and I had ordered my clerk to sign the covenant three years before that date.

Q. Had or had not the Governor and Council directed you to be dismissed from the Mayor's court before such charge of not signing the covenants was suggested?

A. They had ordered me to be dismissed.

Q. What was the answer of the Court in consequence of that order?

A. That there was no legal vacancy in the Court.

Q. How long is it customary in the East Indies to allow civil servants resigning the privilege of the Company's dustuck?

A. Twelve months.

Q. Whether most of the servants who went away upon being ordered would not naturally have returned to their own country without such orders?

A. I believe they would have returned.

Q. Who were the agents you employed in those concerns you entered into after your resignation?

A. I had above 150, and, amongst others, the two Armenians who have given evidence; but they were only employed in collecting out-standing debts and in disposing of goods and contracts which were on hand before my resignation.

Q. What settlements do you believe that several British subjects went to, to get that protection they were refused in their own?

A. French, Dutch, Portuguese and Danish, and they employed themselves in trade.

Q. What were their names?

A. One named Duffield, another Byrn and another Burslem, and several others whose names I don't recollect.

Q. Give an account of the nature of purwannahs, when they first took place, and what effects they are supposed to produce?

A. Purwannahs of the nature of that which were produced to the Committee, were never thought of till 1766. I as well as all the native merchants I ever conversed with upon it, considered it as a scandalous regulation to monopolize trade, as may be understood from the very tenor of it, as it was explained to the Committee.

Q. Did it exempt from duties?

A. I never understood that it did.

Q. What then was the effect of it?

A. The Select Committee had made an order in February 1766, and renewed in October following, that none should buy or sell without these purwannahs; and this purwannah was to give them the Committee's sanction for trading.

Q. What was the greatest amount of duties payable on the spot upon goods in Bulwanting's country?

A. I know of no duties but those which are paid upon the transportation of goods from one place to another, either by land or water in Bulwanting's country, except on piece goods, upon which a duty called the cutwallly is collected on the spot, and this cutwallly is no more than the charge of a tacka (which is about the 20th part of a rupee) which the Cutwall collects for fixing his seal to the corner of the piece. All other duties are paid upon the transportation, for which a dustuck is requisite.

Select Committee proceedings 22d and 31st October 1766 read.

Licence from Bulwanting produced by Gregore Cojamaul, and proved by Gonyshamdass, read.

Licence from the Cutwall, or Collector of Bulwanting's duties for three years produced by Gregore Cojamaul, and proved by Gonyshamdass, read.

General Smith.

Q. What do you know of the imprisonment of the three Armenians, what the cause of it, and by what authority they were confined?

A. I have a cause depending with the two Armenians, yet I am willing to give the best account I can to this Committee.

Q. Do you know of any general orders or regulations for restricting the trade of the Eng-

English and their Agents in the Provinces belonging to the King and Shujah Dowla?

A. I do.

Q. Did you at any time hear any complaints made of the conduct of such Agents by the King, Shujah Dowla, Bulwantling, or others, and what were such complaints?

A. I have; and they appear in my letter to the Select Committee 3d January 1768.

Letter read.

Q. Do you know whether such Agents were made acquainted with such orders for restricting the trade, and did they pay obedience thereto?

A. There was a general publication of these orders, I believe, sometime in 1768, long after my letter, and which will appear upon the Company's books. I think the publication was after my return to the Board at Calcutta.

Q. Did you know of Gregore Cojamaul, an Armenian, or other Armenian Agents for Mr. Bolts, residing in those districts?

A. It was impossible for me to know any Gomastahs. There were 500 Gomastahs. I don't recollect I knew him particularly.

Q. Did this measure of restrictive orders proceed principally from the Governor and Council on complaint of the Princes?

A. I may say it originated from the substance of my letter above-mentioned.

Q. When Shujah Dowla desired you to inform the Governor and Council of those irregularities, what answer did the Governor give?

General Smith then read to the Committee the following letters.

Fort William, January 31, 1768.

S I R,

I have received your letters of the 10th and 20th of December, with returns of the army for the month of November and of the 6th and 9th instant with the draughts of three surveys made in the Subahdary of Oud. As soon as the other two you mention are copied, I shall be obliged to you for them. It is with some astonishment as well as concern that I observe the representations you have been pleased to make to the Committee in your letter to them of the third instant respecting the private trade carried on by English Gomastahs in the Circars of Gauzy-poor and Mizzapoor and other parts of the Nabob Sujah Dowlah's dominions. I have therefore taken this method to acquaint you with my sentiments thereon, for, notwithstanding I am at all times determined to

preserve and support my prerogative in its due extent, and to endeavour at concluding all affairs of a publick nature to the best of my abilities, upon which I esteem the most steady uniform and solid plan; yet no difference of opinion in those points shall have any sway with me, when matters of private concern are under my consideration. The orders of the company and the resolutions of the Committee are positive that no private trade shall be carried on without these provinces, and the penalty to those who shall disobey no less than dismissal from the service; yet it appears by your letters that they are disobeyed, and that in such a manner as to oblige the Nabob Sujah Dowlah to complain to you of the oppressions and extortions of English Gomastahs, the truth of which was confirmed by Bulwantling. You have expressed your apprehensions of fatality to the Company's possessions, unless the most rigorous measures be pursued by the Committee to annihilate these complaints fraught with such pernicious consequences; and informed the Committee of your having assured Sujah Dowlah how desirous you are of striking at the root of this evil, and that it should be your care that the purwannah for an exclusive privilege to make salt-petre on account of the English Company granted to Ismael Beg should be returned. Called upon as the Committee are in this publick manner, were they to content themselves with only recording your letter upon the face of their proceedings, the Court of Directors might very possibly conceive an idea of your attentive and faithful services at their expence, or perhaps see cause to suspect their disinterestedness and integrity. If on the contrary they second your remonstrance with that degree of vigour you tell them it should, by resolving to detect and punish any aggressor, may not your name stand recorded at the head of the list? You have particularised Ismael Beg. Should they inquire by whom he has been employed, will it not be found that he was employed by you? employed not only in carrying on a trade prohibited by the Company, but even to raise that trade into a monopoly throughout the greatest part of the dominions of our friend and ally? You say in your publick letter you have heard I made it a point neither to grant dullucks nor purwannahs into Sujah el Dowlah's dominions. I imagined you had known it was a point established with me and invariably adhered to. However Sujah Dowlah having repeatedly writ-

ten to me on this subject, on reading your letter I had my answer recorded in the Committee proceedings, as well as my assurance of having never granted either dustuck or purwannah beyond the provinces since my coming to the government, except for the baggage of officers going to camp. However hardly you may have conceived of my conduct towards you on any publick account, it is very far from me to wish you an injury, and on the present occasion I am sorry you have acted in so unguarded a manner. If any English gentlemen have been led to extend their trade beyond the provinces, and their Gomastahs been culpable in their conduct, a representation thereof to me should immediately have removed every cause of complaint, and a private representation corrected the indiscretion of the offenders, but, your accusation being publick and general, those who have transgressed must abide by the consequences. Being sensible that the emoluments of your office are inadequate to your station, you may remember I recommended your entering into trade, which you might engage some of your friends to manage for you. How far you have declared your concern herein I know not; but it has been matter of general complaint that the attention of most of the officers of the army has of late been taken up with commercial affairs more than is consistent with their duty; and when represented on this head they have not scrupled to quote the example of the commanding officer. As the very being of the Company in the present posture of affairs depends in a great measure upon the state of our army, I wish to see a stop put to a practice which may be productive, if suffered to go on, of such dangerous consequences. I would very gladly promote the interest of the army by all proper and reasonable means, but not at the expence of the service. It is probable you may suppose I have expressed myself with a degree of freedom in some parts of this letter; but as it is obvious that my intentions are altogether friendly, I hope you will do me the justice to believe me with great regard, (Signed) H. VERELST.

Extract from Col. Smith's Letter to Mr. Verelst, President of Fort William.

Head Quarters at Myr Absub's Gardens near Patna, Feb. 8, 1768.

SIR,

I have this day received your letter of the 31st ult. The freedom with which you have

expressed your sentiments, may be very readily admitted, since you profess your intentions to be altogether friendly. I hope you will in my turn indulge me with the same liberty, since I shall deliver my thoughts with the same degree of sincerity. Marvel not, Sir, at my representations to the Select Committee concerning the prosecution of private trade in Sujah Dowlah's dominions; be assured it is high time to remedy these grievances; such complaints of oppression had been made to me as were insufferable. Had I been treated by you in a manner due to my rank and character, you should have been particularly advised of this and every other material circumstance that came to my knowledge; but circumstanced as I have been, it became necessary for me to confine my correspondence to the board, and this will account for my not writing you a private letter on this subject. I am concerned that you should express even a supposition that, should the Committee content themselves with only recording my letter on the face of their proceedings, the Court of Directors may possibly conceive an idea of my attention and faithful services at the expence of the Committee, or from my representation see cause to suspect their disinterestedness and integrity." I could wish Mr. Verelst and all mankind to believe that I am above aiming at applause at the expence of other men; for I think my own uniform conduct will secure to me that share of approbation it may appear afterwards to have deserved. I wrote to the Committee so strenuously from a firm hope that they would enter into such effectual measures as to eradicate this growing evil, and hereafter you will be convinced I have not painted this grievance in stronger colours than the occasion required. You are pleased to write me "It has been matter of general complaint that the attention of most of the officers of the army has been lately taken up with commercial matters more than is consistent with their duty, and when represented on this head they have not scrupled to quote the example of the commanding officer." I could wish to be informed from whence these general complaints have been made. A general accusation will fall of itself when unsupported by proofs. The conduct of the officers of that part of the army which has been under my immediate inspection, does not deserve so severe a reflection, and the excellent state

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of

• Third Brigade.

of those troops is the best proof of my assertion, and from the review which I have lately made of my regiment and the few seapoys remaining here of the 2d brigade, it clearly appears to me that there has been no want of diligence in the commanding officer, nor of attention in those of an inferior station. As to the officers on the purwannah establishment, I know not how they conduct themselves; they appear to have no military superior whatsoever. That the very being of the Company depends in great measure upon the state of the army is most certain. My sentiments on the present state of it will hereafter appear. In the mean time, if you will be pleased to point out those who have neglected their duty from an attention to commercial affairs, or even those who have been in any wise concerned in a mercantile system, I will assure you of my best endeavour to put a stop to this practice, which I by no means approve. How far and by what instruments I engaged in commerce I will now relate. You must remember, when I was sworn a member of the council, † the dustuck oath was tendered to me. The whole board must remember I then declined taking that oath, because I never had, nor ever intended to enter into commercial schemes; as I considered commerce to be incompatible with my profession. Doubtless you must also remember that soon after this you yourself observed to me, and I will suppose with a very friendly intention, that you thought I was wrong in giving up the greatest and indeed only advantage from my new appointment. I observed that I did not wish to see any commerce whatever carried on by the officers of the army, and, although I was entitled to the privilege of a dustuck, yet I did not chuse to set the example. You replied, that General Carnac had been concerned in trade, which was carried on by yourself or others on his account, and that you advised me to be concerned with Mr. Russel who would transact these affairs for me. I thanked you for your advice, and said I would consider of it. I reflected that my predecessor had received great emoluments from his station, perhaps 30,000 pounds for two years, that the Company's orders had taken away the only emolument I could expect to receive in their service, and thereby reduced all my appointments to the scanty pittance of 700l. per annum, besides defraying my field expences, that nei-

ther the Company at home nor Lord Clive abroad had made the least provision for the Commander in Chief of the forces. Thus situated I thought I might endeavour with some degree of propriety, to encrease my capital by a commercial system, carried on by a friend who was a member of the board, and who was so obliging as to take that trouble for me. Of this you was informed, and soon after I took the dustuck oath. Here then is explained the causes and motives which induced me to engage in commerce, and now you are to be informed how far I engaged in it. Our first essay was in the purchase of your share of the cargoes of cotton from Surat, at an advance of 50,000 rupees upon the prime cost, by which purchase you will do me the justice to say I have not gained any advantage. My second adventure was of sundry articles, exported by the Company and bought at their sales, for which your dustuck was granted to the limits of the provinces. These articles were sold many months since, but not before I discovered that this commercial system, if pursued, would engross too much of my time from more important occupations. I therefore dropt all thoughts of prosecuting the plan, and, as I had several gentlemen of my family who had merited well both from the public and from me, gentlemen whom I wanted to serve, but wanted any other means of doing it; amongst them I divided the profits of the adventure, as I propose doing by whatever emolument may arise from the advance of 25,000 rupees made on my account at the aurungs in Bengal. It only remains for me to treat of my third and last attempt, the saltpetre concern. You must remember that this article of commerce was mentioned to you both by Mr. Russel and me, when I was at Calcutta. You so far approved the scheme, that at the desire of Mr. Russel, you wrote a letter to S. Dowla, to request he would grant that gentleman's Gomastah the exclusive privilege of purchasing salt-petre in his dominions. This letter Mr. Russel enclosed to me. I received it at Monghyr, when on my journey to Allahabad; and when the Nabob paid me a visit on my arrival there, I delivered to him your letter and seconded your request. At that time nothing was settled; but the Nabob desired Ismael Beg to attend him to Fy-sabad for the adjustment of this matter. Some time after a purwannah was granted to him for an exclusive privilege of making salt-petre throughout the Nabob's dominions, upon

† In 1767.

upon condition that he would supply the Nabob with whatever quantity he required at prime cost; and as Ismael Beg was recommended to this employment by me, you may suppose that Mr. Russel and myself would have had the refusal of whatever quantity was made above that which the Nabob would require for his own use, and this to be delivered at the Carumnassahet-river, bounding the Bahar province. In consequence of this purwannah, Ismael Beg began to make his arrangements for the manufacturing of saltpetre after the rains should have subsided; but in the interim arose those suspicions of the duplicity of S. Dowla's conduct. The bare possibility of his meditating hostilities gave me the alarm; for being convinced how faithfully we had fulfilled our engagements to him, and reflecting that, as he could have no just grounds to alledge for a rupture with us, he must therefore seek a pretext to give some colouring to his own conduct; and it was not impossible but that such a man might represent to the world this purwannah, which was his own free grant, to have been obtained from him by improper solicitation. No sooner did this suggestion strike me but I desired Ismael Beg to suspend the commencement of this manufacture; and when I visited the Nabob, you already know that a final stop was put to this affair. I have only to add, that I do not know of any saltpetre having been made under the sanction of this purwannah, and I can affirm that not a single particle has been received. Here, Sir, is the history of Ismael Beg and the saltpetre purwannah. And now, Sir, I cannot avoid testifying my extreme surprize at your query: "If, on the contrary, they second your remonstrance, with that degree of vigour you tell them it should, by resolving to detect and punish every aggressor, may not your name happen to stand recorded at the head of the list?" Upon what part of my conduct, Sir, can you found such a question? Wherein have I acted differently from you? Could I conceive the purchasing of saltpetre in S. Dowla's dominions fundamentally wrong, when you yourself wrote to S. Dowla in favour of Mr. Russel's Gomastah? Could I conceive it to be a prohibited commerce, when you yourself encouraged it? Could I imagine it contrary to the regulations of the Select Committee, when you, who presided in that Committee, made use of your influence to introduce it? I little expected that you, Sir, would have been the person to suggest that

Ismael Beg was employed to raise the saltpetre trade into a monopoly throughout the greatest part of the Nabob's dominions. Had Ismael Beg, in consequence of the Nabob's grant, been the only manufacturer of saltpetre in his territories, he would have enjoyed that privilege by the permission of him alone who had a right to grant it.

That you never granted dustucks into the Nabob's dominions I most sincerely believe; but I cannot conceive how it could remain unknown to you that they were granted by others; for I think there is an express order of the Committee that all dustucks or purwannahs shall be registered, and monthly returns made from the several factories to the custom-house at Calcutta, and the smallest reference to those records would have shown you that dustucks had been frequently granted from Patna and Muxadavad, for every species of merchandize in the Nabob S. Dowla's country. Sensible that my representations to the board of the 3d ult. was made upon the most mature deliberation, and confident that no one action of mine stands in need of concealment, however friendly may be your expressions of concern upon a supposition that I have acted in an unguarded manner, I cannot admit of their propriety, since I see no cause for their application; and in regard to your declaration that no difference of opinion in public affairs should have sway with you, when matters of a private concern are under your consideration. I can only say that it is a worthy sentiment, but it cannot have the smallest reference to me, as it is impossible for you, as Governor of this settlement, with propriety to countenance, or for me, as Commander in Chief, with consistency to be connected in any transaction which requires privacy on my part, or connivance on yours. How far I have ever engaged in mercantile affairs, you have been fully informed; and, as I am above palliating an error in judgment, I will frankly confess to you, that it is the only part of my conduct which I cannot approve upon reflection; not that I had any cause whatever to judge this transaction deserving of censure in itself, but for an example it displays to others, who might not reflect that my being a member of the Council admitted me to privileges no other military man could enjoy. It is now sixteen years since I bore a military commission in this service; and where is the man that can say I ever had a commercial concern, until it was suggested to me by you? I was however soon convinced of my error,

error, and as soon I renounced all thoughts of encreasing my fortune on mercantile principles; and, Sir, I dare appeal to you and to the whole world, whether I have manifested the least avidity for wealth; but on the contrary, the opportunities I have had of acquiring a very large fortune are notoriously known. It is equally known that I have not availed myself in the smallest degree of that opportunity, but have preferred mediocrity and an unblemished reputation. The time is now approaching when you will be fully informed what opinion I have conceived of your conduct towards me. My letter of yesterday's date to the Select Committee requested their permission for me to return to the Presidency that I might prepare for my embarkation to Europe. When cool reflection shall banish hasty prejudice, when jealousies and suspicions can no longer be entertained, then perhaps it may appear that you have judged of me and my actions through a false medium, and conducted yourself accordingly. How much I endeavoured to obtain your confidence I will freely acknowledge, and it was because I could foresee that the welfare of the Company was very nearly interested in a good understanding between the Governor and Commander in Chief, and the events of last year have justified my opinion. How well you have adhered to the declarations you made to me in person, will appear hereafter. In the mean time I have the honour to profess myself with great respect,

(Signed)

R. S.

Q. Whether Shujah Dowla issued the orders for the removal of the Armenian Gomastahs in general from his dominions?

A. The orders were issued by the Select Committee; but some months prior to those orders Shujah Dowla had applied for a guard to take up some people at Banaras, as appears by the following letter from Capt. Harper, Jan. 6, 1768.

To Col. Richard Smith, Commander in Chief of the Forces:

S I R,

The Nabob Shujah Dowla has applied to me for a guard to apprehend some people at Banaras, who under pretence of being servants to English gentlemen, are committing all manner of disturbances. I have not complied with his Excellency's request, and wait your orders to know whether I may send the guard he desires or not. I have the honour

to be with great respect, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

Gabriel Harper.

Camp near Fysabad, Jan. 6, 1768.

Q. Who were those gentlemen?

A. There were so many I cannot particularize them.

Q. Did Shujah Dowla make any representation to you against the Gomastahs of the English, preceding Jan. 1768?

A. I think that the first representation that Shujah Dowla made me in person, but not the first that Bulwanting made.

Q. What was the date of Bulwanting's first representation to you?

A. I cannot charge my memory with the exact date. They were made in person, and by his Vakeels, but not in writing.

Q. Did you acquaint the Governor and Council with Bulwanting's representations?

A. I endeavoured to remedy them myself as Commander in Chief of that province. I do not recollect any representation to the Council prior to the 3d of January.

Q. Do you know of any mal-practices committed by Coja Gregory or Coja Rafael?

A. I don't know them personally.

Q. Had you ever any representations against them by name?

A. Many.

Q. Please to state them.

A. Representations from Bulwanting, and complaints from Shujah Dowla that they carried on a forced trade in that country without any kind of restraint, and paid no duties, and without obedience to the country government.

Q. Were the representations in writing?

A. Not in writing.

Q. Was Bulwanting's representation against Rafael and Coja Gregory by name?

A. I can't particularly recollect, but think I remember the name of Rafael; but they were comprehended in the general complaints against the Armenians. I know them more by the name of Mr. Bolts's Gomastahs than by any other name. Mr. Bolts's Gomastahs were particularly specified.

Q. Do you recollect the names of any of Mr. Bolts's Gomastahs?

A. No.

Q. Was this conversation with Bulwanting before you went to Allahabad?

A. The first time was in 1767. There were many after.

Q. Do you know by whom the Vizieri rupees were coined, and what was the alloy?

A.

A. I never had any thing to do with any mint.

Q. In what coin was the Mogul's stipend paid?

A. I will answer that when the matter comes before the Committee.

Q. Did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Maddison, Resident at the Durbar, particularly naming these Armenians?

A. I never had any correspondence with him when he was Resident.

Q. Did you know Mr. Gentil?

A. I did. He was a Frenchman who received his subsistence from Shujah Dowla. I apprehend he resided there to acquire intelligence of the European settlements. He was much in his favour; but I believe had no ostensible office.

Q. Do you know of a letter from Mr. Bolts to Mr. Gentil, which you transmitted to the Committee at Calcutta?

A. A copy of it was sent to me, and I thought it of so extraordinary a nature, that I looked upon it as my indispensable duty to transmit it to the Committee. I obtained the original, which I also transmitted to the Committee.

Q. Do you know of any renunciation of the 3d article of the treaty with Shujah Dowla?

A. I believe I do. I understand that Lord Clive gave it up to Shujah Dowla. I have it only from hearsay.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Mercurii 13^o die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOTNE in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,	Sir John Turner,
Mr. Fuller,	Mr. Vane,
Mr. Strachey,	Mr. Sutton,
Mr. Rice,	Mr. Ongley,
Sir Wm. Meredith,	Mr. Cornwall.

Mr. Bolts produced nine purwannahs from Shujah Dowla to himself, relating to salt-petre, and directed to

Futty Ally Khan,
Rajah Bulwanting,
Golaum Hufson Khan,
Roy Deendael,
Rajah Bowanying,
Noor Mahamud Beg Khawn Bahadr,
Keydar Beg Khan Bahard,
Ray Kerpadayall,
Ally Beg Khan Bahard;

which were proved by Gonyshamdafs, who said they were exactly the same in substance, only directed to different people.

Padre Rafael.

I was never in the territory of Bulwanting as a Gomastah.

Gregore Cojamaul.

I never was in Shujah Dowla's court, never was above Banaras—Banaras is 120 miles from Fizeabad.

Padre Rafael.

Q. Whether in 1767 you sold any thing for Mr. Bolts in Fizeabad?

A. Nothing—I was a servant to Shujah Dowla, and had 3,600 rupees a year.

General Smith.

Q. From your knowledge of the country are you of opinion that the General orders for recalling the Gomastahs of the English, were proper or necessary?

A. The representation that I made to the Council the 3d of January 1768, is very strong and very pointed to that purpose—I thought it absolutely necessary to recall them.

Q. Was Capt. Harper one of those amongst whom you distributed your profits of trade?

A. Capt. Harper had served me as an Aid de Camp and Secretary for two years, and he was one of those to whom the distribution was made.

Consultations at Fort William, May 3, 1764, read.

General letters from the Court of Directors to the Select Committee, Feb. 8, 1764, read.

Separate general letter, Decemb. 24, 1765, read.

Select consultations at Fort William, May 11, 1765, read.

Consultations, May 20, 1765, read.

Letter from the Select Committee to all the Subordinates, July 26, 1765, with the advertisement, read.

Letter from Mr. Hare to the Select Committee, Aug. 27, 1765, acknowledging the receipt of the advertisement, read.

Select Committee proceedings, October 5, 1765, read.

Select Committee letter received October 23, 1765, read.

Evidence, and Armenian petition, closed.

Lord Clive acquainted the Committee, that having recollected an omission in his evidence of May 4, desired the following words to be inserted:

"After this, two treaties were concluded, one between the English East-India Company and the Dutch East-India Company, wherein the Dutch acknowledged themselves to be the aggressors, and agreed to pay to the English Company all the expences of that war

war.—We restored to them all their ships, together with all the treasure and effects on board, amounting by computation to about half a million sterling."

His Lordship also acquainted the Committee, that upon recollection he finds he was mistaken in the answer he made the same day to the following question:

"On whose application were you made an Omrah?" And upon recollection, his answer to the said question is—"By Meer Jaffier's to the Mogul, and without any application on my part."

His Lordship likewise stated his having mentioned to the Chairman two or three days ago, his desire to make this addition and alteration.

The same was confirmed by the Chairman.

Q. Whether the Dutch according to that treaty did pay the expence of the armament?

A. I believe it was, but have a doubt about it, having left India in the February following the date of the treaty, which was in December.

Bengal Consultations the 8th and 12th of January 1761, read.

Letter from Col. Coote, Mr. Amyatt, &c. dated Fort William 1762, read.

General Carnac.

Q. Was Col. Coote in Bengal at the time of the revolution in 1760?

A. No; he arrived in February 1761—the revolution was in 1760.

Q. How long had Col. Coote left India before the revolution?

A. He had left Bengal before 1758.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Jovis 14^o die Maii 1772.

COLONEL BURGOYNE in the Chair.

Mr. Fuller,	Mr. Vane,
Lord Folkestone,	Mr. Johnstone,
Mr. Strachey.	Mr. Pitt,
Colonel Barré,	Mr. Sutton,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Cornwall.

Colonel Munro—to give an account of the transactions in Bengal.

A. In April 1764 I was under the King's orders, from his Majesty's Secretaries of State and War, to return to Europe with such of his Majesty's troops as did not chuse to enlist in the Company's service—I was accordingly to have embarked with the troops the beginning of May on board a Mocoa ship, which was to sail for Europe; but before I embarked there were two expresses arrived from Bengal, acquainting the Governor and Council at Bombay that Shujah Dowla and Cossim

Ally Khan had marched into the provinces of Bengal at the head of 60,000 men; that Major Adams, who commanded the army, was dead; that the settlement of Calcutta was in the utmost consternation, and the Company's affairs in the utmost danger—they therefore requested that the Governor and Council of Bombay would apply to me to go round immediately to take the command of the army with his Majesty's troops, and as many as could be spared from the Presidency of Bombay. As his Majesty's intention in sending out his troops to India, by the orders I had, was to assist and defend the Company in their different settlements, I thought it would not be answering the intention of sending them out to return and leave the Company's affairs in that situation—I therefore complied with the request, and arrived at Calcutta with his Majesty's troops, and a detachment of the Company's from Bombay, some time in the month of May 1764—Mr. Vansittart, who was then Governor, acquainted me that the army under the command of Major Carnac, had been, since the death of Major Adams, and Shujah Dowla and his army had come into the provinces, upon the defensive and retreated before the enemy—but I am sure from Major Carnac's gallant behaviour upon every occasion, that he will be able to give a proper account for his conduct in that campaign.

Mr. Vansittart requested that I would repair immediately with the troops I had carried round from Bombay to join the army who were in cantonment at Patna and take the command of them—I found the army, Europeans as well as seapoys, mutinous, deserting to the enemy—threatning to carry off their officers, demanding an augmentation of pay: demanding large sums of money, which they said had been promised them by the Nabob, and disobedient to all order—four hundred of the Europeans had gone off in a body, and joined the enemy some time before I joined the army—This being the situation the army was in, I fully determined to endeavour to conquer that mutinous disposition in them before I would attempt to conquer the enemy—I accordingly went with a detachment of the King's and Company's Europeans from Patna, with four field pieces of artillery, to Chippera, one of the cantonments—I think the very day or the day after I arrived, a whole battalion of seapoys, with their arms and accoutrements, went off to join the army—I immediately detached about 100 Europeans and a battalion of seapoys, whole

whose officers told me they thought they could depend upon them not to desert, with two field pieces, to endeavour to come up with the deserters and bring them back to me.—The detachment came up with them in the night time, found them asleep, took them prisoners, and carried them back to Chippera.—The officer who commanded the detachment, sent me an express, acquainting me with the hour he would arrive at Chippera with the prisoners—I was ready to receive them with the troops under arms.—Upon their arrival at Chippera I immediately ordered their officers to pick me out 50 of the men of the worst characters, and who they thought might have inticed the battalion to desert to the enemy—they did pick me out 50—I desired them to pick me out 24 of those 50 of the worst characters—I immediately ordered a Field Court-Martial to be held by their own black officers, and, after representing to the officers the heinous crime the battalion had been guilty of, desired they would immediately bring me their sentence.—They found them guilty of mutiny and desertion, sentenced them to suffer death, and left the manner to me—I immediately ordered four of the twenty-four to be tied to the guns, and the artillery officers to prepare to blow them away.—There was a remarkable circumstance: four grenadiers represented, as they always had the post of honour, they thought they were intitled to be first blown away—the four battalion men were untied from the guns, and the four grenadiers tied and blown away, upon which the European officers of the battalion of seapoys, who were then in the field, came and told me that the seapoys would not suffer any more of the men to be blown away—I ordered the artillery officers to load the four field pieces with grape shot, and drew up the Europeans, with the guns in their intervals, desired the officers to return to the heads of the battalions, ordered them immediately to ground their arms, and if one of them attempted to move, I would give orders to fire upon them, and treat them the same as if they were Shujah Dowla's army—they did ground their arms, and did not attempt to take them up again—upon which I ordered 16 more of the 24 to be tied to the guns by force, and blown away the same as the first, which was done—I immediately ordered the other four to be carried to a cantonment where there had been a desertion of the seapoys some time before, with positive orders to the commanding officer of that canton-

ment, to blow them away in the same manner at the guns, which was done accordingly, and which put an end to the mutiny and desertion.

I prepared to take the field as early as possible after the rains with the army, and fixed the 15th of September for the rendezvous of the troops from their different cantonments.—A couple of days before the army marched I had intelligence that the enemy had advanced several parties of horse and had thrown up some breast-works on the banks of the Soane to impede the crossing of the troops—I ordered Major Champion, with a detachment and four field-pieces, to march and cross the Soane some miles below where the army was to cross. After fixing with him the hour and the day that I intended to arrive at the Soane with the army, I desired that he might be at that time on the other side and endeavour to dislodge the enemy, and cover the landing of the troops.—That officer was so pointed in executing his orders, he began to fire upon the enemy just as the van of the army appeared upon the banks of the Soane and soon dislodged them, by which means the whole army in four hours was landed on the other side without the least molestation—I continued to march on towards Buxar, where the enemy was.—The last two or three days march the line of march was a good deal harrassed by the enemy's cavalry; so much, that two serjeants and six or seven men of the advanced guard were killed.—Upon the 22d of October we arrived at Buxar and encamped just without range of the enemy's shot, and upon my going to reconnoitre their situation with some of the Field officers, I found the greatest part of them were entrenched with the Ganges upon their left, and the fort or village of Buxar on their rear—I intended to have attacked their camp about one or two in the morning of the 23d; and sent out spies to bring me some pieces of intelligence, such as to know whether I could bring my artillery on the right of their camp, resolving not to attack them on their left, that we might have a better chance to drive them into the Ganges than they should us—I likewise wanted to know in what part of their encampment the force of their artillery lay, and where the Vizier and Cossim Ally Khan's tent stood—the spies did not return to camp by twelve o'clock at night—I took it for granted they had been taken prisoners, and therefore resolved to put off the attack till the 24th in the morning.

Two

Two of the spies came in by day-light of the morning of the 23d, and told me that the enemy were under arms all night, moving their artillery, and sending off their treasure and women in the night—I went immediately with some officers to look at their disposition: I saw a good many of their troops under arms, but not out of their entrenchments—The officers who were with me, as well as myself, thought they only meant to shew themselves, in order to strike a terror into our troops, never imagining they would quit their line in order to attack us, as I never heard of a black army before attacking an European army—I returned to our camp, wishing they would come out to attack us: for our army was encamped in order of battle—About eight o'clock in the morning the Field officer of the day came into my tent, as I was at breakfast, and acquainted me, that the enemy's right was in motion, and he was sure they meant to attack us—I immediately went out with my reconnoitring glass in my hand, and saw and thought as he did—upon which I ordered the drums to beat immediately to arms, which was done; and the troops advanced from their encampment, and were in a few minutes ready to receive them—The action lasted from nine till twelve: the enemy then gave way, went off very slowly, blowing up several tumbrils and three large magazines of powder, as they went off—I immediately ordered the lines to break into columns and pursue. Two miles from the field of battle there was a rivulet, where the enemy had a bridge of boats; they pierced the boats, and sunk them before the rear of their army got over, by which means there were about 2,000 of them drowned and sticking in the mud—but that was the last piece of Generalship Shujah Dowla shewed that day, because, if I could have crossed the rivulet with the army, I would either have taken or drowned his whole army in the Carnassa, and come up with his treasure and jewels, and Cossim Ally Khan's jewels, which I was informed amounted to between two or three millions.

The strength of our army at this battle was as follows:

Europeans in battalion rank and file, 746—of which 250 were King's troops—Artillery men 71—European cavalry 40—in all Europeans 857, exclusive of officers—Seapoys rank and file 5,297—Black cavalry 918: in all 7,072—Train of Artillery twenty field-pieces—European officers killed 2; wounded 7—Europeans killed 34; wounded 49—Non-

commissioned officers killed 3; wounded 6—Europeans killed and wounded 101—Seapoys killed 205; wounded 414; missing 85—Black cavalry killed 45; wounded 24—killed and wounded 847—Artillery taken in the field 133 pieces of different sizes, all upon carriages, and most of them English carriages—The enemy was reported to be 60,000, but I am sure they were not less than 40,000: I am likewise sure that there must have been 2,000 of them killed in the field of battle, exclusive of those drowned; and, as I had not surgeons sufficient to dress our own wounded, and give theirs any assistance, I went every day for five days successively to every man of their wounded in the field, and gave rice and water to such as would take it; such was all the assistance I could give them—The army remained at Buxar for several days, until hospitals were provided for the wounded, and to bury the dead—I then marched the army into Shujah Dowla's country, and sent an express to Calcutta for further directions from the Governor and Council—The Mogul (Shah Allum) wrote me a letter the day after the battle, giving me joy of the victory over the Vizier, who had kept him as a state prisoner, and desiring I would take him under my protection, and acquainting me that, though he was with the Vizier in camp, he had left him the night before the battle—My answer to his letter was, as nearly as I can remember, "That I would immediately send an express to Mr. Vansittart, the Governor of Calcutta, but that I would not take him under protection, until I knew how far such a step might be proper, and for the interest of the Company—He sent to me and wrote to me repeatedly, before I had an answer from Calcutta, desiring me to come to him: for he had something very particular to communicate to me—I at last sent him word that I would wait upon him, provided he would not look upon himself as under the English protection; to which he consented—When I waited upon him he told me that, if the English took him under protection, he would give them Shujah Dowla's country, that, or any thing else they were pleased to demand, and repeated many grievances and hardships that Shujah Dowla laid him under, and said he was only his state-prisoner—I continued to march the army on towards Banaras, and the Mogul continued to march with his guards, and encamped every night pretty close to our encampment—Before the army arrived at Banaras I had an answer from the Governor and Council,

eil, who consented that the King should be taken under protection—Upon the army's arriving at Banaras, Shujah Dowla sent me his Minister Beney Bahadra with overtures of peace, which I refused, because I insisted upon it in the first instance, that he would deliver me up Cossim Ally Khan and Sumro. The former had ordered so many of the subjects of Great-Britain to be massacred, and the latter undertook to put the horrid crime into execution, when no man in the Nabob's army would undertake it but himself—Sumro was a German and a general officer, and had been before a Serjeant in the French service, deserted from them to us, and from us to Cossim Ally Khan—he commanded Shujah Dowla's artillery at the battle of Buxar, and had three or four hundred French deserters from our army, under his command—Beney Bahadra told me Shujah Dowla never could think of giving up Cossim Ally Khan or Sumro; but if I passed from that demand, I might have any other terms I pleased—he said Shujah Dowla would give 25 lack of rupees to defray the expences the Company had been at in the war—25 lack to the army, and 8 lack for myself—This he told me in the presence of Capt. Stables and Gordon, who were my Aids de Camp and both now in England, Mr. Stewart, my Secretary, and my Interpreter—My answer was, if he gave me all the lacks in his treasury, I would make no peace with him until he delivered me up those murdering rascals; for I never could think that my receiving 31 or 32 lack of rupees was a sufficient atonement for the blood of those unfortunate gentlemen who were murdered at Patna, nor a sufficient atonement to the weeping parents, friends and relations of those unfortunate gentlemen—these were my very words—upon this Beney Bahadra and I parted—He returned a second time, with assurances from Shujah Dowla, that, if I made peace with him, he would put me upon a method of laying hold both of Cossim and Sumro, and made use of all the persuasive arguments he could to induce me to make peace—I still insisted upon my first preliminary. Beney Bahadra desired it that was the case, that I would permit Capt. Stables, who spoke the country language, to return with him to the Nabob's camp, that the Nabob wanted to speak with Capt. Stables—I told Capt. Stables that as I was fully determined not to depart from his giving up Cossim Ally Khan, and Sumro in particular, I did not wish or advise him to go, for that they might use him the same

way as the other unfortunate gentlemen.—Capt. Stables replied, that he would with pleasure risk his own life, could he be the instrument of bringing these two to be made public examples of.—He accordingly went with Beney Bahadra to the Nabob's camp; and when he returned he told me that since he found that I was determined to have Cossim and Sumro, that in regard to Cossim he would not by any manner of means deliver him up, but let him escape—but as to Sumro, if I sent two or three gentlemen from the English camp, who knew Sumro, he would ask Sumro to an entertainment, and, in presence of those gentlemen he would order him to be put to death—he offered Capt. Stables a sum of money to endeavour to prevail upon me to agree to his terms; but as I never would, the next thing to be considered was the manner of driving Shujah Dowla entirely out of his country, (who was then at Lucknow with the remains of his army) and of the manner of settling his country—I wrote to Calcutta to the Governor and Council, sent them a letter the King wrote to me much about this time, proposing that he should have so much of Shujah Dowla's country, and cede the rest to the Company, and requesting me that I would make no peace with Shujah Dowla—I sent this letter to Calcutta, desiring to have the directions of the Governor and Council with regard to this matter, and acquainting them likewise that I was determined to leave the army so as to return to Calcutta, to embark with the last ship that should sail that season with his Majesty's troops—The Governor and Council sent a copy of a treaty to be executed by the King: and Mr. Marriot, Mr. Billers, who was Chief of Patna, and Mr. Daker, to be present at the executing of this treaty—The treaty with the King was executed.

As so much time had been taken up by these transactions, and the time drawing near for my quitting the command, Major Carnac was ordered by the Governor and Council to repair immediately to take the command—I left the army the 6th of January 1765, and met Major Carnac upon his way to take the command. I told him what my plan of operations would be, had I remained in the command, and which was as follows:—As I hold it a rule never to be departed from, in that country, not to come to a general action with the enemy, except where every thing is at stake, I determined, as we were in possession of (I believe) the greatest part of Shujah Dowla's country, to have remained

some time longer in camp, as his army must of course disperse when his money was out, and if I found that would take up too much time, I would march the army towards Lucknow, and if he came to action, to have then risked a battle with him, and taken possession of Lucknow and Illahabad, which was his whole country with what he had in possession—I told this to Major Carnac, who said he would follow the same plan.

The Company's Governor and Council, and all the servants at the settlement of Calcutta, or elsewhere, were under no apprehensions from what Shujah Dowla or Cossim Ally Khan could do after the battle of Buxar, as will appear from several letters wrote me from the Presidency, and by their letters home, after the battle of Buxar—The Company's investments for Europe were carried on this year in the same manner as usual, they had no enemy nearer the settlement of Calcutta than 800 miles, and that enemy at the head of the remains of a conquered army; that was the situation I left the country in, and before I embarked for Europe, and before General Carnac joined the army, Sir Robert Fletcher marched the army, took possession of Illahabad and Lucknow, and Shujah Dowla's army, as I understood, totally dispersed.

Q. If at the time you found the army in that mutinous disposition, they were regularly paid?

A. They were.

Q. Whether you know of any promise that had been made them of an increase of pay, or of any promise of a present made from the Nabob?

A. I am sure there was no promise of increase of pay; nor do I know of any promise of a present, but I heard that Major Adams told them they should have a present from the Nabob if they drove the enemy's troops out of the country.

Q. What do you apprehend was the cause of this mutinous disposition?

A. From the different actions the troops were in with Cossim Ally Khan, and their being able to drive him from post to post, under that gallant officer Major Adams, they thought themselves intitled to benefit by that success, and I suppose owing to the troops being in the field, there must have been a relaxation of discipline—These are the motives that I suppose induced them to mutiny, and probably there might have been large promises from the enemy, if they would join them.

Q. Of what nation were those Europeans that mutinied and deserted to the enemy?

A. Mostly French—and, I believe, some Germans—I don't know whether there were any English.

Q. Whether those Europeans were mixed with the English Company's, or whether they were in a corps by themselves?

A. They were mixed with the English Companies—did not get back any of those deserters except one.

Q. Where do the Indian Princes get their artillery and gunpowder?

A. Their artillery they get from England, Holland and France; for while I was in India there was hardly a ship came there that did not sell them cannon and small arms—the gunpowder they make the most of it themselves—they cast some cannon—but there is no black Prince that casts cannon but the King of Travancore—shot they cast in abundance.

Q. What number of seapoys can be got in the East-Indies?

A. I believe any number you please—The cannon and military stores are smuggled into the country, and I believe the Company have made some examples—I always thought it a very great scandal that such things should be suffered—I think such a practice might be easily prevented as to the English smuggling.

Q. What do you apprehend would be the means of making the seapoys faithful and good soldiers?

A. One method is a strict discipline—another is leaving them to act with the Europeans—another, suffering them their own customs and manners with regard to religion when it does not interfere with their duty—to be well paid and have good cloathing; and increasing the number of European officers—good care when they are sick, and using them well in every respect while they behave well.

Q. What is your opinion of preserving our conquests in India?

A. In the first place always to keep a proper force of Europeans in that country; never suffering the Company's servants to make war against the country powers, until it is evident that they are the first aggressors, and making proper laws in the country so as that the executive power may be properly executed.

Q. What force of Europeans should be kept in that country—and Bengal particularly?

A. I think never less than an establishment of 3,000 men—and I should rather think, if they could be spared from this country, they ought to be 4,000—not that I don't think 3,000 men are sufficient to defend that country against all the country powers, who may make war against the English, but my reason for saying that another thousand besides the 3,000 might be necessary, would be to counterbalance the black troops, who must be necessarily employed in that country, and who are capable of being taught discipline almost equal to the Europeans.

Q. What number of seapoys is a proper and safe proportion for 3,000 Europeans?

A. About four parts in five, or more.

Q. What do you think might be the supply of recruits necessary to maintain an establishment of 3,000 men in that country?

A. About five hundred men yearly in time of peace.

Q. What is your opinion of the expediency of employing foreigners in that country, and particularly Germans and Swifs?

A. That any foreigners whatsoever never ought to be employed by the English in that country—I have already given an example, that, when an enemy was in the field, they deserted to them, and that they are of a quite different religion, if they are of any at all—I therefore think they would upon every occasion desert from us to those of the same religion as themselves—and it has always been found they do so—another reason is, that as we have but just the number that is absolutely necessary in that country, I don't think they can be depended upon in time of action.

Q. Do you know whether there have been any corps of Swifs or Germans, protestants in India, under their own officers?

A. I don't know of any such corps.

Q. What is your opinion, if they had corps of Swifs?

A. I am against corps of foreigners of Swifs or Germans—but as to have some mixed, I have no objection to it—it might do very well.

Q. What is your opinion of employing as private men, the Catholics from Ireland?

A. I think they might be very well and safely employed—I am always for having the greatest number of troops from this country.

Q. Whether European cavalry would be necessary?

A. Certainly of very great use.

Q. What number would you recommend out of these 3,000 to be European cavalry?

A. At least one third.

Q. What portion of the black troops ought to be cavalry?

A. If it was meant to have European cavalry, I would have no establishment of black cavalry at all, being of no use in time of peace—and in time of war only of use to keep the line quiet on the march.

Q. Whether it has not been the custom for time immemorial, for Captains of English ships to sell arms and military stores to the natives of India?

A. The time I was in India it was a custom—and I have heard it was always the custom.

Q. Whether the French, Dutch and Danes, and all other nations, do not likewise sell military stores?

A. I always heard that they did.

Q. Whether you think there is a possibility of preventing other nations from doing so?

A. No.

Q. Whether it might not be a dangerous experiment to train the troops so as to make them equal to Europeans?

A. It may be a dangerous one—but it will still be a more dangerous one not to do it.

Q. Whether you know or have heard of any other great desertion, except what you have mentioned?

A. Not from my own experience, but have heard the officers say that foreigners always would desert—About a 5th or 6th part of the private men might be foreigners to be mixed with the other troops.

Q. Was you offered a jaghire by the King?

A. The King gave me a jaghire—I was in possession of it—of 12,500l. a year for life, upon some of the provinces in Bengal, for my services to him and the country—Upon my receipt of it I wrote immediately to Mr. Spencer, who was Governor of Calcutta, acquainting him of the King's having given me a jaghire—I received his answer after I had quitted the command of the army—Mr. Spencer acquainted me, that my receiving such a jaghire was so much contrary to the interest of the Company, that they never would suffer me to hold it; that I might remember the Company's having gone to law with Lord Clive about his jaghire, and requested that I would deliver it up to the Nabob, when I saw him, who would not only behave handsomely upon the occasion, but that the Company would never see me the sufferer from such an act, after the services I had done them—From that moment I resolved to deliver it up to the Nabob, when I saw him; and, upon my arrival at

Mux.

Muxadavad, I waited on the Nabob at his palace, who was then ill. I told him that I had got a jaghire from the King; but as I was about to leave the country, I would leave it with him—This was in the presence of Mr. Middleton, Resident at the Durbar: Captains Gordon and Stables—The Nabob upon receiving the jaghire smiled, and said, this is a piece of generosity I am little accustomed to, but, if I live, you shall not be the sufferer—and desired his Minister Nundcomar to desire the Interpreter to acquaint me, that he begged my acceptance of two lack of rupees, which would be at Calcutta much about the time that I should arrive there—A few days after my arrival at Calcutta, I received a letter from the Nabob's son, acquainting me with his father's death, requesting my interest for him to succeed his father as Subah, and acquainting me that he knew the whole transaction of the jaghire, and the promises his father made me, and assuring me that he would make them good, and in this situation I left my jaghire and my lacks—I had a letter from Mr. Spencer since I came to England, acquainting me that he had acquainted my Lord Clive of the demands I had upon the government, that his Lordship promised him, if there was so much remaining of the Nabob's out-standing debts, he would order the payment of the two lack of rupees to my Attorney—I am very happy from his Lordship's eminent services to this country and the Company, that he has a more responsible fund for the payment of his jaghire—At the same time I cannot help regretting, that his Lordship did not think my two years rent deserved a better fund than the Nabob's out-standing debts—Let my small services be rewarded as they may—Let individuals think of themselves as they please, I hope facts will come out before this Committee is at an end, to shew them and the world, that this country has been served, that this East-India Company has been saved by more than one or two men. Many brave and gallant men have done honour to their King, have done service to this country, and have served the East-India Company, and some of them have lost their lives in the cause—I have never received any part of the two lacks, nor any present from the East-India Company.

Q. Whether at the time the Mogul granted the jaghire, the Nabob paid any revenues or acknowledgments to the Mogul?

A. He did not—nor did he pay any of the Royal revenues from Bengal, which were

stipulated to have been paid to the Mogul, either by the Nabob or the Company, I don't know which.

Q. Whether this is not the first time that you have mentioned the circumstance of Mr. Spencer's letter?

A. It is the first time, and probably will be the last time, and I would not have mentioned it now, if it had not happened to have come in as I thought properly in answer to a question that was asked me, and because when Lord Clive was upon the spot, from his not having ordered the payment of it, I thought his Lordship did not think I deserved it, and I gave him no trouble about it—and I knew it was not in my Lord Clive's power to do it when he came home.

Q. Whether you think it would have been proper for Lord Clive to have ordered the Nabob to pay that money?

A. Had I been in his Lordship's situation and he in mine, I certainly would have ordered the Nabob to have paid it.

Q. Did you ever hear that Lord Clive ordered the Nabob to pay such a thing to any man living?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear of any money that was offered to Mr. Spencer, if he would continue Nundcomar about the person of the Nabob?

A. When I came down to Calcutta, Mr. Spencer told me, that he was offered several lacks of rupees (about 9, 10, or 11 lacks: I can't say exactly) to support Nundcomar—which he refused.

Q. Whether you know of any order sent by the Directors abroad to put the two lacks promised you by the Nabob in a course of payment?

A. To the best of my remembrance I had never any public intimation from the Court of Directors, that they sent out orders to that purpose; but some of the Directors told me privately, that the Nabob was to be put under stoppage of so much yearly for the payment of the donation to the navy, the restitution of the two lacks which he promised to pay me—and that is all I know of the matter.

Q. Did you make any application to the Mogul for your jaghire?

A. No—nor any petition for me.

Sir George Colebrooke (Chairman of the East-India Company) informed the Committee, That orders went out last March or April twelve-month, to reduce the income of the Nabob to 16 lacks of rupees during his minority, and to apply the surplus of his revenue

nue to the payment of the retribution, and to Colonel Munro two lacks of rupees.

Q. Do you believe that money will be paid?

A. I have no doubt of it.

Forty-third paragraph, general letter to Bengal, dated April 10, 1771, read.

Colonel Munro.

Q. Had you an offer of the Dewannee for the Company?

A. Yes—the King when I first saw him offered me the Dewannee—he told me he had offered it before—I believe he offered it to Sir Eyre Coote after the Mogul's father's death—he offered it before that to Major Carnac, as I am informed; and Mr. Vansittart, before I joined the army, assured me that he could have had the Dewan, but did not know how far he could be justified in such an act, or how far it might tend to the interest of the Company—My reasons for not accepting the offer, were, that I formed no plans of any kind but that of extricating the Company from the danger that threatened them—The Governor and Council were, or ought to be, the judges of what was, or what was not for the interest of the Company—I was or ought to be the proper judge what was for the honour of his Majesty's troops to be concerned in; and as Meer Jaffer had been but just placed upon the Musnad for the second time, and that the Company's affairs did not require deposing him, nor his own conduct deserve it at that time—I thought it would be neither for the credit of their troops or the honour of the commanding officer, to adopt such a measure—So much was this my opinion, and so well did I know Mr. Vansittart's sentiments upon that subject before I joined the army, that I do not remember I ever said any thing to him about it—These were my reasons for not accepting the King's offer.

Q. Whether the Mogul could have effectually granted the Dewannee to the Company without the Nabob's consent?

A. I think the Mogul could and would have done any thing at that time that I desired him, without the consent of the Nabob—and the Company would have reaped any benefit from that grant of the King's that they pleased, because ever since Cossim Ally Khan had been drove out of the country, the Company themselves have been the Nabob—there has been only a nominal Nabob.

Q. After the battle of Buxar did you receive any letter from the Governor and

Council, acknowledging the merit of your services upon that occasion?

A. I have received several—I imagined that one I received immediately after the battle, is before the Committee.

Q. Did you receive any letter from the Court of Directors here?

A. No; I did not—but the Chairman and Deputy Chairman came to me at my return, to make such acknowledgment.

Q. Did you make any application to the Directors at your return, upon the subject of the jaghire and two lacks?

A. Yes.

Q. What answer had you?

A. I had no public answer.

Letter to Col. Munro, Nov. 6, 1764, read.

Q. Whether for giving up your jaghire of 12,500l. a year, and for the services performed to the Company, you have ever received from the Company any reward whatsoever?

A. None of any kind whatever.

Q. Whether you did not understand from Mr. Spencer (the President at Calcutta) that you should have amends made you by the Company for giving up the jaghire?

A. I do confess that I did; and I also say, that could I have conceived that the Company would have served me so ungratefully in many respects since my arrival from India, I never would have given up my jaghire.

Q. Whether after the battle of Buxar you received any private donations from any of the Eastern Princes?

A. Upon the army encamping at Banaras, the officer who commanded the detachment in the town, wrote me a card, acquainting me that a Rajah had something very particular to communicate to me, and if I granted his request, he would give me four lacks of rupees, and a handsome present to the officer—The request he made me, was to dispossess Rajah Bulwandsing, who was Zemindar from the collection of the country—I told him I would not. I was desired to make no alteration of any kind—About the time I was quitting the army, Bulwandsing hearing I had rejected this offer, came to me, and told me that he was sensible of my favour to him, and begged my acceptance of 80,000 rupees, which is 10,000l.—and except that, from the day I commanded the army, (which was near five years) further than the common customary compliments, which are of small amount, and which I made in my return to others, I solemnly declare I never received a single rupee by way of present, either in money or jewels

jewels—While I had the command of that army, I refused the offers of above 300,000*l.* at different times, for making alterations in the officers of the government—I recollect that at my leaving the country, the Nabob sent 3,000*l.* for me, and 3,000*l.* among the officers of my family, which are the usual presents to the commanding officer.

Q. How long was you in Bengal?

A. From May 1764 to the end of February or beginning of March 1765.

Q. When did the spirit of mutiny first shew itself in the army?

A. Before I came to the command.

Q. Did you levy any contributions at Banaras or else where?

A. I never did lay the country under any contributions of any kind. The merchants of Banaras gave four lacks of rupees to the army for protection to themselves and their effects—I immediately acquainted the Governor and Council with it, to have their sanction for the army to receive it, which is upon the Company's records—and they gave their consent.

Q. Was that the only place where any contribution was given?

A. The only one in my time.

Q. What proportion had you of the four lacks as Commander in Chief?

A. An eighth part.

Mr. Strachey.

Q. Whether you ever heard Lord Clive say that Mr. Spencer had applied to his Lordship to apply to the Nabob for payment of the two lacks of rupees promised to Col. Munro?

A. I never did—and I think that had Mr. Spencer mentioned that circumstance to Lord Clive, it was most probable that his Lordship would have mentioned it to me, who was his Secretary and constantly with him.

General Carnac.

Q. Whether you ever heard Lord Clive say that Mr. Spencer had applied to his Lordship to apply to the Nabob for payment of the two lacks of rupees promised to Col. Munro?

A. I never did—and I had not a doubt till this day but that the Nabob had made Col. Munro such an acknowledgment as his services deserved.

Colonel Munro.

Q. Is not Banaras one of the richest cities in India?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the rate of interest at Banaras?

A. I can't tell—but think it lower there than any where else?

Q. How long was you in quelling the mutiny, and restoring the army to a proper discipline?

A. From the beginning of June to some time in July, when I made the example I have before-mentioned.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Veneris 15^o die Maii 1772.

COLONEL BURGOYNE in the Chair.

Lord Falkstone,	Mr. Ongley,
Sir John Turner,	Mr. Pitt,
Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Fuller,	Lord Clive,
Mr. Strachey,	Mr. Sutton,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Vane,
Mr. Hotham,	

Ordered,

That there be laid before this Committee the correspondence of the servants of the East-India Company one year previous to the march of Surajah Dowla down to Calcutta and till the arrival of Admiral Watson there, so far as relates to any design the Nabob had or might have on that settlement.

Ordered,

That Richard Becher, Esq;—Charles Manningham, Esq;—and John Cooke, Esq;—do attend this Committee upon Monday morning next.

General Carnac.

Q. Was you present at Bengal at the time of the revolution which placed Cossim Ally Khan on the Musnud?

A. I left Bengal in Feb. 1760 with Lord Clive on my return to Europe. On my arrival at St. Helena I had information that the Court of Directors had appointed me Major of their settlement at Bengal and commander of their forces there—In consequence of that information I availed myself of the opportunity of one of the Company's ships that was at St. Helena and went back to Bengal—I arrived in the mouth of the river I think in the beginning of October in that year; but being detained there five or six days by contrary winds, I suppose it was about the 12th or 13th before I arrived at Calcutta—I there received a letter from Mr. Vansittart, who had heard of the ships being in the river, informing me he was gone to Muxadavad with Col. Caillaud and wished me to follow him as soon as possible—I accordingly tarried but a very few days at Calcutta and proceeded up to Mr. Vansittart, in my way to one of the palaces called Moradbag, where Mr. Vansittart was. I of necessity passed by the Nabob's

Nabob's palace while Col. Caillaud and the troops were there, it being the very day of the revolution, in the act of making the revolution, and yet every thing was so quiet that I passed the place without having any idea of the matter—Mr. Vansittart, upon our meeting, informed me of what had been transacted.

Q. Please to state the circumstance relating to Ramnarrain?

A. Ramnarrain was a very able man but very avaricious, and had the credit of being very wealthy, which was motive sufficient for Cossim Ally Khan to have him in his power—he was always an object of jealousy of the Nabob's, and even Meer Jassier wished to have had hold of his treasures. However, Lord Clive had secured him from any injustice of that nature, and it was deemed a proper point of policy to support Ramnarrain. The first orders I received after the victory over the Shawzadda, were, to maintain the engagements which had been observed in Lord Clive's time with respect to protecting Ramnarrain from any violence or injustice on the part of the Nabob—The plea of his being in arrear was the pretext always made use of for oppressing him; but without foundation: for in the frequent conversations I had with Ramnarrain on the subject, he always seemed ready to come to a fair and equitable account. The Governor and Council thought proper afterwards to give me contrary directions respecting that unfortunate man—These stands upon the Company's records a letter from me to the board, shewing the contrariety of their orders and an absolute refusal, while I was at the head of their armies, of doing so dishonourable an act as delivering up this man to his enemy.

Fort William consultation, April 21, 1761, read.

Major Carnac's letter relating to Ramnarrain, read.

The second orders the Governor and Council gave me were to deliver up Ramnarrain, which I absolutely refused—In the interim Col. Coote came and took the command of the army—Col. Coote's pursuing the same measures with respect to Ramnarrain, was an approbation of my conduct, which was very pleasing to me.

Q. At the time you left the army at Patna did you understand that you had a right to quit the service when you thought proper?

A. I certainly had a right in my apprehension to resign the service, except to evade

punishment for any crime I might have been guilty of—or in the face of danger.

Q. Whether you delivered such an opinion to the Presidency at Calcutta?

A. I did and it stands upon record.

Q. Was there then any obligation or covenant between the military servants and the Company to serve for any limited time?

A. I believe there had been instances of inferior officers entering into such covenants, but my commission was sent out without any such stipulation, and I will observe why in justice it ought to be so, for it was in the power of the Governor and Council to dismiss me at their pleasure.

Q. Whether the same liberty did not extend to all the other military servants of the Company, not having entered into covenant?

A. So I have always understood, singly and with the restriction as I have mentioned?

Q. Do you imagine that, if at the time you had resigned, another person exercising the same right at the same time would have rendered an action innocent in itself, criminal by the conduct of another?

A. No; nor men in more than one; as no immediate detriment could have from thence ensued to the service. But I should think myself highly criminal to join in a general combination to resign.

Q. Do you imagine that several persons combining together to do an act that was lawful for each to do separately, would by such combination be guilty of a crime?

A. I do, and for this reason, that general ruin (and more especially in India, where the loss of officers cannot be supplied) would be the consequence of such general resignation.

Q. Do you think that every thing which may be hurtful in its consequences is therefore criminal to do?

A. Where the publick is materially concerned I think so.

Q. Whether your motive for quitting the service was the order you received for giving up Ramnarrain?

A. I did not quit the army, but was ordered down, I believe, with a view of removing every obstacle to the delivering up of Ramnarrain.

Q. Whether you do not think that a breach of the general engagements under which officers served the Company would have warranted a general resignation?

A. I think it may extend to exculpate; but no private considerations can warrant an act when the public safety is at stake.

Sir Eyre Coote—to give an account of the particular circumstances relative to Ramnarrain.

After the campaign was over on the coast of Coromandel, which ended, I believe, in Jan. 1760, I then went down to Bengal. I may say prior to that that I had received a letter from the Governor and Council of Madras to Dec. 1760, informing me of the revolution in Bengal, and there were five lacks of rupees sent from the Nabob Cossim Ally Khan for the payment of the troops acting in the siege of Pondicherry. At that time we were, I believe, three or four months in arrears to our black troops, notwithstanding all the attention the Governor and Council of Madras paid to the supplying us with money. If that money had come in any other way than by a revolution, it would have made me much happier than it did. In my answer to that letter of the 7th, I gave my opinion of my disapproval of that revolution as a measure, I thought, would be productive of the loss of our reputation. Upon my arrival in Bengal I found there were two different parties of the Council, the one that had formed the revolution, and the other that disapproved of it. I was intimately acquainted with the gentlemen of both those parties, and therefore as the affair had happened, however unfortunate I thought it might prove, I made it my business to reconcile the two parties, with a resolution at that time not to interfere in any matter of business or politics, where I thought no honour was to be gained. However, I was over-persuaded by Mr. Vansittart and the other gentlemen (as a measure which they told me they imagined would be of great service to the Company) to go up to the army at Patna. Accordingly I desired they would give me instructions to proceed by.

Instructions to Col. Coote on the Select Committee proceedings, Fort William, April 21, 1761, read.

By this I believe it will plainly appear the Governor and Council had two objects in view in sending me there. The one was the fixing a plan of operations upon the supposition that we should be able to conduct the Mogul to Delhi; the other to procure and protect Ramnarrain in the province of Patna. Upon my arrival at Patna I applied with the closest attention to the business on which I was sent there. I informed the Shah Zadda of the sentiments of the board towards him and the desire the English had to assist him to the utmost of their power, which he seemed very

sensible of and very desirous of having, at the same time desiring that he might be proclaimed and acknowledged by us, as he had been by different powers in Hindostan, and he thought it very extraordinary where he himself resided, there he was not acknowledged. Those matters I communicated to the board to receive their instructions, as will be seen in the course of the correspondence in July. I likewise informed Ramnarrain that I had orders from the Governor and Council to protect him, provided he would settle his accounts with the Nabob; and therefore I desired him immediately to set about it, informing the Nabob of the same, as may be seen in my correspondence with the Governor and Council.

During these transactions I received a letter from the board recommending it to me to proclaim the King. I found that, had I immediately complied with the request of the board, it might prove of fatal consequence to the Nabob, and to the Company at that time; for he had given away several of the best provinces to different people that belonged to him, particularly Purnea; which will likewise be seen in the correspondence. I therefore thought it to the best of my judgment for the advantage of the Company and the Nabob, as it was the Shah Zadda's inclination to let them go to Shujah Dowla. At the same time I had got the Nabob to consent to that measure, and to pay a visit with me to the Shah Zadda. There it was thought advisable by the Nabob and several of the Company's servants who were present, that the Nabob for himself, and I on behalf of the English, should coin the siccas, and acknowledge him Mogul on the day that he should pass the boundary of the province. This he seemed satisfied with, and it was agreed that Major Carnac with part of the army should escort him; the Major informing me in proper time of the day he should join Shujah Dowla, in order that I might keep my promise; the Nabob consenting entirely to this matter, and at the same time agreeing that, if we prosecuted the expedition and settled matters with Shujah Dowla, he would advance the 10 lacks towards the payment of our forces. The King was but a few days gone when the Nabob seemed to alter his sentiments entirely with regard to the promises he had made, and turned his thoughts entirely towards the seizing of Ramnarrain, for whom, if I would give him up, he offered seven lacks and a half of rupees, and whatever I pleased to the gentlemen of my

my family. This I communicated by letter to the Governor and Council, July 17, 1761. The Nabob finding he could not gain his point with regard to Ramnarrain, then thought it necessary to write to the Governor, Mr. Vansittart, the most scandalous invectives and false accusations against me, and was determined that he would not declare the King the day we had both given our words of honour for doing it. He had then a large army encamped on the outside of Patna. I was then in the city, and from the detachments which I had made, and which were sent for the collection of revenues with Major Carnac, I had not then under my command above 150 Europeans, (70 of whom were in the hospitals) and I believe three or four hundred seapoys. I was with this force to protect the city and Ramnarrain, and to defend my own honour. The Nabob knowing my weakness, thought it a proper opportunity to get possession of the city. He applied to me for leave to come into the fort of the city the day before the Shah Zadda was to be proclaimed, (to which I agreed, and he seemed thoroughly satisfied) provided he only brought in the attendants about his person. This he consented to. The night or two before the Mogul was to be proclaimed, he sent me word that he would not proclaim him nor come into the city, unless he had the gates delivered up to him, which I would by no means consent to. At the same time I informed him that I had given my honour for declaring the Mogul on such a day, and I would have it performed in the city, which would not appear proper in the eyes of the country, as he was Subah of the province; and I begged that we might have a conference upon the subject; which he evaded saying, and I was informed by my spies that that very night his camp was all in motion and his artillery brought towards the city.

I sent the next morning to one of his chief ministers to learn the reason of such a movement and the meaning of the Nabob, which he told me was done by Coja Gregore, who was his head general, and he was not afraid to say at the Durbar that it would be productive of mischief. Finding the next night the same movements and disturbances in his camp, I thought it necessary to go the next morning myself, and to see him, if possible. Accordingly I ordered a company of seapoys and a troop of 30 horsemen that I had, to get themselves in readiness by six in the morning; at which hour the next morning I sent Mr. Watts to inform him of my coming. It

was seven before I arrived at his tent, and Mr. Watts informed me that the Nabob was not to be seen; he had sent to him, but had not seen him. I went into the outer tent, taking pistols in my hand for my own security and sat down there, till I should hear farther. As it is a custom in India, when they mean ill to a person that visits them in camp, to cut the tent-cords and let the tent fall on the person they mean to destroy, I desired Captain Iser to place two of the troopers round the tent to prevent any mischief of that kind. Finding the Nabob would not see me, I rode away, and left Mr. Watts to inform him of my business. This the Nabob represented to the Governor and Council as a grievous insult, for which I received several extraordinary letters from the board, which are upon the correspondence together with my answers; and at my return to Calcutta I desired a strict enquiry might be made into the matter, and the enquiry was made.

Fort William consultations, Sept. 28, 1761
—Letter to Col. Coote, read.

I was ordered by the Select Committee to withdraw the protection from Ramnarrain, which I did accordingly. He was soon after murdered and his treasure seized.

Letter, June 18, 1761, to Col. Coote for Ramnarrain's suspension—read.

Col. Coote's letter in answer to ditto, July 17, read.

The withdrawing the protection from Ramnarrain was in effect giving him up to the power of the Nabob.

Adjourned till Monday.

June 18th die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGON in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Sir Wm. Meredith,	Lord Falkstone,
Sir John Turner,	Mr. Vane,
Mr. Ongley,	Mr. Hotham,
Mr. Cornwall,	Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Morton, from the East-India House, presented, pursuant to order, several books and papers.

Letter to George Pigott, Esq; dated July 16, 1756, read.

General letter, Sept. 15, 1756, read.

Letter to the Court of Directors, dated July 18, 1756, from the French factory at Dacca, read.

Charles Manningham, Esq;

In 1756 I was the third in Council and Warehouse-keeper at Calcutta, next to Mr. Drake
S on

on the spot at Calcutta. I think it is not in the power of any man to assign the reasons for the origin of the troubles. We know no part of our conduct at Calcutta that should incense the government against us in any shape. Our troubles commenced in June. Ally Verdi Cawn, the predecessor of Surajah Dowla, died about April preceeding. Surajah Dowla had always the character of a rash, vicious, young man. It was supposed he was tempted from an idea of the place affording great plunder, and we imagine that to be the first occasion of the coming against us. The first accounts we had of his ill intentions towards us was about the beginning of June 1756.

With regard to Kiffindafs—Mr. Drake was in the government of the settlement, Mr. Watts was Chief of Cossimbugar—Kiffindafs, I believe was, at this time in the Dacca part of the country; which about this time, Mr. Watts, as Chief of Cossimbugar, wrote to Mr. Drake to suffer Kiffindafs to land at Calcutta in his way to Muxadavad, by way of refreshment, as his family had been useful to the English. At the time this letter arrived, Mr. Drake was not in Calcutta; this letter was wrote by Mr. Watts, addressed to Mr. Drake: it was sent under cover to me to be opened in the absence of Mr. Drake—(I am not sure whether this period was before or after the death of Ally Verdi Cawn) Kiffindafs landed at Calcutta accordingly, I never saw him—A few days after, when Mr. Drake returned, I delivered him the letter.

Q. Was you upon the spot when Surajah Dowla came down?

A. I was—I believe Kiffindafs was not then in the town.

Q. Did Surajah Dowla make any demand to deliver up Kiffindafs?

A. I don't recollect—if there was it will appear upon the proceedings—It is impossible to give any account of the origin of these troubles. I was at Muxadavad at the time Lord Clive was, in July, when enquiry was made with all possible attention but without success, into the motives of Surajah Dowla's conduct, from his principal officers, and likewise from the officers of his predecessor, from the Sears, and every other person from whom information was likely to be had.

Q. Whether Kiffindafs was really protected or not—and what time he remained in Calcutta after Mr. Drake's return?

A. He was permitted to land, but how long he staid I can't tell.

Q. Did you know or have heard before the

taking of Calcutta that the Nabob demanded Kiffindafs?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he reckoned to be very rich?

A. He was.

Q. Whether it was generally imagined he had brought any of his riches with him?

A. He had a number of boats, and it was supposed that he had treasure with him.

Q. Did you ever hear what became of him?

A. I don't recollect that I did.

Q. Whether Kiffindafs's coming to Calcutta was considered as an escape from the Nabob—Shujah Dowla?

A. It could not be looked upon as an escape; he was coming on his way from Dacca towards Muxadavad where the Nabob was.

Q. Whether when Kiffindafs landed in Calcutta in his way to Muxadavad or Cossimbugar, you think he knew of the death of Ally Verdi Cawn and the succession of Surajah Dowla?

A. I cannot form my opinion on that matter.

Q. Whether it was in Council that you heard the report that the Nabob had formally demanded the delivery of Kiffindafs?

A. I heard at the time Mr. Drake had received a letter from the Nabob to that purport, and had answered that there had been no protection given him farther than permission to land in his way to Muxadavad—I can't say whether it was in Council or Committee that I heard it, but it was in one or the other.

Q. Do you understand that the demand of the Nabob was made before Kiffindafs left Calcutta, or afterwards?

A. I think the letter must have been received while Kiffindafs was in the place.

Q. Do you recollect to have heard of any further demand from the Nabob in relation to Kiffindafs?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you recollect any other demands of any other nature made by the Nabob to the factory?

A. There was a trifling circumstance of a gentleman's erecting a summer-house in his garden, which had been represented to the Nabob as a fortification, which was explained to the Nabob, and a desire expressed that he would send a person to examine it.

Q. Whether the Nabob assigned any reasons for attacking Calcutta at the time he came down?

A.

A. We had no intercourse with the Nabob; the Nabob assigned no cause to my knowledge.

Q. What is your opinion that it is the custom in Bengal that the prime minister of a preceeding Nabob, or his subordinate, should stand forth and be amenable to the powers of the reigning Nabob and not withdraw himself?

A. The nature of the government being arbitrary they actually expect it, but whether it is the custom I can't say.

Q. Whether, if this is refused, the Nabobs usually do not, by all means in their power, endeavour to compel them to be amenable?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Do you recollect any thing with regard to the complaints of tenants of the Mogul being protected by the English in Calcutta?

A. I know of no cause for such complaints.

Q. Whether any such complaint was transmitted to the factory either directly from the Nabob or Mr. Watts?

A. No; I was deputed by the gentlemen of Calcutta to go to Madras. I carried a letter directed to the Governor and Council at Madras, and was commissioned to give them a further account by word of mouth of the affairs of the factory.

Q. Do you know of any messenger of the Nabob's coming to Calcutta upon the subject of protection given to the Nabob's tenants?

A. I know of a messenger coming to Calcutta; the letter was addressed to the President and wrote in Persian. To the best of my remembrance a part of that letter was what I mentioned before, relating to Kiffindass—I don't recollect whether I saw the letter or not.

Q. What was the circumstance of the treatment of the messenger?

A. I believe Mr. Drake, upon the messenger's delivering the letter, ordered him to leave the town.

Q. Was any answer sent by him when he was ordered to leave the town?

A. I believe an answer was sent afterwards, and the purport of it was that Kiffindass was only allowed to land and no protection was given to him.

Q. How long did the messenger stay before he was sent back?

A. I believe a few hours after he delivered the letter.

Q. Was he a man of rank or of low degree?

A. He was a Hircarrah; by name, as I believe, Narranzing.

Q. Whether the answer that was sent was

communicated to the Council, before it was sent, or whether it was sent as Mr. Drake's private letter?

A. It was communicated—the purport of both letter and answer were communicated—I believe the answer was sent after the messenger went away.

Q. Who was the answer sent by?

A. I do not remember.

Q. How long was it after the receipt of the letter that the answer was sent?

A. I can't say. I believe it might be that day or the following day.

Q. Do you recollect any of the contents of the letter?

A. I can't recollect the whole contents of it.

Q. Was it the usual custom when a messenger brought a letter from the Nabob to be ordered to leave the town and no answer sent with him?

A. No.

Q. What was the reason of treating the messenger so?

A. I really cannot assign any reason; for the receipt of the letter was not public, nor was the treatment of the messengers so.

Q. What were the measures the factory took to pacify the Nabob, after they were informed of his hostile intentions?

A. Mr. Drake was repeatedly desired to write to the Nabob to know the cause of his resentment, which I believe he did—I had no doubt but he did.

Q. Did he receive any answer?

A. I believe not—among other methods Coja Wasseed (a merchant of considerable rank and substance, and likewise a tenant of several considerable farms) was requested by letter to apply to the Nabob to know the reason of his resentment, and was desired to act as a mediator upon the occasion—we also desired to be informed, if possible, by means of the Coja Wasseed, whether money was the object in view, and in general requested him to interest himself as well as he could to appease the Nabob.

Q. What was the answer from Coja Wasseed?

A. That it was not in his power to be of use upon the occasion, and that the payment of a sum of money was not the object.—The reason of our applying to Coja Wasseed, was, that we supposed him to be a man of some weight and in favour with the Nabob, from the circumstances of his having entertained him at his house when he was Chuta Nabob.

Q. Was the answer to the letter brought by the Hircarrah approved of by the Committee?

A. There was no consultation taken upon it.

Q. Whether you know or have reason to believe that any sum of money or present was given to Mr. Drake, or any other person, by Kiffindass?

A. I do not know any thing of it; nor have I reason to believe that any were given to Mr. Drake or any other person.

Q. Are you sure that Kiffindass was not received in Calcutta before the death of Ally Verdi Cawn?

A. I am not sure.

Q. Do you remember the purport of Mr. Watts's letter relating to recommending Kiffindass?

A. The letter was to suffer him to land and refresh himself on his way to Muxadavad from Dacca.

Q. Were the contents to permit him to refresh himself in his journey, or was it not to permit him to reside in the town for two months?

A. I cannot recollect.

Q. Whether you do not recollect that there was a particular recommendation of Kiffindass's family, as being particularly serviceable to the English?

A. I cannot recollect the particular purport of the letter in general: it was a warm recommendation of Kiffindass, as the son of Raja Bullub, a man of power and interest at the Durbar, and who might be of service to the affairs of the India Company at the Durbar.

Q. Whether that family had ever any interest at the Durbar after Surajah Dowla came to be Nabob?

A. I can't recollect. (withdrew)

Mr. Sullivan presented, pursuant to order, the state of the Bengal revenues and charges, shewing the gross and nett receipts of land-revenues, and the civil and military charges from May 1765 to April 1770.

Account of the revenues arising to the East-India Company from the northern siccars, according to the last advices.

State of the revenues and duties collected by the East India Company in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, with civil and military charges from May 1765 to April 1770.

Adjourned till to-morrow.

Martis 19^o die Mail 1772.

COLONEL BURGOYNE in the Chair.

Sir John Turner,	Lord Folkestone,
Mr. Trecothick,	Mr. Strachey,
Mr. Vane,	Mr. Fuller,
Mr. Cornwall,	Mr. Burton.

Mr. Becher.

Q. What was the foundation of the opinion that the protection given to Kiffindass was the great reason for S. Dowla's coming down to Calcutta?

A. About the latter end of November or the beginning of December 1755, I was appointed chief of the subordinate factory of Dacca—from that time I did not attend at any of councils that were held at Calcutta; and of course for transactions that passed there I could only be informed by the report of others—At the time the letter of July 18, 1756 was wrote from Dacca, myself and the other gentlemen that signed it with me, were prisoners to the Nabob, and by his permission were allowed to reside in the French factory—For some time before the capture of Calcutta we had no correspondence with the gentlemen of Fort William, but for intelligence we were obliged to trust to the natives of the country, or what the French received from their settlement at Chandernagore—I esteemed it at that time my duty to forward to the Court of Directors, and to the Governor and Council at Madras, such intelligence as I was able by that means to procure; I have since had the greatest reason to believe the accounts transmitted to the Governor and Council at Madras were greatly exaggerated and very fallacious in many particulars—I mean by those fallacious particulars, what was related in an account we got from the French—The report of Kiffindass's being received and protected in Calcutta, being a cause assigned by Surajah Dowla for his displeasure against the English, I heard from numbers of people where I was, as well from the French as the natives: I own I gave credit to it, and therefore did assign that as the principal reason to the Court of Directors.

In relation to the affair of Kiffindass—As far as I recollect to have heard, Kiffindass was received about the latter end of March 1756, and to have remained in Calcutta till the place was taken by Surajah Dowla the 20th of June, at which time he and Omichund were both prisoners in the factory by order of the Governor, as I believe—In the situation the East-India Company were then as merchants, and living under the protection

cession of the country government, I was then, and still am of opinion that neither Kishindas nor any other subject of the Nabob should have been received and protected in our settlement, and I still think that this did give a pretence to Surajah Dowla to shew his resentment or displeasure against the English; but at the same time I am now convinced from the many opportunities I have since had of conversing with those that were at that time principal officers and in high station about Surajah Dowla at Muxadavad, that, even if that pretence had not been given, he would have marched his army down against Calcutta—his object was money: Calcutta was reported to be very rich, and so were the other European settlements of Chander-nagore and Chinsura. Surajah Dowla was a young man, violent, passionate, of great ambition, tinged with avarice, and expected both wealth and honour by attacking the European settlements, or by extorting money from them—This appears from his conduct by the attack of Calcutta, and from the sums he extorted from the French, Dutch, and Danes after the taking of Calcutta.

Q. Did you ever hear of the Nabob's demanding Kishindas, after he was received in Calcutta?

A. I don't recollect that I did before Calcutta was taken, but heard it soon after—I might have heard it before, but don't recollect that I did—My opinion at that time was, that if Kishindas had been delivered up, and a sum of money offered, the Nabob would not have proceeded to the length he did in attacking Calcutta; and I grounded that opinion in a great measure on what had been the former custom of the Nabobs and Princes of that country, when they were displeased with the English.—Alli ver di Cawn, who was a wise Prince, had upon different occasions shewn his displeasure and taken money from them, but appeared always to be at the same time so sensible of the benefit accruing to his country by the trade carried on by the English, that he never proceeded farther than to put a stop to the trade of the English Company; and to place forces round their factories; by which means he always brought them to the terms he pleased.

Q. Do you know the reason why the Governor did protect Kishindas?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you know of any money extorted from the Company by Alli ver di Cawn, or any troubles arising from demands of money previous to the accession of Surajah Dowla?

A. I recollect two instances in my time, when sums of money were taken from the Company by Alli ver di Cawn; the first to the best of my remembrance was in 1744 or 1745, when he made a demand upon all the European settlements in his dominions, and gave as reasons for it, the great expences he was obliged to be at in maintaining a very large army to defend his country, and those who lived under his protection from the Mharattas who used at that time almost annually to invade Bengal—The English Company at that time was obliged to pay three lacks and a half of rupees as well as I remember; and the other European nations in proportion to their trade—Another instance that I recollect was about 1748 or 1749. The Company's trade and business was stopp'd, and forces put round their subordinate factories for several months, in consequence of the complaint of an Armenian, who had freighted goods on a ship under Dutch colours, which ship was taken by Commodore Griffin, or some of his Squadron, and condemned, as I understood, for having French property on board. The Armenian being under the protection of the Nabob of Bengal, made his complaint to the Nabob of the loss of his property, and the Nabob insisted on the English making good to him the loss he had sustained by that capture.—At that time orders from home were peremptorily not to comply with the demands made by the country government; in consequence of which the gentlemen refused to comply with the demands made by the Nabob; but after several months using their endeavours to pacify him, they were obliged to comply.—I suppose the Company looked upon the demand of the three lacks and a half by Alli ver di Cawn as a hostile demand, and I believe the orders I have mentioned were sent out in consequence.

Q. Whether you know or believe, that Mr. Drake or any other person received money or presents from Kishindas for the protection given him?

A. I do not know, nor do I believe that he or any other person did.

(Withdrew.)

Mr. Cooke—was in Bengal in 1756, Secretary to the Governor and Council at Calcutta.

Q. Inform the Committee of what you know relative to the transaction at that time?

A. Alli ver di Cawn, Nabob of the three Provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, died

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on the 9th of April 1772, and Surajah Dowla took possession of his government agreeable to the will and intention of his grandfather, who had even in his life time seated him on the Musnud, and obliged the officers of the Durbar to do him homage as Subah; this paved the way for his being acknowledged and obeyed as such without hesitation or dispute immediately on the death of the old Nabob.—The only shew of opposition that he met with was from the widow of Nawahjis Cawn, who had got a body of men together to secure the wealth she was left in possession of by the death of her husband, in case the young Subah should attempt to seize it. This was soon adjusted, and her troops disbanded upon promise of being left unmolested in her person and riches; by which means all was quiet at the capital, and Surajah Dowla's authority universally established in the dependant provinces, except at Poornea, the Nabob whereof (a relation) refused to trust himself in the hands of the young Subah, and therefore would not come to Moorshedabad, but kept himself in his Provinces of Poornea at the head of his army. This obliged Surajah Dowla to take the field very soon after his accession to the Subahship, and march up as far as Raja Maul to intimidate the Poornean, and force him to come to the Durbar.

Presently after the death of the old Nabob President Drake wrote Surajah Dowla a letter of congratulation on his accession, and desired his favour and protection to the English Company, which was received very kindly, and promises given our Vackeel that he would shew the English greater marks of friendship and esteem than ever his grandfather had done.

About this juncture the Company Packet and the Delawan was received from Madras, by which we found there was the greatest likelihood imaginable of a rupture between us and France, and the Court of Directors particularly recommended to the Governor and Council to be strictly on their guard, and to put their fortifications in the best state of defence they could.—In consequence of these advices, the line of guns towards the River was repaired and strengthened, and some other trifling works erected, particularly a redoubt at Perrin's garden, which had been planted by Colonel Scott. This circumstance is mentioned, as the Soubah made it one of his pretences for attacking the English.

It is necessary to take notice that one Kissindas (who had been in the government's service, as Duan and Naib of Dacca) had embarked himself, his women and effects, on a large number of boats upon the death of Nawahjis Cawn (which happened not long after that of old Ally ver di Cawn) and had sheltered himself from the power of Surajah Dowla in the woods below Dacca, till he heard that his father Radgbullubdas was set at liberty, and seemingly restored to favour—then under pretence of going on a pilgrimage to Saugers or Saggernaut, he landed himself and effects in Calcutta on the 16th of March, in his passage down the River, by permission of the presiding member of the board (Mr. Drake being at Ballasore for his health)—This anecdote is likewise mentioned for the same reason as the reparations to our works, because Surajah Dowla made use of his being suffered to live in Calcutta as another cause of offence; the English giving protection (so he deemed it) to the servants of the government, by his reception of Kissindas in the settlement.

As soon as Surajah Dowla found himself pretty well established in the government, he sent a Hircarrah (messenger) to demand Kissindas; but as the Hircarrah came in a private manner and disguised into the settlement, the President (Mr. Drake being then returned from Ballasore) thought it improper to admit him as a messenger from the Nabob, and ordered him to be turned out of the bounds.

Very shortly after this transaction, the Governor received a letter from the Soubah, signifying his displeasure at our repairing our fortifications or carrying on any new works without first obtaining his permission, and insisted not only on our putting a stop to such works, but on our destroying what was already done.—The Governor's answer not corresponding with the Soubah's impetuosity of temper, and finding that we would not comply with his peremptory orders for destroying our works, he took the sudden resolution of forcing us to a compliance; immediately laid aside his design of crossing the Ganges to bring the Nabob of Purnea to reason, and marched his whole army back to Moorshedabad, having first sent orders to Rejah Doolubram (alias Roy Doolub) to invest our Patory at Cossimbuzar with a body of horsemen.—This step was followed by a total stoppage of all our business at the Aurunges and the other subordinate factories.

The 25th of May we received the first advice of the Nabob's orders for investing Cossimbuzar, and from that time every day brought us fresh intelligence of that factory being surrounded with the Soubah's forces, and that Surajah Dowla absolutely threatened to attack them, if we delayed or refused to destroy the works we had erected at Ca cutta.

Letter after letter was dispatched to the gentlemen to order their Vackeel to remonstrate at the Durbar how unjustly the Soubah proceeded against the English, in suffering their enemies to persuade him they were erecting strong fortifications, when nothing was further from the truth; which the Nabob might be satisfied of, if he would send a person that he could confide in to Calcutta, to see what we were doing and report the same as it really was. Our communication with Cossimbuzar began now to be difficult; and, as our last advices only served to confirm the report of the Soubah's determination to make himself master of that factory first, and after that to march against the Presidency itself, a council of war was summoned on the 5th of June, to consider of the situation of Cossimbuzar factory, and whether it was practicable or advisable to send them a reinforcement. The weakness of our own garrison (which did not then exceed 170 effective men, not above 50 or 60 of whom were Europeans) determined the majority of the officers who assisted at that council to declare in writing, that in their opinion it was imprudent at that juncture to attempt sending up a detachment for reinforcing Cossimbuzar, surrounded as it was by the Soubah's forces.

For the reasons already mentioned, as well as many other substantial ones, the President and Council thought it more eligible to promise obedience to the Nabob's orders than to risk the issue of a quarrel with him at a time we were so ill prepared in every respect for offence or defence. A letter to that purport was accordingly enclosed to Mr. Watts to be delivered to Surajah Dowla; but the ingress to our factory being put a stop to, the chief never received this letter.

While this was doing at Cossimbuzar, the gentlemen were not idle in Calcutta, but exerted their utmost, as things grew to a crisis, to put the place in as good a posture of defence as it was capable of, and dispatched several Pattamans to Fort St. George for assistance. Orders were likewise sent to Dacca and the other subordinates, to call in as much of the Company's money and effects that were outstanding as they could, and to

hold themselves in readiness to embark the same upon the first notice and bring them to Fort William.

On the 6th of June it was currently reported, but nobody knew whence it arose, that Cossimbuzar was delivered up to the Nabob. The Governor thereupon ordered a survey of the town to be made, and the works necessary for its defence to be laid before the board by the officers in garrison, which was accordingly done the next day. The plan was to throw up a few batteries fronting the principal avenues in the town and a line of entrenchment between, which was immediately set about, and every Cooley employed to get it done. The militia were summoned and exercised, and every other measure taken to maintain a siege; in case the Nabob carried things to that extremity. As it was impossible to receive any reinforcement in time, if the Soubah pursued his march to Calcutta immediately, the French and Dutch were applied to for assistance. The Dutch declined giving us any, and the French gasconaded with us, by offering to join their force with ours, if we would quit our own settlement, and carry our garrison and effects up to Chandernagore.

At one o'clock, P. M. of the 7th of June, we received the intelligence of Cossimbuzar factory being surrendered up to Shujah Dowla on the 2d of that month. This intelligence came from Mr. Collet, and therefore removed all doubts concerning the loss of that place, as he was second upon that spot. By this letter it appeared that the chief had been assured, that, if he would wait on the Nabob in person, he might possibly prevent the factory being attacked, which his council thought it more advisable for him to do than to risk the event of a rupture. Mr. Watts met with a very different reception to what he expected; and he and Messieurs Collet and Barson were forced to sign a Mulchulka or obligation, that the Nabob had got prepared. They had been promised their liberty upon signing it, but found there was no faith to be put in the Soubah's word; for, instead of obtaining their liberty, Mr. Collet was remanded back to the factory, and forced to give it up to the commander in chief of the Nabob's troops: after which he was again carried to the camp, and Mr. Watts and he were kept close prisoners, and treated in a very indifferent manner.

The seizing of Cossimbuzar in this treacherous manner and his subsequent proceeding,

ing, plainly indicated the Soubah's intention was no less than the attack of the Presidency and expulsion of the English; for, immediately orders were given to his Generals to march towards Calcutta, and his whole train of artillery was brought into the field. The other Europeans at Chandernagore and Chinsura were called upon to assist his forces in reducing Calcutta, and every body at the Durbar forbid to intercede for the English.

So uncommonly expeditious were the Soubah's forces in their march down to Calcutta, that in about thirteen days after the surrender of Cossimbuzar they began the attack of the Presidency itself, having in that time marched above 160 miles with a heavy train of artillery in the hottest season of the year.

Hostilities began on our part on the 12th of June, by spiking up the cannon at Jannah's fort, (a fortification belonging to the Moors a little below the town) and endeavouring to beat down the walls of that battery, which, however could not be effected on account of the prodigious hardness of the Pacca-work and the vast thickness of the masonry.

While our people were upon this enterprise, a party of the Nabob's troops from Hughly, with five pieces of artillery, arrived, and obliged our men to return to their ships. A second attempt was made two days after to dislodge the Moors from that place, but to no purpose; the cannon from our country ships being too small to make any impression or do any mischief.

Several letters and messages passed between the President and Coja Wazeed, in which the latter was desired to use his influence with the Nabob in our favour, and authorized to compromise matters by giving a sum of money, which was imagined was what the Soubah aimed at, according to the custom of his predecessors, who had frequently squeezed large sums from the Europeans under various pretences; but we were disappointed in our judgment of Surajah Dowla's views, and we quickly found that he was too much exasperated to be appeased by the ordinary method of a present.

On Wednesday the 16th a firing was heard to the northward, which proved to be an attack made upon the redoubt at Perrin's by the van of the Nabob's army, who were advanced as far as Mr. Kelsall's garden at Chilpoor, and were attempting to enter Calcutta on that side, by forcing the post before-mentioned. The reception they met with at this redoubt, obliged them to abandon the

design of entering the town at that avenue, and we found their army had wheeled off to the eastward, towards Dumdumma, which side of our town was quite exposed and defenceless. It was hoped however, that the men they had lost at Perrin's would have cooled their ardour, and have made the Nabob listen to terms of accommodation. All Thursday we were pretty quiet, excepting the disturbance occasioned by a band of robbers attending the Nabob's camp, who had entered the town in several quarters, and plundered every house they came to. The enemy had now entirely surrounded the town, and on Friday the 18th of June, in the morning, attacked the entrenchments on every side with the musqueteers of their army, that had infinitely the advantage of us in this attack, as they could fire upon our men from the tops, windows and verandas of the houses, which stood close to and overlooked our lines and batteries; by which they did a great deal of mischief, and annoyed our people so terribly, that scarce any body could venture to raise his head above the cover of the breast-works, for fear of being killed or wounded; while on our part, we were obliged to spend our fire at random, by pointing our cannon at the houses they were lodged in, without being certain of their doing execution, though it is most probable we must have killed many of the enemy.

The firing was very hot on both sides from eight in the morning till noon, when the enemy slackened and made almost a total cessation of the attack, for what reason we could not tell. In the afternoon they began with more warmth than ever; our people were now extremely fatigued: a great number had been killed, and a far greater wounded. The enemy poured in multitudes from all quarters; there seemed no hopes of defending the lines under all the disadvantages already mentioned: the Moors having possessed themselves of every lodgment that commanded the entrenchments, and having in some places penetrated within our works. In this situation of things it was judged expedient to spike up all the cannon at the fascine batteries and withdraw the military and militia stationed there, nearer to the fort itself, and to abandon the entrenchment. Orders were issued to the several posts for that purpose, and the same put in execution towards the close of the evening.

No sooner was this perceived by the enemy than they possessed themselves of our lines and turned one of our own 18 pounders at

at the gaol battery against the fort; but their little skill in managing artillery prevented their doing much damage with their cannon in any part of the siege; and, had they used their musquetry no better, we might have remained very secure within our walls. They now brought up a few pieces of small cannon to play against the fort from a little battery or breast-work to the south-east; but what annoyed us most of all were the wall-pieces and match-locks which they fixed upon the tops of several houses, that entirely overlooked the fort, and fired with showers of balls from them, and that so incessantly, that it became very dangerous to stir from one part of the factory to another. This evening (the 18th) it was determined to remove our women on board the Daddaley and such other country ships and vessels as were in the river. This embarkation was performed in the dusk of the evening, but with so little order, that many of the ladies (among whom was the Governor's wife) were left behind, and some of them obliged to remain even till the next day for want of boats to carry them off.

It is very easy to imagine the consternation and confusion that was discovered in every countenance, when it was known that in one day the enemy had obliged us to abandon those works on which we had placed our principal dependence, and had flattered ourselves we could have defended till a reinforcement arrived from Madras. The inability of our military affairs appeared now too evident to expect much good from them; and, as the Governor was as little qualified to act in such a situation as the officers, it could not but follow that all command must have been in a manner at an end for want of a proper confidence in those who were to be obeyed. This was actually the case; and, from the time we were confined to the defence of the fort itself, nothing was to be seen but disorder, riot and confusion. Every body was officious in advising, yet no one was properly qualified to give advice. The factory was so crowded with Portuguese, women, and unnecessary people, that it would have been impossible to have found provisions enough for one week, even had our walls and garrison been able to resist the efforts of the enemy. In this situation it was lucky for us the Moors (who never fight in the night) suspended their operations as soon as it was dark, and gave us by that means an opportunity of consulting and debating what was to be done. The majority of the military officers gave it as their opinion, that it was impracticable to

defend the fort with so small a garrison, and so unprovided with stores for a siege against the numerous army of the enemy. The artillery officers reported we had not powder and shot enough for three days. Our bombs and granadoes were of no use; the fuses being spoiled by the dampness of the climate, owing to their being filled some years and never looked into afterwards. Thus circumstanced, a retreat to our ships was by every body judged the most eligible step that could be taken; but the dispute was whether that retreat ought to be made immediately under favour of the night, or deferred till the next day, and in what manner to conduct a general retreat without confusion or tumult. It was at last resolved to defer the retreat till the next night, and that all the next day should be employed in embarking the Portuguese, women, and our most valuable effects, by which means we should evade the disorder we dreaded. Had this plan been strictly adhered to and rightly executed, a number of lives would have been saved, and all those dreadful and melancholy consequences prevented, which afterwards happened. Mr. William Baillie (one of the council) who exerted himself upon all occasions in a most disinterested and generous manner, undertook to see the women and effects sent away, and began the embarkation of the first early on Saturday morning. The enemy renewed their attack with the break of day, and cannonaded the fort very briskly from two or three different batteries, besides keeping up a very hot fire from the tops of the houses with their wall-pieces and shambingees. The Moors pressed on so close and in such multitudes, that it was judged most prudent to call in all the out-posts (for we had occupied the church and a few of the adjacent houses all the preceding night) to prevent their being cut off. The party stationed in Mr. Cruttenden's house upon leaving it set fire to it, to prevent the enemy from making a lodgment there, as it stood within forty yards of the factory walls, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the Company's house likewise in flames (done as we imagine by the enemy) which stood as near the walls on the other side.

Unluckily no orders relating to the intended general retreat had been published; and, as the resolution of retreating was known by the whole garrison by report, without the method which had been planned for putting it in execution, many of the inhabitants imagined that every body was to

shift for himself, and endeavour to get on board such vessel as he conveniently could. Upon this presumption several left the factory and made their retreat to the ships; which being observed, they were followed by many others, some of whom had been even present at the consultation in which the plan of the retreat had been settled; but, concluding the former scheme was altered for considerations to them unknown, they made the best of their way to the ships lying off the fort. To add to the general confusion, between nine and ten o'clock, the *Doddale* (on board of which ship were Messieurs M. and T.) weighed her anchor and dropt down to Surman's garden; the Captain of her, it seems, being apprehensive of her being burnt by the fire arrows (or rockets) discharged by the enemy, upon the vessels in the river. No sooner was this perceived, than every ship and sloop followed the example, and weighing their anchors, left the station they might have been of the greatest service in, by affording an asylum to the garrison at their retreat. This ill-judged circumstance occasioned all the uproar and misfortunes that followed; for the moment it was observed, many of the gentlemen on shore (who perhaps never dreamt of leaving the factory till every body did) immediately jumped into such boats as were at the factory stairs, and rowed to the ships; the Mangers and Dandys of the boats we had secured, seeing the universal confusion that prevailed, and that the ships were dropping down the river, thought the danger much greater than it really was, and began to consult their own safety, by leaving the shore and rowing away as fast as they could, either to the ships or to the river, maugre all that could be said or done to prevent them. Among those who left the factory in this unaccountable manner, were the Governor, Mr. Drake, Mr. Mackett, Capt. Commandant Minchin, and Capt. Grant. In less than a quarter of an hour, those who persevered in defending the fort, found themselves abandoned by all the seniors of council and the principal military officers, and had the mortification to see themselves deprived of the means of retreating by the desertion of the ships and boats. As soon as it was known that the Governor had left the factory, the gate towards the river was immediately locked to prevent any further desertion, and the general voice of the garrison called for Mr. Holwell to take the charge of their defence upon him—A council being hastily summoned, Mr. Pearkes

(the senior then on shore) waved his right to the government in favour of Mr. Holwell, who thereupon acted in all respects as Commander in Chief, and exerted his utmost to encourage every one. Signals were now thrown out from every part of the fort for the ships to come up again to their station, in hopes they would have reflected, after the first impulse of their panic was over, how cruel as well as shameful it was, to leave their countrymen to the mercy of a barbarous enemy; and, for that reason, we made no doubt they would have attempted to cover the retreat of those left behind, now they had secured their own; but we deceived ourselves, and there never was an effort made in the two days the fort held out after the desertion, to send a boat or vessel to bring off any part of the garrison.

All the 19th the enemy pushed on their attack with great vigour, and having possessed themselves of the church, (not 30 or 40 yards from the east curtain of the fort) they galled the garrison in a terrible manner, and killed and wounded a prodigious number. In order to prevent this havoc as much as possible, we got up a quantity of broad cloth in bales, with which we made traverses along the curtains and bastions; we fixed up likewise some bales of cotton against the parapet, which were very thin and of brick-work only, to resist the cannon-balls, and did every thing in our power to baffle their attempts and hold out, if possible, till the *Prince George* (a Company's ship employed in the country) could drop down low enough to give us an opportunity of getting on board.

This ship had in the commencement of hostilities (on the 16th) been ordered up to Perrin's to assist that redoubt, in case the enemy made a second attack, but afterwards they wheeled their army round towards Dumdumna; the party at that post was withdrawn, as no longer necessary, and the *Prince George* directed to fall down to her station opposite the south-east bastion of the fort; she was in sight about noon on the 19th, and was now the only glimmering hope left us to escape falling into the hands of the Moors. Our situation and distress was therefore communicated to the commander of her, Thomas Hague, and he positively directed to bring his ship as near the fort as he could without loss of time—These instructions were transmitted on board by the hands of Messrs. Pearkes and Lewis, and we began now to entertain some expectation of making a general re-

treat, notwithstanding what had happened in the morning—but it was otherwise determined by providence; for by some strong fatality the Prince George run aground a little above the factory, owing to the pilot's misconduct, who lost his presence of mind, and was never after got off.

The enemy suspended their attack, as usual, when it grew dark; but the night was not less dreadful on that account; the Company's house, Mr. Cruittenden's, Mr. Nixon's, Dr. Knox's, and the Marine yard were now in flames, and exhibited a spectacle of unspeakable terror; we were surrounded on all sides by the Nabob's forces, which made a retreat by land impracticable, and we had not even the shadow of a prospect to effect a retreat by water, after the Prince George run aground.

On the first appearance of dawn, on the 20th of June, the besiegers renewed their cannonading.—They pushed the siege this morning with much more warmth and vigour than ever they had done—about eight o'clock they attempted to break into the factory by means of some windows in the eastern curtain, which we had neglected to brick up. While every body was intent on repelling this onset, an alarm was spread that the enemy were scaling the north-west bastion. Part of the garrison was thereupon detached to prevent this attempt, and the hottest fire ensued for about two hours we had yet seen on both sides. The besiegers at length gave over their efforts and retired with great loss; but they continued to cannonade very briskly from their batteries, and with their wall-pieces and musquetry did infinite mischief.

It was now esteemed most eligible to endeavour to pacify the Nabob's resentment and supplicate his forgiveness by the mediation of Memckehund, his principal minister, to whom Omichund, by Mr. Holwell's direction, wrote a letter requesting him to intercede in our behalf, and prevail upon Surajah Dowla to desist from prosecuting the attack, and suffer us to carry on our business as usual under his protection. An Armenian undertook to carry the letter to Memckehund, and was suffered to pass, but we never received any answer.

About noon there was a sudden cessation of firing on the enemy's part, from whence we conceived some hopes that Omichund's letter had been delivered and was likely to produce the effects we wished for—About four o'clock, a Serjeant, stationed on the front gate of the factory, came to Mr. Hol-

well and informed him, that one of the Nabob's people had slipped into the street, and with his hand made signs for us to desist firing. This circumstance gave great satisfaction and seemed to promise a favourable end of our troubles and distress.

Orders were accordingly given for a suspension of hostilities on our part, but in less than half an hour intelligence was brought to Mr. Holwell, that the enemy was crowding in great numbers under the walls of the fort to the eastward and southward; whereupon he hastened up himself to the south-east bastion to view their motions, directing every one to be at their quarters; by this time the besiegers were suffered to advance close up to the foot of the walls without a single musquet being fired upon them, and Mr. Holwell, still imagining that every thing would be compromised, forbade all acts of hostility, notwithstanding the enemy pressed in such multitudes upon us; by way of capitulation or conference, he waved a flag of truce, which not being understood by the Moors, no regard was paid to it: and while this was transacted to the eastward, a body of the enemy scaled the north-west bastion, as did another party to the southward, where the wall was low, and drove our people from their stations there—As soon as this was known, a Dutchman of the artillery company broke open the back-door of the factory, and with many others attempted to make their escape that way. The besiegers now poured in in great numbers from all parts, and Mr. Holwell finding how things were circumstanced and how impracticable it would be to drive the enemy out of the fort, now that so many had penetrated within the walls, with the west gate of it open, and considering that further opposition would not only be fruitless, but might be attended with bad consequences to the garrison, he and Capt. Buchanan delivered up their swords to a Jammadar that had scaled the walls, and seemed to act with some authority among the Moors; this example was quickly followed by every body, who threw down their arms, and by that act surrendered themselves prisoners at discretion. The factory was in a few minutes filled with the enemy, who without loss of time began plundering every thing they could set their hands on; we were rifled of our watches, buckles, buttons, &c. but no further violence used to our persons. The bales of broad cloath, chests of coral, plate and treasure, lying in the apartments of the gentlemen who resided in the factory, were

were broke open, and the Moors were wholly taken up in plundering, till the Subah entered the fort, which was a little after five in the afternoon, carried in a kind of a litter. His younger brother accompanied him in another. Surajah Dowla seemed astonished to find so small a garrison, and immediately enquired for Mr. Drake, with whom he appeared much incensed. Mr. Holwell was carried to him with his hands bound, and upon complaining of that usage, the Nabob gave orders for loosing his hands, and assured him upon the faith of a soldier, that not a hair of our heads should be hurt. The Nabob then held a kind of Durbar in the open area, sitting in his litter, when Kiffindass who had been kept a prisoner by us during the siege, was sent for and publicly presented with a scerpaw or honorary dress. The Armenians and Portuguese were set at liberty, and suffered to go to their own houses. Between six and seven Surajah Dowla left the fort, the charge whereof was given to Memckchand as Governor. They searched every part of the house to prevent treachery; and, in the dusk of the evening, the Mussulmen sung a thanksgiving to Allah for the success they had met with.

Hitherto we had fared extremely well, and as we had been unmolested in our persons, so long our apprehensions of ill usage and barbarity began to vanish; and we entertained hopes not only of getting our liberty, but being suffered to re-establish our affairs, and carrying on our business upon the terms the Subah had pointed out in the Mulchulka. Messieurs Walls and Collet were forced to sign. But these hopes and expectations were very soon changed into as great a reverse as human creatures ever felt. The circumstances of the Black Hole affair, with all the horrors of that night, are so well known, and so much surpass any description that words can paint it in, that I shall say no more upon that subject, than that a little before, we were all of us ordered to withdraw and remain in a place contiguous to the Black Hole, where our soldiers were usually confined in the stocks. While we were wondering what this should mean and laughing at the oddity of it, a party of fellows came and ordered us to walk into the place before-mentioned, called the Black Hole: a room or rather dungeon eighteen feet long and fourteen wide, with only two holes barricaded with iron bars, to let in air, which opened into a low piazza, where a guard was set. Into this hole we were forcibly

crammed about eight in the evening, and the door immediately locked upon us. The number of souls thrust into this dungeon were 150, among which were one woman and 12 of the wounded officers. The heat and stench presently grew intolerable. Some of our company expired very soon after being put in; others grew mad, and having lost their senses, died in a high delirium. All we could urge to the guard set over us, we could not prevail upon them either to set us at liberty or separate us into different prisons, which we desired and offered money to obtain, but to no purpose. We were released at eight o'clock next morning, and only 22 came out alive.

Q. Do you remember the terms of the Mulchulka signed between Mr. Watts and the Nabob?

A. To the best of my remembrance it was that we should carry on trade as other merchants and without any advantage from our Phirmaund.

Q. Whether you have reason to believe that any money or other present was offered or given by Kiffindass for the protection given him?

A. I do not know or believe that any money or present of any kind whatever was given by Kiffindass or any of his friends, directly or indirectly, to the Governor or any other member of the Committee.

Q. What answer did the Dutch and French factories return to Surajah Dowla's application for assistance?

A. I believe they declined to assist him.

Q. Did Mr. Drake refuse to deliver up Kiffindass to the Nabob?

A. I really believe he did.

Q. Were Omichund and Kiffindass prisoners?

A. Omichund was a prisoner, but I am not sure whether Kiffindass was kept in the factory against his consent or not. The reason of Omichund's being a prisoner, was, that Mr. Drake suspected his being a fomentor of the troubles.

Q. What offence did the Nabob charge Kiffindass with when he demanded him?

A. Only that he was tenant of the Sircar. I don't know of any other tenant or officer of the country government that was protected at Calcutta. I do not believe that the Nabob had any intention of a massacre, when he confined us in the Black Hole, but merely an intention to confine us for the night, without knowing whether the prison was great or small.

Q. When the prisoners were released from the Black Hole, was not Mr. Holwell and some others immediately carried before the Nabob, put in irons and sent prisoners to Muxadavad?

A. Mr. Holwell was carried before the Nabob; and I heard afterwards that he and three or four other gentlemen were put in irons, sent up the country and very hardly treated.

Q. Whether you heard that the Nabob expressed any concern at the catastrophe that had happened in the Black Hole?

A. I never heard that he expressed the least concern about it, but always understood that he received the account with a total indifference.

Q. Whether the Nabob did not ask Mr. Holwell where the treasures were?

A. I understood Mr. Holwell was carried before him for that purpose, and that he was extremely surprized to find the treasury so low. There were not above five thousand pounds in the Company's treasury.

Q. Whether, when Calcutta was re-taken, was not every thing found in the settlement restored to the owners?

A. Every thing was restored to those who would make out their claim to it. The army and navy did not touch any part of it. What was found was not of great value. There was a good deal of the Company's cloth, but very little private property.

Q. What became of the other prisoners?

A. Those, who were not confined with Mr. Holwell, were set at liberty.

Q. Whether upon the loss of Calcutta, a general bankruptcy ensued in the English settlements in Bengal?

A. I believe that, excepting one gentleman, who had remitted a part of his fortune home, there was not a man that was not ruined.

Q. Whether upon the capture of Calcutta the loss of the Company was not very great?

A. The loss of the Company was very great.

Q. Whether you apprehend the restitution that was afterwards made was equivalent to the loss?

A. It was supposed to be more than equivalent. A great quantity of the Company's goods were restored at the re-capture, both in Calcutta and other places. Whatever came into the hands of the Sircar was delivered up again.

Letters from Messrs. Watts and Collet,

dated Chandernagore, July 16, 1756, in part read.

Part of President Drake's defence, No. 9, read.

Adjourned till Friday.

Veneris 22^o die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOMAST in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Vane,	Mr. Pitt,
Lord Folkestone,	Mr. Sutton,
Mr. Curzon,	Mr. Trecothick,
Mr. Johnstone,	Sir Gilbert Elliot,
Mr. Rice,	Mr. Cornwall,
Mr. Strachey,	Mr. Fuller.

General letter to Bengal, April 27, 1763, read.

Letter from Secret Committee in London to Select Committee in Fort William, Dec. 30, 1763, read.

General Consultations, April 20, and May 17, 1764, read.

Part of Ramchurn's trial read.

Ordered,

That there be laid before this Committee copies of the opinions of the different lawyers employed by the East India Company on the subject of Lord Clive's jaghire.

Adjourned till Monday.

Lunæ 25^a die Maii 1772.

Colonel BURGOMAST in the Chair.

P R E S E N T,

Mr. Johnstone,	Mr. Cornwall,
Lord Folkestone,	Mr. Strachey,
Lord Clive,	Mr. Curzon,
Mr. Ongley,	Ld. George Germain.

Lord Clive observed, concerning the account laid before the Governor and Council by Roy Dullab, in which is an article of five per cent. received by him (Roy Dullab) on a present of 25 lacks of rupia, given by the Nabob to his Lordship, that to the best of his recollection, Roy Dullab, who was the Nabob's Prime Minister and Treasurer, received a commission of five per cent. upon all the treaty money, except that to the army and navy, upon all the Company's money, and also upon all the separate donations to those individuals, as well Blacks as Europeans, who had been particularly useful in the revolution, some of whose names were mentioned in his Lordship's evidence on the 28th of April, that those separate donations must be included in the 25 lacks specified in Roy Dullab's account—Lord Clive having been the principal person, he imagines was the occasion

nominal, who the whole of his salary was put under his name, though his proportion was only what had been already ordered by the Legislature. And it is certain, that the addition of five per cent. a commission for the Public, was made from every body's contribution, and so from Lord Clive's.

Mr. Whittier presided, pursuant to order of the directors of Mr. Yerke, Mr. Hilditch, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Cooney, Mr. Sayer, Mr. T. H. Jones, Mr. Denning, Mr. Ryce, and Mr. Fletcher Norton's, on the subject of Lord Chichester.

1. Interpretation - The first step in the process of interpretation is to identify the text to be interpreted. This is done by reading the text and identifying the main ideas and themes. The next step is to analyze the text, looking for key words and phrases that may have specific meanings. This is followed by a comparison of the text to other texts, looking for similarities and differences. Finally, the text is interpreted, meaning that the meaning is explained and the text is put into context.

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concern about it, but always understood that

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What is the capital of Colorado?

4. The fact of the Company's loss.

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1943

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